



**FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES**  
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**Volume XI**  
**Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington

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## **Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath**

### **276. Summary Record of the 40th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, February 5, 1963, 4 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. IV, 38-42, 1/25/63-3/29/63. Top Secret. The meeting was in two parts, the first on Cuba, the second on Europe. Only the first part is printed here. The meeting, held at the White House, lasted until 5:30 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)

Director McCone circulated copies of the attached memorandum on the status of Soviet military forces in Cuba./1/

/1/February 5. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

The President asked that the U.S. Intelligence Board statement of the Cuban situation be sanitized and made public tomorrow/2/ and similar statements at frequent intervals thereafter. He said it should include the latest intelligence information. In releasing it, Mr. McCone should make clear that the Board wanted to receive all information from anyone who had it. The Board would thus be in the position of welcoming information from all sources with a view to obtaining the best picture of the Soviet military posture in Cuba. The President also asked Mr. McCone to ask Congressman Bruce for the information which he has. In the President's view, if we acted promptly in putting out all our information within the next two or three days, we would be able to stem the tide of Congressional criticism, turn it to our advantage, and reduce the problem to manageable proportions. Secretary McNamara felt that the President should make a press statement at his press conference Thursday/3/ or possibly a television show should be arranged. He said the briefing on our intelligence from Cuba would be very impressive and, by the use of aerial reconnaissance pictures, we could reveal how extensive our present surveillance efforts have been and now are.

/2/The statement, February 6, was made public by McCone. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Cuba, Cuba Intelligence) See the Supplement. On February 6 at 3 p.m., Secretary McNamara gave a special briefing at the Department of State on Soviet military presence in Cuba. The text of the 51-page briefing, including questions and answers, is in Washington National Record Center, RG 330, OSD-McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, Cuba.

/3/The President answered five questions on the topic at his press conference on Thursday, February 7. For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963*, pp. 148-155.

General Taylor noted that Congressional hearings on the Defense Department budget had turned into a Congressional investigation on Cuba. Most of the time Secretary McNamara has spent on the Hill was taken by

Cuban questions rather than military budget problems.

The President said the way to clarify the numbers problem was to refer to the level of Soviet military forces in Cuba in July, in November, and today, rather than to compare the level from July to today. He suggested that correspondents from the Hill and the State Department be invited to join those covering the Defense Department for briefings about the situation in Cuba. He said that the 4500 Russian troops which have been withdrawn from Cuba since about November 1st is conclusive proof that there is not a Soviet military buildup in Cuba. He suggested that General Carroll's briefing on Cuba might be made public. In addition, a backgrounder could be held following Director McCone's statement to the Congressional Committee.

With regard to questions put to military officers concerning the implications of the Soviet military presence in Cuba, the President stressed the importance of speaking with one voice. He said we should neither exaggerate nor minimize the Soviet presence in Cuba but it was important that military and civilian officials take the same line. He acknowledged that we do not know why the Russians are keeping their troops in Cuba. They may think we are planning an invasion and therefore want their troops there. On the other hand, they may be keeping their troops in Cuba in order to control Castro.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that domestic partisan pressure for an invasion of Cuba can be dealt with by pointing out that the previous Administration did not invade Cuba when it would have been easy to do, i.e. before the Soviet buildup. Now, the cost of invasion would be greatly increased.

The Attorney General expressed his concern that in all statements about Soviet military presence in Cuba we should not forget to include a caveat that we may not be seeing everything going to Cuba. He did not think we should take the risk of being accused later of not having seen something in Cuba now which turned up there in the future. He also was uneasy about the prospect of our helping the Russians by giving the public everything we know about Soviet military presence in Cuba. In response to the President's question, he suggested that release of sanitized intelligence information be done via Congressional Committees rather than directly to the public.

The President pointed out that his efforts along with those of the Departments of State and Defense had been unsuccessful in convincing many people that we knew exactly what was going on in Cuba. He said he believed a new effort should be made, namely, to use the USIB in the hope that doubting citizens would accept the testimony of our top intelligence officials. He repeated his belief that we should go as far as we possibly can in making public intelligence information in an effort to get the situation under control this week. Thereafter, we might talk to responsible Congressional Committee chairmen, proposing a procedure somewhat similar to that suggested by the Attorney General.

#### Cuban Reconnaissance

The President called attention to reports that a Soviet incoming ship would arrive on February 8th loaded with what was suspected to be military equipment. He noted the request of KOMAR/4/ for low-level reconnaissance flights in order to be certain that we knew the exact nature of the cargo of this Soviet ship./5/ The President said he felt there are two limitations on our use now of low-level reconnaissance missions; (a) negotiations to obtain the release of U.S. prisoners in Cuba, which he understood might be successfully concluded sometime in early March, and (b) possible withdrawal of Soviet military personnel. Low-level flights might influence a Soviet decision involving the removal of their troops from Cuba. The Russians might misread low-level reconnaissance flights as an indication of our preparing ourselves for military action in Cuba and decide that their forces must remain to counter anticipated U.S. actions. He requested that a letter to Khrushchev be drafted raising again the question of when the Russians plan to pull back their troops.

/4/The abbreviation is incorrect, it should be COMOR (Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance).

/5/In McCone's record of this meeting he recounted that he expressed one reservation on low-level flights: the

effect on the Donovan mission. In response to a question from the President, McCone answered that the Simferopol was under careful surveillance. If the ship offloaded at Havana, low-level reconnaissance would not be productive because of the proximity of receiving warehouses to the dockside. If the ship docked at Matanzas or Mariel, low-level photography would be productive. (Memorandum for the record by McCone, February 6; Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963)

Director McCone said he wished to reserve on the low-level recommendation until we knew whether the incoming Russian ship would dock at Havana or Mariel. If it came into Havana, the problem of knowing the nature of the cargo was much more difficult than if it docked at Mariel where facilities were such that its cargo would have to be displayed on the dock and thereby visible to high-level cameras.

Secretary McNamara said that the USIB had listed twenty-one targets in Cuba which they wish to cover with low-level reconnaissance missions involving fourteen sorties. He said the risk of the loss of a low-level U.S. plane is very slight, but the risk of a strong Soviet and Cuban reaction is very high. In addition to the two limitations mentioned by the President, Secretary McNamara thought a low-level flight might initiate escalating actions which would place in jeopardy our current high-level reconnaissance flights. He said he saw no military need for the low-level flights but did recognize that there was a domestic political problem which had to be met. In his view, low-level flights are justified only under two circumstances; (a) when we have reason to suspect that offensive weapons are being reintroduced into Cuba, and (b) when we are preparing for an invasion and must have current information in order to do our military planning.

General Taylor acknowledged that there was a military need to know but not necessarily tomorrow. He agreed with Secretary McNamara that there was very little risk of one of our planes being shot down. He also referred to the requirement that our intelligence be kept up to date so that we could keep our invasion plans current. With respect to intelligence on incoming Soviet ships, he said the Chiefs felt less strongly about the need for intelligence and were prepared to recommend low-level flights on a case-by-case basis. He acknowledged that once a Soviet ship was in harbor we obtained a great deal of information from agents in Cuba.

The President decided that we should send a letter to Khrushchev on the Soviet troop withdrawal problem but not undertake low-level reconnaissance flights until we knew where the Soviet ship would dock.

Director McCone said that the intelligence community was very concerned about unexplained military activity taking place on Cape Francis, an island some ten miles offshore Cuba. He suggested that a low-level flight over this area would be highly useful but added that he shared the views expressed by Secretary McNamara and General Taylor as regards the U.S. prisoners in Cuba. He said he suspected that Donovan would be concerned if he were asked what effect such flights would have on his negotiations.

The President said we would decide on the reconnaissance missions on Friday. His current view was that if the Soviet ship went to Mariel we should probably overfly it. If we carried out this mission, we should probably also overfly Cape Francis.

#### Shipping Order

Mr. Bundy summarized the instruction to U.S. agencies which would prohibit the shipment of U.S.-owned goods on Free World ships engaged in the Cuba trade. The President approved the directive and agreed that its release should be made from the White House./6/

/6/See Document 277.

Deputy Under Secretary Johnson reported that the proposed action had been explained to numerous Congressmen who, in general, felt it was a proper action to take. He also reported that efforts would be made to

explain the directive to the International Longshoreman's Association in the hope that this Union and labor in general would not frustrate the implementation of the directive by refusing to accept it as an adequate measure to take against Cuba.

Bromley Smith/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**277. National Security Action Memorandum No. 220**

Washington, February 5, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 220. No classification marking. Copies were sent to the members of the Executive Committee.

TO

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Agriculture

The Secretary of Commerce

The Administrator, Agency for International Development

The Administrator, General Services Administration

SUBJECT

U.S. Government Shipments by Foreign Flag Vessels in the Cuban Trade

At its meeting on February 5, 1963, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council considered United States policy with respect to shipments financed by the Departments of State, Defense, and Agriculture, General Services Administration, and the Agency for International Development on foreign flag ships engaged in the Cuba trade./1/ The President approved the recommendation that such cargoes should not be shipped from the United States on a foreign flag vessel if such vessel has called at a Cuban port on or after January 1, 1963. The President agreed that an exception may be made as to any such vessel if the persons who control the vessel give satisfactory assurance that no ships under their control will, thenceforth, be employed in the Cuba trade so long as it remains the policy of the United States Government to discourage such trade. The Secretary of State is to be consulted on the form and content of any such assurances.

/1/See Document 276.

The Secretaries of State, Defense, and Agriculture, the Administrator of AID, and the Administrator of GSA were directed to take such steps as may be necessary to carry out this policy.

The Secretary of Commerce is to make available to the appropriate Departments current pertinent information which he may have on ships engaged in the Cuba trade.

McGeorge Bundy

## **278. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, February 6, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963. Secret; Eyes Only.

On February 5, DCI met with Secretaries Rusk, McNamara and Ball to discuss the COMOR proposal for low-level overflights. There was a lack of agreement. Secretary McNamara explained the plan for seven sorties (utilizing 14 planes) to cover all of the targets. This was exclusive of the COMOR recommendations for covering the unloading of ships by day and night. McNamara did not advocate the program but merely explained it. DCI advocated the program; Rusk stated he did not advocate it but did agree to the mission over Cayo Francis.

McCone stated he felt the situation in Cuba was more ominous than thought by many in the Administration./1/ He felt that if the Soviets wished merely to control Castro and to maintain Cuba as a base for infiltrating Latin America, they could do so at much less cost and with much less provocation than the present program. He therefore warned that in his opinion we could expect a more ominous situation relative to Cuba--perhaps the introduction of offensive weapons again. DCI said that Khrushchev had taken one step backward, we could expect him to take two steps forward surreptitiously.

/1/At the White House daily staff meeting on February 7, Bundy noted that McCone "was something between concerned and angry because some of Secretary McNamara's statements did not agree with some of his (McCone's) statements already on record." Bundy appeared worried that this could result "in the first big, internal, high-level personality clash of this administration." Bundy himself said the difference in their views "was a simple reflection that McCone is afraid of the military situation in Cuba while McNamara is not." (Memorandum for the record by Lawrence Legere, February 7; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, February 1963)

At 11:30 DCI met with the President and Mr. Bundy. The discussion revolved around conditions in Cuba and the presentation to be made to the Executive Committee later in the afternoon./2/ McCone repeated his concern about the situation in Cuba, also the danger of either threatening to halt or actually halting our U-2 reconnaissance. The President said that would bring a new confrontation and that as far as he was concerned would require action. McCone said he felt that both Rusk and McNamara did not share this determination. It was agreed that the DCI should make a public statement on the situation in Cuba, and the President ordered a statement prepared./3/

/2/See Document 276.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 276.

John A. McCone/4/

Director

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## **279. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Secretaries of the Army (Vance), Navy (Korth), and Air Force (Stahr)**

Washington, February 8, 1963.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban Volunteer Program. Confidential.

## SUBJECT

Armed Forces Training Program for Members of the 2506 Cuban Brigade

The attached military training program/1/ for members of the 2506 Cuban Brigade, is approved. The Secretary of the Army, as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for all aspects of Cuban policy, will direct implementation of this program by the Services. The military departments will be prepared to begin processing both enlisted and officer Brigade members by 25 February 1963.

/1/Attached, but not printed.

It is recognized that adequate personnel standards must be maintained, but the objectives of this program must not be frustrated by unduly rigid adherence to current high induction standards. The age limit for induction of enlisted men of the 2506 Cuban Brigade for the attached program will be 18 through 34. The age limit for commissioning Brigade officers will be 21 through 45. Notwithstanding existing Service policies and regulations concerning temporary appointments of non-declarant aliens as commissioned officers, Brigade personnel who apply for officer training and who meet stated requirements will be commissioned in the Service of their choice as ensigns or second lieutenants.

After completion of training, Brigade members who desire to continue on active duty will be permitted to do so if they qualify and are selected. Enlisted trainees who, upon completion of their training, do not continue on active duty may be discharged or, if they desire and are qualified, will become members of the standby Reserve. Officers who, upon completion of their training, do not continue on active duty will be released or, if they desire and are qualified, will become members of the standby Reserve.

The Air Force will conduct all English language training provided for in the attached program.

The Army will induct Brigade members from age 35 through 50 who volunteer and meet appropriate qualifications for a special eight week military training program. Upon completion of this training program, such inductees, if they desire and are qualified, will become members of the standby Reserve.

The Miami Armed Forces Induction and Examining Station will provide for group processing of Brigade members and for their transportation to designated training centers.

Funding and manpower requirements resulting from implementation of the program will be absorbed by the military departments. Expenditures in connection with this program should be identified separately.

Robert S. McNamara/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.

## **280. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, February 9, 1963, 3 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CUBA-US. Secret. Drafted by Gutherie and approved in S on February 18. The meeting took place in Rusk's office and lasted approximately 45 minutes. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)

## SUBJECT

Cuba

## PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador

John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV

The Secretary told the Ambassador that Cuba is still a troublesome problem. In his talk with Ambassador Dobrynin at lunch on February 8, Ambassador Kohler had referred to Cuba as something that was poisoning our relations./1/ This was an accurate statement. President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev understand that the United States has no desire or intention to invade Cuba. It was not possible, however, to make a wholly unqualified commitment concerning the future, as this depends on the attitude of the Cuban Government. If Cuba wishes to live in peace then there will be peace in the Caribbean. However, we were not encouraged by the way in which Castro has attempted since January to whip up violence in Latin America. Subversive activities in Venezuela and elsewhere make the future very uncertain. As for the Soviet presence in Cuba, the United States is concerned over the fact that the movement of Soviet forces out of Cuba has stopped while additional military equipment continues to enter the island. We had supposed that the troops connected with the operation and protection of the missiles which had been emplaced in Cuba would be removed. Evidently some Soviet troops had been sent there initially to protect these weapons but these troops were still there although the weapons had been removed. Training was clearly not the mission of these troops as there are few Cubans to be found where the Soviet forces are. The presence of these troops contributes to the heightened tensions in our relationship. Therefore, we hope that the Soviet Government will find it possible to reduce tensions by making it clear there is no Soviet military build-up in Cuba and that there is an intent to further reduce the number of Soviet forces there, as Khrushchev had indicated would be the case. The Secretary had noted a press report of a conversation which Khrushchev had had with a Canadian businessman in which Khrushchev had stated all the Soviet troops in Cuba were on a training mission. Clearly, the Secretary said, not all of them are there for this purpose.

/1/No other record found.

The Secretary went on to say that the President has a serious problem over Cuba. Last August and September he had tried to calm down the American people on this issue. However, the events of September and October were not only serious in themselves but had reduced the President's credibility in the eyes of his own people. Now, it was not so easy for the President to reassure the country over Cuba. The American people remember what Senator Keating had said last August and what the President had said and Keating's speculation had turned out to be correct. This situation makes it very difficult for the President to calm the atmosphere in the United States. We hope, therefore, that steps will be taken in Cuba to make it clear that Cuba is not being prepared as a base for adventure in the rest of the hemisphere. We do not agree that a Soviet military presence in this hemisphere is a normal situation. The Cuban question is clearly poisoning United States-Soviet relations and we strongly urge the Soviet Government to do what it can to reduce this complication.

Ambassador Dobrynin replied that he assumed the Secretary's reference to Castro's activities since January referred to Castro's speech of January 2. It should be remembered that many things were being said in the United States. Castro's speech was a point by point reply to statements made by the President. The President had just told the Bay of Pigs prisoners that their banner would again fly in Cuba. The Ambassador asked the Secretary to consider how Castro regards threats from the United States. He also noted that the Cuban Government was very unhappy with the result of the United States-Soviet negotiations on Cuba. The Ambassador said that he could not believe the United States fears Cuba and that the Cubans have a rather natural resentment against the large

country only 90 miles from their shores. While he personally believed the President's pledge not to invade Cuba, the Cubans did not believe it. The Secretary replied that we do not of course fear Cuba but that we do link Castro's speeches with subversive activities in other countries. He told the Ambassador he would give him more precise information subsequently about Cuban subversive activities.

The Ambassador asked whether the Secretary was seeking some clarification regarding the status of the Soviet military personnel in Cuba. The Secretary replied in the affirmative and reiterated that we were looking for some outward movement of Soviet forces now there. The Ambassador promised to report this conversation to his government./2/

/2/On February 18 Dobrynin handed Rusk an aide-memoire stating that the Soviet Union had decided to withdraw from Cuba "Soviet personnel connected with the protection of the types of weapons withdrawn from Cuba and likewise some of the military specialists involved in training Cuban troops. It is intended to recall from Cuba in the nearest future--before the middle of March--several thousand men." (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/63-3/63) See the Supplement.

### **281. Message From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to Secretary of State Rusk**

Washington, February 13, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR. Secret. According to an attached covering letter from Carter to Rusk, February 13, McCone (who was in Europe) sent this message to Acting Director Marshall S. Carter, asking that he give a copy to Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and the members of the USIB. Carter assured the addressees that the Deputy Director (Intelligence) and the Office of National Estimates were at work evaluating the matters raised by McCone.

1. I am growing increasingly concerned over Soviet intentions in Cuba. The agent report of deep verticle wells, three to four meters in diameter in Pinar del Rio is not satisfactorily answered by negative surface indications or the absence of spoils as quantities of earth involved could be trucked away and hidden from view and other signs of workings could be easily camouflaged. I therefore feel we cannot dismiss this possibility on the basis of negative photographic interpretation and analysis.

2. Several recent events contribute to my growing concern over the possibility of reintroduction of an offensive capability in Cuba and I wish the entire Intelligence Community to intensify efforts to satisfactorily answer this question. In addition to reports mentioned, the receipt of two shiploads of unexplained military cargo and the precipitous discharging of the cargos by military personnel, together with news of a possible third cargo, is to me an ominous sign. In addition Khrushchev's false and absolutely misleading statement that his technicians were in Cuba to train Cubans is inconsistent with the facts as were his and Dobrynin's statements prior to the October crisis.

3. Furthermore, the disarmament proposals by the Soviets in Geneva yesterday were so obviously unacceptable to the West (as they have been on numerous occasions during the past ten years) that I believe they were stated as a justification for a Soviet offensive weapons base in Cuba than for any other purpose. Certainly they were not advanced for the purpose of serious negotiation.

4. In view of all of the above, I am inclined to the view that it is highly dangerous for the Intelligence Community or spokesmen for the Government to take a categoric position concerning the possible exist-ence or future clandestine development of an offensive threat and am inclined to place greater emphasis on my statement that this can only be proven by penetrating and continuing on-site inspection.

### **282. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, February 14, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 2/63. Confidential.

SUBJECT

Isolation of Cuba

There seems to be very little doubt that Cuba has been substantially isolated from the Free World.

1. Only about 5 OAS countries maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba and all of the OAS countries, to a lesser or greater degree, regard Castro as a menace.
2. Free World shipping to Cuba has fallen precipitously during recent months. There are about 1/2 as many Free World ships travelling to Cuba now as opposed to the period before the quarantine.
3. Cuba's trade with the Free World has dropped considerably over the past few years--trade with the Free World totaled about \$1-1/2 million in 1958 as opposed to \$200 million in 1962.
4. Free World air services are extremely limited. At present only Mexico and Spain permit flights to Cuba.

This isolation has not come about accidentally. We have actively encouraged this isolation unilaterally (shipping restrictions), bilaterally (representations to certain countries trading with Cuba), and multilaterally (OAS).

If he can help it, I don't think the President should play too hard this afternoon/1/ on the great job we are doing by isolating Cuba; it may come back to haunt us. While a policy of isolation has some advantages (e.g. highlights the problem and sets the scene for more drastic action in the future) it is becoming quite clear that isolation from the Free World does not hurt Cuba in any real sense (e.g. total import levels remain the same). It may well be that at some future date we will find it in our interest to back off some of our formal and informal restrictions on contact between the Free World and Cuba. The real crux of the matter, of course, is to isolate Cuba from the Soviet Bloc.

/1/Reference is to the President's press conference, February 14, which included questions and answers on Cuba; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 172-180.

I would much prefer to see the President steer away from the isolation issue and instead try to get across to the American people a sense of perspective in viewing the Cuban problem.

GC

**283. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, February 18, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 2/63. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Report of a Possible Revolt in Cuba on February 20th/1/

/1/The Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research prepared an assessment on February 18 of reports of a possible revolt. The assessment acknowledged the possibility of a small uprising in one or more parts of Cuba, but doubted the likelihood of a large-scale uprising. (Ibid.)

The discussion at State this afternoon brought out the following points regarding the possibility of a revolt in Cuba on February 20th.

1. Both State and CIA doubt the reliability of the report. CIA noted, however, that if such a thing were about to happen, the report of it would come in just this way.
2. One of the tough questions--what size and type of revolt is worthwhile to support? Do you determine this by the number of people involved? The geographic area it covers? etc. The revolt should have a potential political appeal to a large cross section of Cuban people. For example, a revolt by a number of disgruntled farmers would not meet this criterion.
3. There was some discussion of a possible outline of action. First, there could be a deniable airdrop of supplies by CIA while the U.S. military arm began to wind up. This could be followed by a limited airstrike within about twenty-four hours and a full island air-strike within seventy-two hours. It would take a maximum of eighteen days to mount a full invasion force. Between the full airstrike and the invasion, things could be going on--e.g. special forces dropped in Cuba. A diversionary action should be initiated quickly so that Castro cannot concentrate his forces on the insurgents, leaving us no one to liberate.
4. The presence of Russian troops, of course, presents a very sticky problem. One of the first targets would be the SAM sites and inevitably Russians would be killed. The effect of this on Khrushchev would have to be weighed.

Perhaps we could tell Khrushchev what we are going to do and advise him to take all Russians off the SAM sites and move them to restricted areas. In this regard we could risk a flight or two over the SAM sites to test whether he has followed our advice.

If the prospects for the removal of the Russian troops in the near future look very good, we may want to dampen the revolt for now--broadcasts by Cuban exiles that Castro is setting a trap.

5. The present Department of Defense off-the-cuff estimate of fighting in Cuba is that there would be four or five days of heavy fighting and another thirty days of less severe fighting. There might or might not be prolonged guerrilla activity. If the campaign is short and sweet, there probably will be less guerrilla fighting afterwards.
6. It was noted that the invasion would violate the Havana Treaty (can respond to calls for help only by recognized governments)./2/

/2/The Havana Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, signed at Havana on February 28, 1928; see 46 Stat. (Pt. 2) 2749.

Sterling Cottrell is zeroed in on this and hopes to have something over here between noon and 1:00 PM on Tuesday./3/

/3/On Tuesday, February 19, Brubeck sent Bundy a memorandum on the reports of the uprising and an attached "Alternative Course of Action in the Event the Reported Large-scale Uprising Occurs." The plan of action envisioned recognition of and assistance to the insurgents including air strikes, unconventional warfare, and an invasion of Cuba by U.S. forces. The plan recommended no action until the uprising occurred and there was a call for help from the insurgents. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 2/63)

GC

**284. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk**

Washington, February 19, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Hearings Before the Committee on Export Control. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to McNamara and McCone. In a covering memorandum Bundy asked for any corrections or additions. A handwritten note on the cover memorandum indicated that Rusk said it was "O.K. with him," and Bundy's office was informed.

As a result of a discussion on Monday, February 18th, from 5:30 to 7:30, a consensus emerged among the four of us on the following guidelines for discussion of various aspects of the Cuban problem, both in public and in Executive Session.

1. The invasion of April 1961 and its aftermath

It was agreed that only those who had had an active part in the April invasion would discuss it before Congressional committees. With respect to the prisoners of that operation and their exchange, all questions would be referred to Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach or Mr. Robert Hurwitch, who would be made available to testify to any appropriate committee. Questions relating to the future of the released prisoners would be referred to Mr. Cottrell of the Cuban Coordinating Committee.

2. Intelligence collection and evaluation in September and October 1962

a. It was agreed that the first responsibility in discussion of this subject belonged to the Director of Central Intelligence.

b. With respect to statements made by Administration officials in September and October, it was our expectation that these statements would turn out to be consistent with the agreed estimates of the intelligence community at the time, except where an individual might have signalled a personal view as being at variance with the estimates. (The only individual known to me who may have done this is Mr. McCone himself.) It was agreed that CIA would prepare, in consultation with State and Defense, a full record of these estimates which could then be submitted in whatever way seemed most effective to deal with charges against such witnesses as Mr. George Ball and Mr. W.P. Bundy.

c. It was agreed that all witnesses should explain that unverified refugee and agent reports were not normally forwarded to high policy officers and that before the 15th of October the prevailing intelligence judgment was that there was not credible evidence of offensive missiles in Cuba. (This is the conclusion of the DCI's coordinated report to the President's Board, pp. 47-48.)/1/ There were reports of sufficient interest to lead to targeting of the overflight of October 14th, but no reports which led to changes in the estimates of any intelligence agency as reported to the President's senior advisers.

/1/Apparent reference to the Killian Report.

d. With respect to overflight policy, we agreed that all flights requested of the President were authorized by him; all priorities set by the USIB were accepted; only one low-level flight was proposed by a senior intelligence officer, and this one (for overflight of Banes) was held up until appropriate efforts had been made by a high-level flight. The absence of this low-level flight did not prevent positive identification of the Banes site in intelligence publications of September 17th.

e. It was agreed that refugee reports proved useful, but that they were not adequate for positive identification without photographic confirmation.

f. We also agreed that Senator Keating was not in fact way ahead of the Government with respect to offensive weapons. His first assertion that there were missile bases in Cuba came on October 10th. By that time, the President had already authorized the flight of October 14, which was targeted for the verification or disproof of raw reports of the sort upon which Senator Keating appears to have relied. The Senator took a chance on unverified information. The Executive Branch made arrangements to check it in the most effective possible way. We need not feel defensive over having chosen this course of action.

g. With respect to "management of news," the fact is that there was no special control over the dissemination of verified information except between October 15th and October 22nd. There were justified limitations upon widespread dissemination of unverified information. There were also, by some Administration spokesmen, too energetic assertions that because we did not have credible evidence of Soviet personnel and weapons beyond those in the agreed estimates, no such personnel or weapons were in fact in Cuba. This was to assert a negative which in the nature of things could not be certain, and we should accept the fact that some overstatements were made.

h. We agreed that, on balance, and judged by the result, a basically creditable job was done on the intelligence front. Effective and timely reports were produced on all weapons systems before they became operational. That very sensitive intelligence weapon, the U-2, was used without public clamor and with decisive effect. A denied area was penetrated accurately and in time. We also agreed that in retrospect there were discernible weaknesses in this process: as, for example, that the estimates took too little account of the possibility of a dangerous new departure in Soviet policy; that there was a lack of all-out energy in framing and presenting intelligence requirements; that delays in executing approved reconnaissance missions were not reported upward, or monitored downward; and that dissenting recommendations were not carried to the President. Remedial action on all these matters is in hand under the Director of Central Intelligence, who himself accurately anticipated the Soviet move.

### 3. The present situation

a. The military position. We hoped that our current estimates could be ironed out closely between CIA and Defense, especially on the following points:

(1) That the agreed number of missiles and bombers did leave and that our inspection at sea was convincing.

(2) That our policy on surveillance is to conduct steady high-level overflight and to use low-level flights when it is agreed in particular cases that they are necessary.

(3) That our estimates on MIGs, submarine bases and FROGS are what they are, and that any apparent discrepancies are due to personal opinion or differences in methods of statement not to disagree to estimates.

(4) There is an important distinction between offensive weapons and defensive weapons--a distinction which was first made by the President in September--although many spokesmen have correctly pointed out that one must be careful about making this distinction too hard and fast.

b. Subversion. It was agreed that the State Department would take the lead in stating our view of policy toward subversion toward Cuba, and Mr. Edwin Martin has agreed to circulate to all concerned his authoritative statement on the subject delivered to the Latin American Sub-Committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 18, 1963.

#### 4. General assessment and policy

It was agreed that insofar as possible, we would all be guided by authoritative Presidential statements on these matters, and I shall circulate later today a set of the relevant Presidential statements since November 20, when the President first made an authoritative summary of the U.S. position as it stood after the October crisis.

McGeorge Bundy/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

#### **285. Editorial Note**

On February 21, 1963, the U.S. Intelligence Board considered and approved a report of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance recommending that high-level photography of activities related to impending movement of Soviet personnel and equipment in Cuba be supplemented by low-level photography and night photography. Low-level photography would target Soviet ships in Cuban ports and unidentified installations. (Memorandum to the U.S. Intelligence Board from James S. Lay, February 21; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, Feb. thru April, 1963) For text of the memorandum and the attached report, see the Supplement.

Also on February 21 the Central Intelligence Agency submitted to the U.S. Intelligence Board a special estimate, SNIE 85-2-63, "Reactions to U.S. Low-Level Overflights of Cuba." The estimate concluded that Soviet and Cuban forces would refrain from hostile action against three or four low-level missions per week for 2 weeks. Should the flights continue without interruption or increase, Castro would press the Soviet Union for military counteraction. The Soviet Union would temporize, seeking a political or propaganda campaign against the flights. The Soviet Union might pass private warnings to the United States and initiate diplomatic negotiations to end them. Faced with continued flights and Soviet refusal to act, the estimate suggested that Castro would probably take unilateral action against low-level reconnaissance planes. The Special Estimate did not predict at what point Castro would attempt to act. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry) For text of SNIE 85-2-63, see the Supplement.

#### **286. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk**

Washington, February 21, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. II (Thompson). Secret. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Tyler, and Hillenbrand.

#### **SUBJECT**

Visit of Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, USSR

The Soviet Ambassador came to see me at 6:00 p.m., Wednesday, February twentieth, and informed me with reference to the statement which we propose to make in regard to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba/1/ that the Soviet Government proposed a substitution of the following sentence for the first sentence in our draft statement:

/1/The text of the proposed U.S. statement, given by Thompson to Dobrynin on February 19, reads: "Following discussion with the Government of USSR and in accordance with assurances received from Chairman Khrushchev in November, U.S. Government has been informed by Soviet Government that several thousand Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Cuba before middle of March. This government understands that passenger ships are en route to Cuba for that purpose. U.S. Government considers this action by Soviet

Government useful step in reduction of international tensions." (Telegram 1755 to Moscow, February 19; Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR)

"The Soviet Government has informed the United States Government of its intention to withdraw from Cuba by the middle of March several thousand Soviet military personnel having to do with guarding the kinds of weapons which were removed from Cuba and also some of the military specialists who were occupied in training Cuban military cadres."

I inquired whether he thought his Government would object to our keeping in a reference to the fact that there had been discussions between us on this subject. He said he was not authorized to agree to any change and understood that if we accepted the proposed Soviet draft, Moscow would not feel obliged to make any statement. If this were not the case, his Government would probably make a statement of its own in which it would set forth its position. I said it did not seem to be either in their interest or ours for it to appear that the Soviet withdrawal was a result of all the noise that had been going on recently about this matter and wondered if he thought there would be any objection to the President making the statement as proposed by the Soviet Government but, in reply to questions at his press conference, making reference to the discussions which we had had./2/ The Ambassador was reluctant to commit himself, but indicated he thought this would be all right.

/2/For text of the President's news conference on February 21, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 206-207.

The Ambassador then read me the following oral statement:

"The Soviet Government cannot disregard the fact that during recent days there has taken place in the USA a real rush and devils sabbath in connection with the question of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. In this connection statements are made, one more reckless than the next. Some permit themselves even to resort to threats against the Soviet Union. It stands to reason this will in no sense contribute to a clearing of the international atmosphere and to an improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. If all this continues and if the necessary restraint is not shown, then naturally, this will require the other side to state its attitude toward such a kind of performance in the USA and give the necessary rebuff to unbridled and irresponsible people who, raising a provocational racket in connection with the question of Soviet military personnel in Cuba, are obviously trying to exert pressure on the Soviet Union.

"These persons are deeply mistaken if they think that anything is permitted to them and that there are no forces which could withstand them. They clearly fail to take into account that other countries, in this case the Soviet Union, have the possibility of putting such people in their places, if they themselves don't know how to put themselves in their places and come to reason.

"In Moscow they wish to express the hope that the noisy and unbalanced chorus of voices hostile to the Soviet Union, which are still giving forth today, will give place to a more reasonable approach to the matter, which would meet both the interests of repairing Soviet-American relations and the interests of lessening international tension."

I pointed out that the position of my Government on the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba was well known and I saw no need to repeat it. So far as statements by others were concerned, he was, of course, aware that we did not control nor inspire such statements. The Ambassador said he understood and that his Government had similar problems.

## **287. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, February 25, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. II (Thompson). Secret.

## SUBJECT

Aide-memoire of February 25, 1963/1/

/1/The aide-memoire stated that the United States would appreciate further information concerning arrangements for withdrawal of troops from Cuba, and expressed the view that comprehensive information on this matter was in the interests of both sides. (Ibid.)

## PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, USSR

Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, Department of State

The Soviet Ambassador telephoned me about 10:00 this morning to say that he could not transmit to Moscow the attached memorandum which was handed to the Soviet Counselor by Mr. Guthrie on February twenty-third. He pointed out that the memorandum implied an agreement which did not exist. I inquired if it would be satisfactory if we left out any reference to the conversation I had had with the Ambassador./2/ He replied that, speaking personally, he thought this would be considered in Moscow as a kind of ultimatum since the Soviet Government would have to either accept our proposed procedures or protest them. He said if we wished to propose an agreement with the Soviet Government on this subject, he would, of course, transmit our proposal, but he could not transmit the memorandum.

/2/Apparent reference to a February 21 Dobrynin-Thompson conversation; the memorandum of the conversation by Thompson reads:

"At the White House reception last night, I had just started talking to the Soviet Ambassador when the President walked up. In the course of the conversation, I said I had just been on the point of suggesting to the Ambassador that it would be in our mutual interest for them to arrange a boat drill on the vessel taking Soviet troops out of Cuba in order that we could get some good pictures.

"The Ambassador replied that he did not think we would have any difficulty whatever getting good pictures by the same methods we had used when the missiles were removed." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, Feb-April 1963)

After discussion with the Secretary, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Bundy, who discussed the matter with Secretary McNamara by telephone, and after clearance with the President, at 1:00 p.m. today I handed the Soviet Ambassador the aide-memoire of February twenty-fifth on this subject.

After reading the aide-memoire, the Ambassador inquired what kind of information we were seeking. I replied that it would be helpful to know the names and times of departure of the ships involved, and added that if the Soviet Government could do so, I thought it would be most helpful to be informed of the numbers and types of troops involved. The Ambassador inquired whether it was intended that this information be made public. I replied that I did not think we would need to make public the fact that we might be informed of the names and departures of the ships, but that if they could give us the numbers of troops, it would be to our mutual interest that we be allowed to make this information public. I pointed out that our whole thought in this operation was that it was in our mutual interest that the public be convinced that the useful action being taken by the Soviet Government be convincingly confirmed.

## **Attachment**

Washington, February 23, 1963.

With reference to Ambassador Thompson's discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin, February 21, the United States Government wishes to inform the Soviet Government that the United States will photograph outbound special interest passenger ships from Cuba during daylight and that aircraft and/or ships approaching for photographic coverage will:

- a. Approach from the stern on a parallel course.
- b. Take station well clear on either beam.
- c. Fixed wing aircraft will dip wings: ships sound four or more blasts on the whistle, helos no special signal required.

This information is being provided in order that it will be understood by both the U.S. ship/aircraft and Soviet passenger ships involved as

- a. An intention to approach closer without hostile intent.
- b. An intent to overfly or close for photographic purposes.
- c. Provision of opportunity for the Soviet ship to have its embarked troops on topside, and
- c [d]. An understanding that both are to come up on 500 kcs for radio communication should such be required.

### **288. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk**

Washington, February 25, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 2/63. Secret. Also sent to McNamara and McCone. In an attached personal memorandum to the same three men, Bundy stated that in light of their comments, he had decided not to attempt a resume of guidelines for Congressional testimony as it would be subject to misunderstanding.

In a follow-up to our discussion of last week,/1/ I am circulating herewith certain documents which I think may be helpful to all who are called upon to discuss the problem of Cuba either in Executive Session or in public. These documents are:

/1/Document 284.

First, a compendium of the President's own principal comments on Cuban affairs./2/ The President's statements obviously represent the position and policy of the Executive Branch, and witnesses undertaking to explain the position of the Executive Branch on policy matters should be guided by these statements.

/2/Attached but not printed.

The second major document enclosed is a report prepared under the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence with respect to intelligence on Cuba before and during the October crisis./3/ This account represents a coordinated report, and witnesses undertaking to discuss the matter will wish to be familiar with it. Since the

subject is highly classified, it is assumed that witnesses without appropriate clearance will be cautious in commenting on it, and that witnesses who are more fully informed will take appropriate precautions as to the character of hearings in which they discuss it. Discussion of any possible modifications in our intelligence procedures growing out of this experience should be avoided by any witnesses not having direct responsibility.

/3/Apparent reference to a memorandum dated and distributed on February 27. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuban Missile Crisis--Miscellaneous) See the Supplement.

Finally, I am circulating copies of a public statement presented by Assistant Secretary Martin on February 18./4/ This statement is an unusually clear and comprehensive account of the problem of subversion, and witnesses called to testify on this subject will wish to be familiar with the official position presented by the Department of State.

/4/Printed in the Department of State Bulletin, March 11, 1962, pp. 347-356 and March 18, 1963, pp. 404-412.

McGeorge Bundy/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## **289. Memorandum for the Record**

CM-351-63

Washington, February 28, 1963.

//Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-257-69. Top Secret. Drafted by Taylor on March 1.

### **SUBJECT**

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President on 28 February 1963

All the Chiefs were present at the above meeting which lasted from 5:30 p.m. to 6:45 p.m. The following subjects were the principal topics of discussion.

#### **a. The Cuba Invasion Plan.**

(1) The Chiefs discussed the time-space factors in the implementation of CINCLANT Operation Plan 312 and 316 using the chart attached as Annex 1./1/ The President was shown why it would take approximately 18 days from decision to D-Day from present troop and ship dispositions. In order to reduce this time to something like 7 days, considerable repositioning would be required in order to get Army/Marine units to the East Coast and to assemble the necessary cargo shipping. The Chiefs expressed the view that it was unlikely that a period of tension would not precede a decision to invade Cuba which would allow ample time for preparatory measures; hence, it was undesirable to make permanent changes of station of Army and Marine units which would upset the present disposition of strategic reserve forces.

/1/Not printed.

(2) The President expressed particular interest in the possibility of getting some troops quickly into Cuba in the event of a general uprising. He was told that only the airborne troops could arrive with little delay, that the first Marine elements would require about 7 days before landing. He asked the Chiefs to develop specific plans in anticipation of the need for this kind of quick reaction.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

f. Rules of Engagement. The President referred to the rules of engagement transmitted by the JCS to CINCLANT, CINCARIB, CINCSAC, and CINCONAD (number 8756 dated 22 Feb 63).<sup>/2/</sup> After some discussion with the Chiefs, he directed that the phrase on hot pursuit contained in line 11 of sub-paragraph 1a be changed from "into Cuban air space" to "to Cuban air space." Following the meeting the Chairman transmitted this decision to the Director, Joint Staff for transmission to the field.<sup>/3/</sup>

<sup>/2/</sup>Not found.

<sup>/3/</sup>In JCS telegram 8874 to CINCLANT, CINCARIB, CINCSAC, and CINCONAD, February 28. (Department of Defense, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense's Cable File, Cuba, 1963)

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Maxwell D. Taylor

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

## **290. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, February 28, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Clifton Series, JCS Conferences with the President, Vol. II. 2/28/63-9/9/63. Top Secret.

On Rules of Engagement, the President made it very clear in the meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff today, and the Chiefs agreed, that they should amend the present Rules, which were approved in November, 1960. The President also made it very clear that according to the present Rules, in the case of an incident where we are attacked, etc., we can chase them to the Cuban airspace and not into it. These Rules will prevail until another incident arises. But the President feels that we must have a chance to decide in Washington whether or not this has been a political decision of Castro's government before we risk one of our aircraft flying clear into Cuban airspace and being shot down by one of their SAM outfits. He would hate to have this sequence of events occur without having a chance to evaluate the situation.

C.V. Clifton/<sup>1/</sup>

<sup>/1/</sup>Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## **291. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, March 4, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone.

SUBJECT

Meeting with The President--4:30 p.m.--4 March 1963

The President stated he felt that an attempt was being made to drive a division within the Administration, most particularly between CIA on the one hand and State and Defense on the other. This he said worried him and he hoped we could avoid any statements on the Hill, publicly or to the Press, which would exacerbate the situation.

I replied that I felt there was no reason for all the furor and that I had prepared a background memorandum/1/ which, if used, would correctly project what had happened, all of which was understandable, and avoid the situation that worried him. I then pointed out that I well understood the problems within CIA as they felt that throughout September they had operated under an inhibiting policy and, knowing this from innumerable discussions with high authorities, had recommended only most limited overflights in September as they felt, and I feel correctly felt, that recommendations for a more aggressive program would undoubtedly have been refused to them. Nevertheless I felt the situation was adequately covered in my memorandum (referring to memorandum of 27 February, "U-2 Overflights of Cuba. . .")/2/ and, while the Sunday morning quarterbacks could possibly criticize failure to adopt a more aggressive program in September, it was my opinion that any photography prior to October 16 and 17 would not produce the type of evidence necessary for Executive action, particularly when OAS, British, German and French support was essential.

/1/Reference is to McCone's memorandum of February 27; see the Supplement.

/2/In a March 6 memorandum to McCone, U. Alexis Johnson stated that the Department of State reviewed his memorandum of February 27, "U-2 Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 14 October, 1962." Johnson suggested that the memorandum be revised to exclude the descriptions of positions taken by various individuals and institutions. Johnson reasoned that if the U.S. Government was to "maintain that degree of frankness and freedom to state views out of which sound decisions can be reached, particularly on sensitive intelligence matters, it seems to me that we should seek to preserve the anonymity of our advice and deliberations." Johnson recommended that the memorandum be changed to a factual account of events. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. IV) See the Supplement.

McCone responded in a March 7 memorandum to Johnson that it would not be possible to make the changes suggested by the Department of State as he had already distributed it to members of the USIB, most of whom had already testified before Congress. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 64 D 438, Cuban Missile Crisis, Miscellaneous) See the Supplement.

I then said there was considerable distress within CIA over their failure to act on my telegrams and I read to the President excerpts from several of the September telegrams. He expressed surprise that they were as firm, perceptive and detailed as they were and said, "You certainly had the situation sized up, but I was one of those who did not think the Soviets would put missiles in Cuba." He recognized that there was bound to be something of an internal problem but felt that we should minimize it and should not permit it to get into an interdepartmental row. I assured him this would not happen.

We then spoke of the decoration of the four lost fliers./3/ He said he would mention it at his Press conference, but seemed to favor withholding decorations for about two months. However, he favored ultimately giving the decorations posthumously.

/3/U.S. employees killed during the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The President queried me concerning the number of CIA people who had been killed or imprisoned in our operations and I said I would supply him with this information.

In summary the purpose of his asking me to call was to try to avoid a split within his organization and I assured him that I did not think one was necessary. However, I did point out that it was necessary for everyone to recognize and to understand that extreme caution was used through September in considering U-2 operations over Cuba.

## 292. Summary Record of the 509th National Security Council Meeting

Washington, March 13, 1963, 4:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, No. 509. Top Secret.

### SUBJECT

Latin American Policy/1/

/1/On March 11 McGeorge Bundy sent the members of the National Security Council a memorandum explaining that the President was calling the meeting to have a "broader exchange of views" on Latin American and European policy. Bundy also submitted talking points used by Secretary Rusk in a recent talk to the Cabinet, dated February 28, which noted that while it was not a formal State paper, it was a "responsible statement of the main lines of our present courses." (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

### PRESENT

President, Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Dillon, Attorney General, General Taylor, Director McCone, Secretary Vance, Under Secretary Ball, Ambassador Stevenson, Administrator Bell, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Director Murrow, Director McDermott, U. Alexis Johnson, Assistant Secretary Martin, Assistant Secretary Tyler, Paul Nitze, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Sorensen, Mr. Dungan, Mr. Kaysen, General Clifton, Mr. Bromley Smith

The President opened the meeting by asking Director McCone for a summary of current intelligence on Cuba, as well as a summary of his recent experience on the Hill with Congressional Committees.

Mr. McCone reported that Soviet troops were withdrawing from Cuba; that between 1700 and 2000 had already left, more were probably leaving, but we had no knowledge of how many thousands would actually depart. Because there appears to be no movement of major items of military equipment, we do not know whether the Soviet troop withdrawal to date has actually affected the Soviet military capability in Cuba.

With respect to U.S. prisoners in Cuba, Mr. McCone reported that Mr. Donovan would be in Havana this week where he expects to arrange for the release of all U.S. prisoners without more conditions. Mr. McCone said we have held off flying low-level reconnaissance missions until the U.S. prisoners were out of Cuba. He hoped we could fly low-level missions just as soon as the prisoners were out.

Director McCone reported that the Stennis Congressional Committee will make a favorable report./2/ All members appear to be satisfied with the performance of the Intelligence Community and their public report will cite no intelligence gap to be criticized. Mr. McCone said the Congressional group pressed very hard with respect to future policy toward Cuba and Latin America. He said he told the group policy was beyond his competence, but on being pressed he told them there was a Cuba problem and a separate Latin American problem. He said he favored taking positive steps to prevent any other country from falling to Communism. As regards Cuba, he said first we must get the Soviets out and, after that, the Castro government can be broken up by a military coup favorable to the U.S. Mr. McCone said he favored a military uprising rather than a civil uprising. He concluded by predicting that the investigation of past actions in Cuba was about finished on the Hill.

/2/The Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, Senator John Stennis, Chairman, released a sanitized version of its report to Congress on May 9. The report concluded that while the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence organizations made mistakes in some areas, U.S. intelligence

"performed creditably" in other areas. The report discounted the idea of an "intelligence gap" between September 5 and October 14, 1962, but expressed concern that all Soviet strategic bombers and missiles might not have been removed and that there was a minimum of 17,500 Soviet troops remaining in Cuba. (Congressional Quaterly Almanac, Vol. XIX, 1963, p. 316)

The President indicated the Soviets may be pulling away from a Cuba withdrawal and apparently are not taking out the four armored groups now there. Secretary Rusk said that if the armored groups do not come out, we can go back to the Russians and remind them that these groups, which were used to protect the missiles, should come out as part of the commitment to remove missile-associated forces.

The President referred to a State cable which reported that Khrushchev is saying that we are moving away from our no-invasion pledge.<sup>/3/</sup> This may explain why Khrushchev is hesitant to pull out his troops. He asked that we raise this subject with Khrushchev within the week.<sup>/4/</sup>

<sup>/3/</sup>Telegram 2241 from Moscow, March 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR) See the Supplement.

<sup>/4/</sup>See Document 293.

The President asked whether we are doing all we can to isolate Cuba. He cited (a) free world trade with Cuba, (b) embargo of allied shipping, and (c) the movement of students and subversives into and out of Cuba.

Secretary Rusk indicated that we are keeping the pressure on, but acknowledged that unless the British take immediate action, we would have to raise with them the question of U.K. ships in Cuba trade. Assistant Secretary Martin called attention to the pressure which he had put on the NATO members during a recent trip to Paris.

The President asked for a report on current shipping restrictions and on what actions we would take as soon as the U.S. prisoners were out of Cuba.

Secretary Rusk commented that he did not believe it would be useful to demand the withdrawal of all Latin American missions from Havana. He said we had been working bilaterally on the Bolivians and the Uruguayans with a view to prompting them to break relations. Afterwards, we would suggest that Chile might break relations. [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]

The President, referring to his forthcoming trip to Costa Rica,<sup>/5/</sup> wanted to be certain that we avoided the impression that we want to go further on Cuba than we actually do. He was concerned that the Nicaraguans and the Guatemalans would want to take more forceful action than we are now prepared to take. He asked that we make certain that the other countries were aware of this problem prior to the opening of the Costa Rica meeting.

<sup>/5/</sup>Reference is to the President's trip for meetings with the Presidents of Central America, March 18-20.

Secretary Rusk commented that he believed that there was a real falloff in Congressional demands for the invasion of Cuba. He felt that in the last ten days the demands for military action had been decreasing substantially.

The President commented on the problem of persons going to and from Cuba. He said we have little hard evidence on who was moving and he referred to the use by Time magazine of the word "flood" to describe persons going to Cuba.

Mr. McCone indicated that he had told Mr. Luce that the use by Time of the word "flood," to describe the number of persons going to Cuba, was wrong. The President said he had also told Mr. Luce that the use of the

word "flood" by Time's staff was an excellent illustration of how Time overstated situations. There resulted a humorous exchange to the effect that the President was delighted that Mr. McCone supported him in telling Mr. Luce that the word "flood" was wrong and leading the President to suggest that we should have meetings more often to be sure we were taking the same line.

Mr. Martin said that on the basis of the evidence we had, the number of trainees in Cuba has dropped off since last October.

In this connection, the President asked how we could sort out the students who come back from Cuba. Some become obviously activists in the Communist movement, but not all. He asked for further information on this subject.

[Here follows discussion of Haiti, economic development in Latin America, and independence for British Guiana.]

Mr. Murrow reported that we are getting our message through to the Cubans by radio even though some of our programs are being jammed. He said the missing ingredient in our message to the Cubans is hope. He believes we must present long-range plans on the future Cuba after Communism. Now, he said that we are unable to talk about the promise of the future.

In response to the President's question as to whether or not we had a speech on what we hope for the future of Cuba, Mr. Martin referred to the comments made to the Brigade in Miami.<sup>/6/</sup> The President thought something should be put in the communique at Costa Rica, but he was doubtful that we could develop an agreed future program because of splits among the Cuban exiles.

<sup>/6/</sup>See footnote 2, Document 260.

Secretary Rusk wanted to be certain that we do not create false hopes. Mr. Murrow felt we are entitled to issue some promissory notes.

The President said he doubted that we could do better than to try to get a statement from the Cubans of what they want.

Mr. Murrow said what was required was a U.S. government statement. Secretary Rusk said we did not want to do anything which would get in the way of the movement of Soviet troops out of Cuba. Mr. Bundy expressed his doubts as to whether actions we take now affect the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Under Secretary Ball thought we should involve the OAS in the work of developing plans for Cuba of the future. Mr. Martin agreed and said he would discuss it with the OAS members.

The President commented on the continuing pressure which he thought we would get from the Hill when it became clear that not all the Soviet troops were leaving Cuba. He said we should protect ourselves as best we can with the shipping policy, the trade matters, and the movement of persons, with the overall purpose of increasing the isolation of Cuba.

The President suggested that the group meet every week. He postponed discussion of the European policy until his return from Costa Rica. [Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

Bromley Smith<sup>/7/</sup>

<sup>/7/</sup>Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

### **293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union**

Washington, March 13, 1963, 4:24 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson; cleared with Ball, Martin, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Rusk and Johnson.

1933. Eyes only for Ambassador. With reference Khrushchev's statements to Trevelyan on US commitments with respect to Cuba reported Embtel 2241,/1/ President desires that you take advantage of suitable opportunity to point out to Khrushchev that the President's position has been entirely consistent on this matter and that the President is concerned that Khrushchev should feel there has been any change. The President clearly set forth our policy in his November 20 press conference, which stated inter alia "as for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. As I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this Hemisphere.'"

/1/See footnote 3, Document 292.

As the President said in his message of November 21, he regretted that Chairman Khrushchev had not been able to persuade Mr. Castro to accept a suitable form of inspection or verification in Cuba, "and that, in consequence, we must continue to rely upon our own means of information. But, as I said yesterday (referring to his November 20 press conference), there need be no fear of any invasion of Cuba while matters take their present favorable course."

As the President has subsequently been very careful not to depart from the position taken in his press conference of November 20, he finds it difficult to understand how Chairman Khrushchev could believe that he is now in any way departing from his previous policy, with which Khrushchev had expressed understanding, as noted in the President's letter of December 14.

In your discretion and in manner you consider most appropriate, you should reiterate to Khrushchev that, in view of history this affair and in absence other means of verification contemplated in original undertaking embodied in President's letter of October 27 and Chairman Khrushchev's letter of October 28,/2/ we must continue to rely upon our own means of information and any interference with our ability to obtain such information would bring about a most serious situation.

/2/Documents 95 and 102.

Chairman Khrushchev should also understand that Castro's belligerent attitude toward the other states of Latin America creates a most difficult situation for the President. Castro's threats toward such forward-looking and progressive leaders as Betancourt, in Venezuela (as well as others), followed by terrorist attacks, sabotage and bombing by terrorists within Venezuela who are publicly supported by Castro, make it difficult to believe that Castro desires to live in peace with his neighbors. The President hopes that Chairman Khrushchev continues to share the President's desire to reduce tensions in the Caribbean area and will thus exercise his influence on Castro to this end./3/

/3/In telegram 1950 to Moscow, March 14, the Secretary told Kohler that the last paragraph of this telegram was not intended to imply that the President "has any intention of invading Cuba under present circumstance, or otherwise modify the statement of policy set forth in the first three paragraphs." Rusk noted that Kohler would understand that the President "cannot make to Soviets any open-ended commitment which would amend or detract from our treaty obligations in this Hemisphere." (Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR)

Rusk

## **294. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, March 16, 1963, 8 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR. Secret; Priority.

2315. Eyes only for Secretary. Deptels 1933 and 1950./1/ My meeting at noon today with Kuznetsov (Embtel 2311)/2/ lasted forty-five minutes.

/1/See Document 293 and footnote 3 thereto.

/2/Telegram 2311, March 16, informed the Department that as Khrushchev was on vacation, Kohler was meeting Kuznetsov at noon, March 16. (Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR)

I made oral statement to him as instructed Deptel 1933, prefacing it with sentences: "The President has been disturbed to learn of Chairman Khrushchev's remarks with regard to the President's position on Cuba. I have been instructed to inform you of the following in this regard, and to ask you to transmit it to Chairman Khrushchev." (I discussed with British Minister-Counselor Barker March 15 problems involved in referring to statement made by Khrushchev to British Ambassador Trevelyan, who absent from Moscow for few days visiting Leningrad. Barker saw no particular difficulty. In view of precise manner in which it was necessary to cite Trevelyan as source for Khrushchev's remarks, Department may wish consider providing FonOff with suitable fill-in.)

Following translation, Kuznetsov responded he should first of all say that he was very surprised by such a statement. With regard to SovGovt position on this question, it had been set forth with sufficient clarity several times, by Khrushchev in period both before and after crisis and in series of documents, as well as in discussions in New York that lasted almost two and half months. Kuznetsov was now wondering why USG was making such statement at this time. It was incomprehensible to him.

He continued, SovGovt has stated its views with regard to President's statement in his November 20 press conference and with regard to questions he had raised there. Basic documents in this matter were letters exchanged by Khrushchev and President October 27 and 28, which contained obligations of two sides. With regard President's November 20 statement, SovGovt could not accept it in full. He wished to recall to me that SovGovt had not agreed with claim of USG that it had assumed right to conduct flights over territory of another state. By virtue of this claim, USG was disregarding sovereign right of Cuba and was assuming policy "from position of strength" towards Cuba. This was dangerous policy.

My raising question of so-called on-site inspection evoked very great perplexity. Why was it being raised again? If legal side of matter were considered, Khrushchev's letter of October 27 said that such inspection could be conducted if Cuban Govt agreed. Moreover, SovGovt, with agreement Cuban, had given US authorities opportunity to verify withdrawal of weapons, to photograph and count them. It seemed at time that American side was satisfied. With regard to question of future inspection, he wished to remind me of Thant proposals and others for UN presence in Caribbean, which would have involved inspections in Cuba and US on terms of equality. USG had refused to consider, let alone accept, these proposals and must bear responsibility for their non-adoption. Making such statement now to SovGovt evokes great lack of understanding.

In President's November 20 press conference, he made statements of arbitrary character, saying USG could conduct inspections it wished to. This did not correspond to obligations assumed on October 27-28. It contained many arbitrary elements and many "ifs." President said USG could decide unilaterally whether Cuba was danger to US and other Western Hemisphere states.

Now representatives of USG are saying that Cuba by its very exist-ence constitutes danger to US. USG officials and US intelligence even fabricated data to show Cuba has been conducting subversive acts.

If such questions exist, USG should talk to Cuban Govt.

Kuznetsov said he must resolutely reject effort to raise this now with SovGovt and attempt to engage it in discussion of question of events in Venezuela. USG always tried to explain such events by talking about "hand of Moscow", "Communist plots", and so forth, but all that is simply invented. Those who invent such things know they do not correspond to reality. Trouble is USG does not want to let Cuban people decide on their own way of life.

If US thinks it suffers from existence of Cuban regime, why shouldn't USG meet with Cuban representatives and discuss these questions in effort to find solutions to them. Cuban representatives, including Premier and President, have expressed their willingness to discuss these questions.

Provisionally, Kuznetsov said, he decidedly rejected assumption contained in statement to effect that SovGovt should discuss matters relevant to Cuban Govt as though it had taken upon itself some obligation in this regard. It would be better if I did not make such statement. While he could not say definitively, he was not sure SovGovt would accept it. It was not quite clear why I was making it at all.

I said I thought there had been some misunderstanding here. This was oral statement which I was asking him to communicate to Chairman Khrushchev. It was not a demarche. Reason for statement was to be found in remarks Chairman had made to foreign diplomat. Purpose of statement was not to raise new questions, but to reassure Chairman Khrushchev that his doubts about a change in President's policy were not founded, but that President's policy remained unchanged. Consequently, I was surprised by what Kuznetsov had said in commenting on statement, since President wanted only to reassure Chairman. President's policy not changed.

Kuznetsov said that what surprised him was part at end where President talked about Venezuela as though USG wanted to make SovGovt responsible for something that had happened there. He asked me to repeat this part, since that was part he could not accept.

I repeated portion of statement derived from final para Deptel 1933.

Kuznetsov said he wished to re-emphasize that this was not merely simple restatement of US policy but raised question of SovGovt and Khrushchev using influence on Castro. He could not accept these last words.

Relations between US and Cuba are very abnormal. Who is responsible? USG is responsible. American actions are things which create this tension. I knew about steps which USG had taken. It therefore sounded very funny for USG to ask SovGovt to take steps towards Cuba. Secretary Rusk had made statement few days ago to effect that existence of Cuban Republic was incompatible with US interests./3/ Who gave USG right to dictate? There had been all that noise in US about Cuba. There had been noise when invaders returned and about economic sanctions. Kuznetsov therefore thought that this sort of appeal should be addressed in first place to USG. It should be apparent to US from history of Bolshevik Revolution how futile our efforts were. I must know what Ryabushinsky had said on eve of revolution, that "hand of hunger would strangle revolution."

/3/Apparent reference to Rusk's remarks before the Advertising Council, March 12. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 1, 1963, pp. 467-475.

He continued, if we wished to put responsibility on SovGovt for events in Latin America, that was really too much. President himself had recently made statement to effect that events in Latin America were not ones for which Moscow or communism could be held responsible. These charges were "nonsense, nonsense."

I said I thought I should understand whether he wished to transmit this statement to Khrushchev.

Kuznetsov answered that he was not sure Khrushchev would accept it; he would have to ask him.

I said I should emphasize once again that this was response to Chairman's doubts about President's policy. We had two different analyses of Cuban situation. We regarded belligerent attitude and threats of Castro as cause of tension in Caribbean. We think he has broken his word by imposing his regime on Cubans without giving them promised opportunity to express their will.

With regard to last words in statement asking Chairman to exercise his influence on Castro, this was expression of President's hope. Perhaps this hope would not be realized, but understandable he should express it.

At this point Kuznetsov asked which remarks of Chairman President had in mind in making statement.

I said they were remarks Chairman had made to Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, in which Chairman had expressed view President's position had changed with regard to Cuba.

Kuznetsov then asked whether President wanted final words of statement, "and will thus exercise his influence on Castro to this end," included. I said he did.

I then handed Kuznetsov note on aircraft violations.

While Kuznetsov was serious during this discussion, his attitude and manner were not unfriendly, and encounter ended as it had begun, with good-natured personal small-talk.

Comment: While Kuznetsov handled himself well, as usual, I got definite impression he was either not aware of what Khrushchev had told Trevelyan or, if aware, had regarded Khrushchev's statement as routine effort warn US against increasing pressure on Cuba and consequently had not anticipated effect remarks would have. It is of course possible that, particularly in view all he said, Soviets will refuse accept statement. Regardless of this, I believe point has been made. We should nevertheless perhaps anticipate response in kind.

Kohler

**295. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy**

Washington, March 17, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 3/63. Secret; Eyes Only.

Mr. President:

1. Attached is the latest on Cuba from Moscow. In Khrushchev's absence, Foy Kohler delivered his oral message to Kuznetsov. Kuznetsov's comments are at Tab 1./1/ At Tab 2 for reference are Kohler's instructions./2/

/1/See Document 294.

/2/See Document 293.

2. Donovan called the Department this morning. He expects to have one more meeting with Castro this morning and will be back in Miami at 5:00 P.M., when we will know more. He spent yesterday with the U.S. prisoners, seeing the 17 at the Isle of Pines and the others in confinement near Miami. He has reported that all are in

reasonable condition although the ones on the Isle of Pines are in better shape. He has arranged for the release of the two women and one mentally ill man. The Cubans have agreed to release the rest of the natural born U.S. citizens once all the goods are delivered, but are still holding out on the naturalized citizens.

The Department is working hard on getting shipping and hopes to have the deliveries completed in two weeks.

C. K./3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

## **296. Report of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Department of State (Cottrell)**

Washington, March 21, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 3/63. Secret. Executive Secretary Brubeck sent this report to McGeorge Bundy on March 21.

### **SUBJECT**

First Report of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

#### **I. Introduction**

It is contemplated that these reports will be issued twice monthly to provide, in summary form, a guide to the recent activities of the Coordinator and the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee. A separate section will be devoted to each NSAM or to Presidential memoranda directed to the activities of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee.

#### **II. Memoranda Guiding the Coordinator's Activities**

##### **A. National Security Action Memorandum No. 213 of January 8, 1963./1/**

/1/Document 264.

1. The Coordinator of Cuban Affairs has taken over responsibility for the day-to-day coordination of Cuban Affairs.

2. An Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs, chaired by the Coordinator, has been established. It consists of the Coordinator, Secretary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance, representing the Department of Defense, and Deputy Director Richard Helms of the Central Intelligence Agency. Officers have also been detailed to the Committee from State, Defense, Justice, HEW, CIA, and USIA to work as necessary in particular cases. A White House representative from the office of Mr. McGeorge Bundy has maintained close liaison with the Coordinator and the Committee. The Coordinator works through these assigned officers in meeting the responsibilities in (1) above.

3. The Coordinator has named Mr. John Hugh Crimmins, a Foreign Service Officer, to represent the U.S. Government with Cuban refugee groups in Florida and to coordinate Federal programs there. He has opened a branch office of the Coordinator in Miami.

4. The Coordinator has assumed the same responsibility for covert as for overt operations, while recognizing that he is to report on covert matters to the Special Group, which will be guided by broader policy set by the President through NSC ExComm.

B. National Security Action Memorandum No. 220 of February 5, 1963./2/

/2/Document 277.

NSAM 220 directed the Secretaries of State, Defense, Agriculture, and the Administrator of GSA to carry out a new policy on U.S. Government shipments by foreign flag vessels in the Cuban trade.

The Coordinator receives reports from these agencies indicating what steps have been taken. The Secretary of Commerce is making available to the Coordinator, through the Bureau of Economic Affairs of the Department of State, reports on current pertinent information on ships engaged in the Cuban trade.

C. Memoranda from the President of February 15, February 25, and March 2, 1963./3/

/3/In these memoranda the President asked the Departments of State and Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency to prepare under coordination of a CIA official specific proposals on lessening and possibly eliminating the flow of labor leaders, students, and others from Latin America who went to Cuba for training and indoctrination and returned to their own countries as possible Communist organizers. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 3/63)

These memoranda concerned the flow of students, labor leaders, etc., who go to Cuba for subversive training, the development of precise information as to their travel techniques, and the development of a program to control such traffic.

The President outlined three general avenues through which the problem should be approached. They are bilateral negotiations with friendly Latin American countries, working through the Organization of American States (OAS), and the presentation of a program by the President at the meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica.

So much work toward a solution of these problems has been done over the past month that a report of reasonable length can hope only to give the highlights of government-wide efforts. They include:

1. The Department of State has for some time been dealing with the problem of Cuban subversive training, both bilaterally and through the OAS. It has been trying to have governments withhold permission to their nationals to travel to Cuba and to reduce further free-world air traffic, both scheduled and unscheduled, to Cuba. Several memoranda to the White House have concerned this work.

2. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs met to study the subversive problem on February 15, and a working group headed by Ambassador Thurston submitted a report on February 25 which encompassed the SCCS Report to the OAS and the recommendations of experts drawn from appropriate government agencies./4/

/4/A copy of the February report is *ibid*.

3. The Coordinator, on the basis of these studies, appointed a Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion. It was established on February 27, with Major General Victor H. Krulak, USMC, as chairman.

4. The Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion submitted its first report on March 8./5/ This report on movement of personnel to and from Cuba was forwarded by the Coordinator to the White House, and the Coordinator and Major General Krulak met with the President on the afternoon of March 8. Subsequently, the Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion has prepared action papers on a) the movement of propaganda materials, b) the movement of arms to and within Latin American countries, c) the establishment of a surveillance system in the Caribbean, d) the exchange of intelligence information on a bilateral and multilateral basis, and e) the movement of funds.

/5/The report was submitted to the President. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 36 Cuba)

5. The Office of Regional Political Affairs in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, submitted to the Coordinator on March 8 a draft OAS Resolution on Cuba, which was forwarded to the White House via the Coordinator and the Secretary of State. This office also submitted talking points on Cuba for the President at San Jose, Costa Rica.

[2 paragraphs (13 lines of source text) not declassified]

8. Our posts in the Caribbean were informed on March 13 that we desire to consult with them on possible additional U.S. training and other assistance which may be required to develop or improve border and coastal patrol capabilities of their respective security forces. This program would involve possible assistance to Colombia, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Panama, and the Central American countries of Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras. This offer was discussed at the San Jose meeting.

9. The action taken above is part of our plan for the establishment of a coordinated Caribbean surveillance system involving continued close-in surveillance of Cuba by U.S. forces; a U.S. military alerting system, by which intelligence of subversive movements will be rapidly transmitted to the American Ambassadors to countries concerned through intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and the Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters of the Atlantic Command; a unilateral surveillance and interception effort by each country in its own territorial waters; and U.S. assistance in the final interception in territorial waters upon request of the country concerned.

10. Following the San Jose meeting with the Central American and Panamanian Presidents, and a study of the Subcommittee's reports, the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee will make further recommendations on the problems raised in the President's memoranda.

## **297. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, March 22, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 3/63. Top Secret; Sensitive.

At the President's press briefing on Thursday morning (March 21),/1/ the question of the activities of Alpha 66 and similar groups arose./2/ The President expressed some concern as to why we were without good intelligence on the intentions of these groups. We might well want to prevent them from engaging in further raids, and at the present we appeared to be without any capability to do so.

/1/On March 18 a Cuban refugee group, Alpha 66, mounted attacks on a Soviet ship and Soviet installations in Cuba. On March 19 the Department of State issued a statement that it was "strongly opposed to hit-and-run attacks on Cuba by splinter refugee groups." The statement continued, "such raids do not weaken the grip of the Communist regime on Cuba--indeed they may strengthen it." The statement concluded that the U.S. Government was investigating the raid to see if U.S. law was violated. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 266. In his press conference, Kennedy stated that "our best information was that they did not come from the United States." He also stated that the United States did not support the group and had no connection with it. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 277-278)

/2/Under Secretary Ball had nine telephone conversations with Department of State, Justice, and White House officials between 9:10 a.m. and 2:15 p.m., March 19, prior to the release of the Department of State's statement. Ball was told by U. Alexis Johnson that the United States had no connection with Alpha 66; but as Ball observed, "nobody is going to believe this." Ball noted that the actions of Alpha 66 were in clear violation of the U.S.

neutrality laws. (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba)

In consequence of this observation, I spoke with the Attorney General, Mr. Helms and, the next day, with Mr. McCone. I expressed the President's concern and made the point that it would be undesirable for a jurisdictional boundary line between the activities of the FBI and the CIA to prevent our doing as much as we should be able to do in this matter. All agreed that the matter would be examined and an improvement in our means of dealing with it effected.

CK

**298. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, March 23, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 3/63. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

**SUBJECT**

Cuba

Here are some of the latest developments regarding Cuba.

1. Donovan's meeting with Castro: As you probably know, Castro released only two female prisoners. A memorandum is attached as Tab 1 which gives some of the highlights of the Donovan/Castro meeting./1/ Donovan hopes to go down to Havana again in about a week to pick up the nine skindivers (the Cubans indicated they would be released at that time).

/1/Not found.

Also attached as Tab 1 is Carl Kaysen's memo to the President on press conference day. It is in response to the President's interest in knowing whether or not Castro's present reluctance to release the prisoners reflects a change in his December commitment to release them.

2. Russian Withdrawal from Cuba: Although State, in its press briefing book, recommended that the numbers game be avoided, the President announced at his press conference on March 21, 1963 that three thousand Russian troops had been withdrawn from Cuba. Attached as Tab 2 is the pertinent excerpt from the President's press conference./2/

/2/For text of the President's March 21 press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 273-282.

3. Activist Refugee Groups: On the nights of March 17-18 the Second Front of the Escambray, with the probable assistance of Alpha 66, made a raid on the port of Isabella de Sagua. Attached as Tab 3 is a memorandum describing the action,/1/ a brief statement giving our attitude toward such raids, and the President's comments on March 21./3/

/3/See footnote 1, Document 297.

The incident highlighted a jurisdictional problem between the CIA and the FBI--i.e. who is responsible for knowing about the activities of these groups. The answer is probably that both have an interest in the activities of

these groups which seem to operate both from within and without the United States. We have been in touch with State, CIA and FBI and have urged them to get together on this question (Carl's memorandum on this subject is also attached as Tab 3).<sup>4/</sup> They will also get together regarding what, if anything, we want to do or can do to stop the raids.

<sup>4/</sup>Apparent reference to Document 297.

4. Exchange with USSR on Cuba: Attached as Tab 4 is the latest on Cuba from Moscow. In Khrushchev's absence, Ambassador Kohler talked to Kuznetsov. The background cables are also included in Tab 4.<sup>5/</sup>

<sup>5/</sup>See Documents 293 and 294.

5. The Flow of Cuban Refugees: HEW's John Thomas told me about the recent unofficial (no-funds, no-staff) hearings held in Miami by representatives Pepper and Fascell on the depressing impact of the Cuban refugees on the Miami area. The hearings tended to exaggerate the problem and to cover up for indigenous problems in the Miami area--e.g. the bad year for the citrus fruit industry and a decline in the tourist industry. Mr. Thomas felt that while Fascell has a real interest in the Miami situation and is probably aiming to get federal works projects, etc., Representative Pepper used the hearings primarily as a political device to further his own career. Mr. Thomas will send us a copy of the hearings as and when they are published.

While Mr. Thomas does not regard the Miami situation as explosive, he is not at all happy about it. Fifty-six thousand refugees have been resettled but over one hundred thousand still remain. It is necessary to increase the net outflow of refugees from the area. Just as important, it is necessary to show the Miami public that there is a substantial outflow.

Mr. Thomas noted that the problem is to make a dent in the settled refugee population. While these people are more difficult to resettle than newly-arrived refugees, Mr. Thomas hopes, within a month, to increase the rate from four hundred to eight hundred per week. (The rate of flow into Miami is now about fifty per week.) He has a number of devices for effecting the increase. Among other things, in about a week, he hopes to surface an organizational mechanism whereby Protestant resettlement facilities will be used to assist in resettling Catholic refugees. This will help a lot.

6. Subversion: The Krulak Subcommittee is now working on a paper to control the movement of Cuban funds in Latin America. Also, the Subcommittee is focusing on preparations for a meeting in Managua with Central American governments. The meeting, which was called for at Costa Rica, will be held on April 3 and 4. The pertinent portion of the Costa Rica declaration which lays the groundwork for the Managua meeting is attached as Tab 5.<sup>6/</sup>

<sup>6/</sup>For text of the Declaration issued at Costa Rica by the Presidents of the Republics of Central America, Panama, and the United States, March 19, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 234-238.

7. Americans Traveling to Cuba: Attached as Tab 6 is an excerpt from the President's March 21 press conference regarding the travel of Americans to Cuba. The Justice Department is now working on this one.

GC

## **299. Note by Director of Central Intelligence McCone**

Washington, March 26, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963. No classification marking. Drafted by McCone. This was an addendum to a

conversation between McCone and the President on March 25 lasting from 12:15 to 1 p.m. The main conversation was unrelated to Cuba.

#### ADDITIONAL NOTE IN MY MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT

The President and I engaged in a brief discussion of the Soviet plans with respect to Cuba. He indicated that he once felt that the Soviets would withdraw all of their forces from Cuba, but that he had now reached the conclusion that the plan had changed. Bundy volunteered that they at no time had said specifically that they were to withdraw all of their forces, in fact their particular wording was somewhat vague. McCone stated that indicators were conflicting. On the one hand, certain information such as the recent [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] report of Castro's own statements would lead one to the conclusion that a gradual and continuing withdrawal would take place; that the Cubans were trained and became proficient in operating advanced sophisticated Soviet equipment. This would take many months, probably the balance of the year and Castro welcomed this period of time because it would mean a continuing Soviet interest in Cuba. On the other hand, DCI pointed out that building of permanent installations and the arrival of undisclosed but apparently sophisticated equipment, although in small quantities, nevertheless important volume would indicate a conclusion that Soviets were there to stay, but perhaps on a somewhat reduced scale.

### **300. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, March 27, 1963, 7 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exile Activities. Secret; Operational Immediate.

2420. Eyes only for Secretary. Deptels 1933 and 1950;/1/ Embtels 2315/2/ and 2321./3/ Gromyko called me in at 4:00 p.m. Moscow time to make oral statement in response my March 16 statement to Kuznetsov. Translation his statement contained next following tel./4/

/1/Document 293 and footnote 3 thereto.

/2/Document 294.

/3/In telegram 2321, March 17, Kohler stated to Kuznetsov that the President's message (see footnote 2 above) was a "purely private communication for the Chairman from the President which would not be published." Kohler did warn that Khrushchev could "decide to come back hard and publicize. Consequently we should be alert to this possibility." (Department of State, Central Files, POL Cuba-USSR) See the Supplement.

/4/See Document 301.

Subsequent 30-minute discussion began with Gromyko's asking me transmit contents of statement to President and saying he wished to add a few words about note Embassy received earlier today regarding attack on L'Gov (Embtel 2422)./5/ He said MFA had received word just before our meeting about analogous provocation involving another Soviet ship in Cuban port./6/ MFA did not yet have details and would in due course give Embassy Soviet reaction to this new provocative act. But, it appeared USG underestimated gravity of such provocative actions against Cuba and Soviet ships. If it correctly estimated gravity of such actions, it would not permit them to take place.

/5/In telegram 2422, March 27, the Soviet Foreign Ministry protested the attack on the Soviet cargo ship L'Gov in the Cuban port of Isabela La Sagua and insisted that the United States take measures to prevent such acts in the future. The Foreign Ministry stated that "Surely [it is] clear, that without material support of US Government and without supplying of American weapons and ships, group of traitors to Cuban people, sheltering on territory

USA would not be able undertake these kinds provocation." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exile Activities)

/6/The Lambda 66 Cuban exile group attacked the Soviet ship Baku when it was loading sugar in the Cuban port of Caibarien. The raiders had a free lance photo journalist aboard. See memoranda from Chase to McGeorge Bundy and Clifton to the President, March 27. (Ibid.) The texts are in the Supplement. On March 30 the Departments of State and Justice issued a statement that they neither supported nor condoned these attacks which were probably counter productive. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 22, 1963, pp. 600-601.

I said I first wished to comment on his oral statement. President's intention had been to give private reassurance to Chairman Khrushchev as result of doubts President felt Chairman had expressed regarding USG policy towards Cuba. President had also wished express hope that SovGovt might exercise influence to alleviate situation. I said I should certainly report statement to President and assumed this remained a private exchange.

Gromyko said that was correct; for time being Soviets had no intention of giving information on exchange to press.

I said that, since I had no new instructions, I would not reply now to statement but would stand on what I had said before. With regard to L'Gov, I said I wished to call Gromyko's attention to Lincoln White's March 19 statement and to President's March 21 statement,/7/ that exiles who conducted raid had not come from US, that we did not feel these kinds of raids served useful purposes, and that we had not supported this and these men did not have connection with USG. I said these statements were already on record and it was thus appropriate to cite them today.

/7/See footnote 2, Document 298.

Gromyko said SovGovt acquainted with these statements, but has to ask itself how we can make such statements and at same time act in direct contradiction to them. SovGovt could not regard State Department statement as satisfactory. Its understanding of State Department statement is that if raids were bigger and more successful, that would be a different thing. As for SovGovt, it categorically condemns all acts of this kind. Can USG really hope to find serious people who can believe that it is not involved, when this exile scum was sitting under US wing? These groups only acted with the knowledge and connivance of USG. He wished to emphasize that USG is not attributing serious significance to these acts. On other hand, SovGovt regretted position taken by US. It was high time more sober approach was taken to such actions.

Gromyko continued, Caribbean crisis had apparently been settled, but he and I, like US and Sov representatives elsewhere, had to keep reverting to it. There was, however, one possibility for settling matter: USG should leave Cuba in peace. In Soviet view, this lies in best interests of US and whole world.

I said I felt I had to comment now because Gromyko's additional remarks had called into question statement of President. When we make these statements, we do so because they are true. I repeated raiders had not come from US territory. With regard to "scum", we have different understanding from Soviets of who are scum and who are honest people. As to question of fulfilling terms of Oct. 27-28 agreement, they had never been fulfilled. Provisions for inspection and verification had not been made. What did Soviets want us to do: protect Cuba from such raids? It should be clear to them we are not going to do so. Just as Soviets expect many countries to opt for communism, we expect many countries, including Cuba, to opt for freedom. Perhaps solution was for USSR to leave Cuba alone. I had pointed out to Dobrynin in Washington that this problem was poisoning our relations. If USSR would only leave Cuba alone, this poison would be removed. USG has recognized measures taken by SovGovt to reduce poison. But Oct. 27-28 agreement had never been fully realized, and that must be recognized.

Gromyko, moderating his tone, asked again whether we expected to find people who would believe our

statements that USG can do nothing at all about actions of these emigre groups. He fully recognized and appreciated that it did not please US when he pointed out there was no way to reconcile statements of top US officials with facts of provocations. New provocation had occurred only today. SovGovt was expressing hope that USG and President would take more sober approach to such serious provocations and would act in spirit of agreement that had been reached Oct. 27-28. USSR had always and would always act in accordance with this agreement. He was sorry to have to protest and would prefer not to do it, but circumstances compelled it.

I said, as was evident from statements I had cited, USG was opposed to these raids and would do everything it could to discourage them. I did, however, want to make it clear to him that USG did not intend to institute blockade of Cuba in order to stop such raids. I assumed Sovs would not like us to do so. However, there is great deal of Soviet activity on island. Perhaps they should stop it, since it was inflaming public opinion in US. Way to solve problem was to remove this element which poisoned US-Soviet relations.

Gromyko said difference in our positions was that USG was threatening Cuba and Cubans were taking steps to protect their frontiers. That was why Sov specialists were in Cuba. Chairman had explained this to President and there was little he could add at this time to that explanation. However, he agreed it would be good to remove poison. As afterthought, Gromyko said he assumed that by "poison" I meant these raids.

I said by "poison" I meant everything involved in Cuban problem: Belligerent statements of Castro, presence of Sov military, and reaction this evokes in US. I agreed that if we could eliminate all this it would be good. I asked whether they intended publish note on L'Gov.

Gromyko said they probably would. (Subsequently, his office called Emb to specify that both L'Gov note and their reply to our Alaska aircraft intrusion note would probably be published.) But, for time being, they regarded exchange of oral statements as private and did not intend publish.

Kohler



**FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES**  
**1961-1963**  
**Volume XI**  
**Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington

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## **Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath**

### **301. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, March 27, 1963, 8 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-2763. Secret; Operational Immediate. This telegram was inadvertently filed under the discontinued decimal filing system.

2421. Eyes only for Secretary. Following is translation oral statement made to me today by Gromyko.

*Begin text.*

In accordance with your request,/1/ contents of oral statement delivered by you on March 16 were brought to attention Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev.

/1/See Document 293.

I have been instructed to deliver following oral reply to that statement.

Statement which you delivered expressed concern of President USA over certain remarks by Chairman of USSR Council Ministers N.S. Khrushchev, which were interpreted by President to mean that, in N.S. Khrushchev's opinion, President's position regarding Cuba had in some way changed recently. In that connection, you made reference to N.S. Khrushchev's conversation of March 6, 1963, with Mr. Trevelyan, Ambassador Great Britain in Moscow./2/

/2/See footnote 3, Document 292.

What can be said in this regard? Chairman of USSR Council Ministers Khrushchev pointed out in above-mentioned conversation with Mr. Trevelyan as well as on number other occasions, that remarks are heard more and more frequently in USA to effect that USA Government had made no commitment not to invade Cuba. N.S. Khrushchev emphasized that such remarks are very dangerous and are fraught with fatal consequences, since this can lead to destruction in embryonic stage of that confidence--even though it be slight--in the (given) word, which developed during settlement of crisis in Caribbean area.

There were more than adequate grounds for these remarks of Chairman USSR Council of Ministers. Government USA is of course aware of this and there is hardly need to enumerate now all statements, including those of American officials, which cast doubt on fact that US had taken upon itself commitment not to invade Cuba.

Now US Ambassador has stated in name of President that President's position in regard to Cuba has not

undergone any kind of change. If this statement is to be understood to mean that US Government intends to abide strictly by its commitments on settlement of crisis in Caribbean Sea area, Soviet Government is prepared to welcome this. Substance of commitments which parties assumed during exchange of messages between Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers and President of United States on October 27 and 28, 1962, are well known. It is not necessary to prove that fulfillment of these commitments by parties is most important guarantee for maintaining peace in Caribbean area.

As far as Soviet Government is concerned, it, showing its concern for strengthening of peace and normalization of situation in this region, is conforming invariably to understanding laid down in above-mentioned messages and is strictly observing commitments which it took upon itself. Moreover, Soviet Government has often undertaken steps, including some quite recently, which go even further than commitments which it took upon itself on October 27 and 28, 1962, regarding settlement of crisis in Caribbean area. Soviet Government has a right to expect from Government of USA a similar attitude toward its commitments including, of course, commitment on non-invasion of Cuba.

Unfortunately, however, statement transmitted by US Ambassador on March 16, can also be understood in different sense. One cannot but draw attention, above all, to the fact that this statement in expounding position of US Government regarding Cuba, lays emphasis not upon commitments of the parties which were assumed during settlement of crisis in Caribbean area, but upon statement of US President at his press conference on November 20, 1962. In addition, this statement bears strictly unilateral character and therefore has never been considered and cannot be considered as integral part of understanding which was achieved on settling crisis. It is in direct contradiction both to commitments of USA for settling crisis in Caribbean area and also to norms of international law. It is not difficult to imagine dangerous consequences to which such a policy could lead and serious trials to which it could subject world.

In statement, transmitted by US Ambassador on March 16, it is claimed that Government of Republic of Cuba is threatening Government of Venezuela and even supporting some sort of actions undertaken against Venezuela. Question arises: what is purpose of such arbitrary statements, all the more so since we are invited, in connection with them, to exert some sort of influence on Government of Republic of Cuba. Isn't the real intention that of undertaking new dangerous steps against Republic of Cuba based on statement of President of USA of November 20. It is certainly well known to all that it is not Cuba which threatens Venezuela or any other states in Western Hemisphere, but, on the contrary, USA and some of its allies which threaten Republic of Cuba, call for overthrow of its government, and organize subversive activity against Cuba on wide scale.

It is precisely this policy of USA, and not any sort of "aggressive Communist initiatives," which are source of new danger to preservation of peace in Caribbean area, new danger to peace throughout world.

In this connection, one cannot but draw attention to fact that reference was again made, in oral statement of March 16, to intention of Government of USA to continue reconnaissance flights over territory of Cuba. What is purpose of raising this question now? Can it be for purpose of legalizing such flights and obtaining our agreement to them? But Government of USA knows well that Soviet Union always opposed and continues to oppose such actions by USA, which are crude violation of international law and of UN Charter. Efforts to justify continuation of such flights by references to necessity of inspection of territory of Cuba cannot be recognized as having any basis, since question of inspection has not existed for a long time. There is no point now in returning to all the ins and outs of this question; it was resolved in course of settling crisis in Caribbean area. It is only necessary to emphasize that continuation of completely unjustified provocative flights by American planes over Cuban territory, which evoke legitimate indignation, particularly in Cuba, can lead to most serious consequences, full responsibility for which will rest on Government of United States, and only on it.

We believe that situation in Caribbean area can be normalized once and for all and that conditions can be created there for establishment of a really durable peace. For this only one thing is necessary: That USA should not interfere in internal affairs of Cuba and should renounce attempts to export counterrevolution to Cuba.

If President of USA would use his influence in this direction, he would thereby make great contribution to cause of eliminating dangerous tension which still exists in Caribbean area. Soviet Government is convinced that precisely such a course of policy corresponds both to interest of establishing peace in Caribbean area and to interest of improvement of Soviet-American relations and relaxation of international tension. As far as Soviet Government is concerned, it invariably stands for such a course in international affairs.

*End text.*

Kohler

### **302. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy**

Washington, March 28, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 3/63. Confidential. Drafted by Robert Follestad, Officer in Charge of the Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, and cleared by Martin, Cottrell, and U. Alexis Johnson.

Dear Mr. President: I am concerned that hit and run raids by Cuban exiles may create incidents which work to the disadvantage of our national interest. Increased frequency of these forays could raise a host of problems over which we would not have control.

Actions such as yesterday's exile attack which caused substantial damage to a Soviet vessel may complicate our relations with the USSR without net advantage to us.

I therefore propose several measures which could impede or deter further attacks of this nature./1/

/1/In a March 28 memorandum Chase alerted Bundy to the recommendations proposed in this letter. Chase also informed Bundy of his conversations at the Department of Justice on March 27. According to Chase, the discussions "indicated that the FBI is not doing a stellar intelligence job; they seem to know remarkably little about the activist groups. However, I have been told that FBI has been shaken up by this episode and that solid FBI contributions will be forthcoming today." (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

First, the intelligence community could increase its efforts in Miami to develop hard information about projected raids. This is currently communicated to Customs authorities charged with investigation of violation of arms control.

Second, Customs and the Coast Guard, on the basis of this information can stop and search the vessels. (They now do this, and picked up about 50 men and four boats last year.) Arms and vessels are confiscated, and participants arraigned if a violation of law has occurred. Bail is set in accordance with the severity of the violation. An increase of one or more vessels to facilitate current Customs and Coast Guard operations in the Miami area would be helpful.

Third, CIA, FBI and Customs officials in Miami could quietly inform suspects in the exile community that the United States intends to intensify enforcement of violations of pertinent laws relating to exile raids.

Fourth, the FCC could locate and close down illegal radio transmitters operating out of the Miami area in connection with these raids.

Fifth, we can inform the British Government of our plans to try to control these activities and express our understanding that the British Government has become increasingly concerned about the possibility that British

territory in the Bahamas may be used for these raids and may be considering action to police these areas more effectively.

These measures have not been discussed with any of the senior officials of the Departments concerned, but if any of the measures commend themselves to you, I suggest that a meeting of the interested Departments be called to discuss the problem.

Faithfully yours,

Dean Rusk

### **303. Summary Record of the 42d Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council**

Washington, March 29, 1963, 12:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. IV, 38-42, 1/25/63-3/29/63. Top Secret. The meeting lasted until 1:30 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) and was the last meeting of the Executive Committee.

The President said he had asked the Council to meet in order to talk about the two recent hit-and-run raids staged by anti-Castro refugees. The State Department has twice said that these raids are not particularly helpful. Even so, we must anticipate that there will be more such attacks. We have said the raiders do not take off from the U.S., but it is difficult to maintain that they do not get their supplies in the U.S. The question is whether we should take direct action in the U.S. to cut off their supplies or whether we should try to advise them to attack Cuba but not the Russians, with the result that the raids would draw less press attention and arouse less acrimony in Moscow.

Director McCone agreed that more raids of this kind are probable. The anti-Castro groups purchase supplies in the U.S. and come in and go out of the U.S. The raids are actually staged from the Bahamas and other than U.S. territory. The raiders would be extremely difficult to control because they are brave men fighting for freedom of their country.

Reading from a paper,<sup>1</sup> Mr. McCone said the continuance of the raids would cause trouble inside Cuba and would discredit Castro in Latin America if he was unable to prevent the raids. The Soviets, if the raids continue, might reappraise their support of Castro or, alternatively, raise directly with the President the continuance of the anti-Castro raids. Mr. McCone said his personal view was that there would be intense public and press criticism if we stand down these raids. He anticipated Congressional criticism as well. He recommended that we officially disallow the raids without acting to prevent the raiders from using the U.S. as a base.

<sup>1</sup>/See the attachment to Document 304.

Secretary Rusk said that the hit-and-run raids against Cuba, in an area which is under our military umbrella, will be blamed on us no matter what we say. No one would believe that we do not have the capability of preventing the raiders from leaving the U.S. If anyone is shooting Russians we ought to be doing it, not Cubans who are acting beyond our control. He predicted that if the raids continue, the result will be to draw Cuban and Russian forces further outside the territorial waters of Cuba in an effort to stop the raiding ships at sea and before they reach Cuban ports. Our air surveillance of Cuba will be complicated and the cost of our continuing overflights will increase because Cuban planes will be patrolling farther off shore, searching for incoming raiding ships. He recommended that the least we should do is to stop the violation of our laws. If we decide that such raids should be conducted, we should plan them ourselves and see that they are carried out under our control rather than as now occurs.

The President pointed out that the U.S. private ship, the Floridian, was probably shot at in retaliation for earlier anti-Castro raids.<sup>/2/</sup> The result is that we have to put our forces into action to defend U.S. ships.

<sup>/2/</sup>At approximately 6 p.m., March 28, two Cuban MIG aircraft fired on the U.S. ship Floridian in international waters off the north coast of Cuba en route from Puerto Rico to Miami. (Telegram 468 to Bern, March 29; Department of State, Central Files, POL 33-6 CUBA-US)

Secretary Rusk approved landing anti-Castro agents in Cuba who could be useful on the ground inside the country, but he said there was no benefit from hit-and-run raids which we do not control.

Secretary Dillon said it was impossible for us to control the raids. He said that after the ships leave Florida, they proceed to an island from which the raid is launched at a later time. In some cases larger ships leave U.S. ports and rendezvous with smaller ships at sea. A naval barrier off Cuba is the only sure way to stop these raids. The Coast Guard does not have enough boats to carry out this assignment. If our intelligence on the raiders improves, we can do much more to prevent the raiders leaving the U.S.

Secretary Rusk noted that in his discussions of the raid problem with Congressmen, he had noted a mixed reaction. Not all Congressmen supported the anti-Castro raids.

Mr. McCone said the Bahama Islands were being used by the raiders as the take-off point. He predicted that the number of raids will increase rapidly.

The President commented that these in-and-out raids were probably exciting and rather pleasant for those who engage in them. They were in danger for less than an hour. This exciting activity was more fun than living in the hills of Escambray, pursued by Castro's military forces.

Secretary Rusk doubted that the Russians would get out of Cuba as an answer to the harassment of the raiders, but rather will build up the power of the Cubans to prevent the raiders from doing any damage at sea or ashore.

Secretary McNamara said that we can stop the raiders if we use the Navy. If we don't want to stop the raids, we can modify them, making it difficult for the raiders to attack targets not of our choosing. In any event we can so act that we disassociate ourselves from the raiders and avoid charges that the raids are based in the U.S.

The President suggested that we first tell the British and then, on a background basis, tell the press that the raiders are staging out of the Bahama Islands.

The Attorney General said that we can slow down the raids if we wish and later stop them entirely if we so desire. We can do a great deal more to stop them than is now being done. The Coast Guard can stop outgoing ships. We can prosecute cases against those who are supplying ammunition to the raiders. We can prosecute the ten Americans who were picked up recently at sea with arms which were to be used by the raiders. We can create a deterrent against such raids.

At this point the President read part of the most recent Soviet protest, including the sentence which asked rhetorically where do these raids originate, from Europe?<sup>/3/</sup>

<sup>/3/</sup>Reported in telegram 2435 from Moscow, March 29. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exile Activities)

The Attorney General pointed out that we would look ridiculous if the raids continue and we say we cannot control them or prevent them.

Ambassador Thompson emphasized that we must prevent any raider plane bombing a Soviet ship.

Secretary Rusk repeated his view that raids which do not result in a penetration on the ground in Cuba are fruitless.

The Attorney General commented that we did have a problem domestically of explaining why we were stopping the raids, but we can stop them by prosecuting those involved and by making the raiders' stay in the U.S. very unpleasant.

Ambassador Thompson noted that we could say that attacks on Soviet ships could prevent the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba.

Mr. Harriman agreed with Secretary Rusk that the raids will not prompt the Soviets to leave Cuba, but rather to step up participation in Cuban military activities. He agreed that there was no value in the pin-pricking hit-and-run raids.

Secretary Dillon pointed out that even if we did not succeed in catching the raiders on their way out, we would have a serious effect on future raids if we caught the raiders upon their return.

The President asked that we handle this problem in such a way as to avoid the appearance of prosecuting Cuban patriots. He suggested that we tell the raiders that they must not attack Soviet ships--but could attack purely Cuban targets. The purpose would be to avoid heating up the situation to the point where the Russians would send destroyers to protect their ships in Cuban waters. We might tell the raiders that if they stop their present attacks and undertake to carry out assignments as guided by the CIA, they could continue, but if they refuse to accept CIA guidance, we would take action to prevent further raids.

Secretary Rusk felt there should be a prohibition against attacks on all kinds of shipping and a halt to all hit-and-run raids. He had no objection to raiding if people were actually put ashore.

Mr. McCone noted that the raiders will not go ashore because they know they will be caught. He said that even with extensive planning it is difficult enough to put in controlled agents. The CIA has means of informing the raiding groups that they should stop attacks on Soviet shipping or attacks on all shipping.

The President asked why we could not put pressure on the suppliers of the raiders. These suppliers would not be Cubans.

The Attorney General reported that the FBI is investigating the source of the raiders' supplies. He said the raiding groups were very small and it might not be possible to communicate with every group. We could proceed to arrest the raiders and later prosecute those against whom we had sufficient evidence. It did not appear likely that before the middle of April we would have a grand jury which would be responsive to our efforts to indict the raiders. In the meantime, however, we could slow down the raiders by passing word to them through the Coast Guard, the FBI, and other channels that we would not permit the continuance of their activities.

Secretary Rusk said that more public knowledge of the pressures we are putting on the raiders would, in his view, help our position.

In reply to a Presidential question, the Vice President said we would be irresponsible if we did not act against the raiders who were carrying out irresponsible actions that could result in getting us involved in a war. He said we should stop these irresponsible people. He suggested that the military prepare a plan as to how to halt the raids and inform all U.S. Government agencies that our policy was to prevent further raids. He would proceed against the suppliers of munitions. He predicted that, just as we would, the Russians will shoot back if the raiders continue shooting at Soviet ships. He acknowledged that there would be some criticism of our action, but felt that there would be much more criticism if we did not stop the raids. He urged that we inform the appropriate

Congressional Committees and other governments of our intention to stop the raiding.

The Attorney General said that one way of dealing with the raiders would be to prevent their return to the U.S. if they once leave without permission. Such action would be less drastic than prosecution. It would involve warning individual Cubans that if they left the U.S., they would not be permitted to return.

The President hoped we could pick out a good case for the first one to prosecute--not Robert Emmett, but rather an ancient arms dealer. The Attorney General noted that Americans are supplying the arms used by the Cuban raiders.

The President asked the Attorney General to meet with Mr. McCone and representatives of State, Defense, and the White House to draft an action program for his approval, to include the following points:

- a. Guidance by the CIA to the raiding groups.
- b. Discussion with the British about the use of the Bahama Islands by the raiders.
- c. Consideration of whether we should inform the press for background that the raiders are taking off from the Bahamas.
- d. Preventing the planned airplane raid, if necessary, announcing that we intend to stop the raid so that if it takes place, then all would be fairly and clearly warned.
- e. Ways of preventing the return of raiders leaving U.S. jurisdiction.

The President suggested that the group discuss their recommendations with him tomorrow.<sup>/4/</sup> He also asked that a policy statement for issuance to the press be prepared for his consideration.

<sup>/4/</sup>No further record of the meeting has been found.

Bromley Smith<sup>/5/</sup>

<sup>/5/</sup>Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

### **304. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, March 29, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963. Secret. Drafted by McCone.

#### **SUBJECT**

Executive Committee Meeting--12:30 p.m.--29 March 1963

#### **IN ATTENDANCE**

All present, plus Cottrell, Kaysen, Dungan and others

The President raised the question of what should be our policy on hit-and-run raids and asked my views. I reported my views as per the attached memorandum of 29 March. Secretary Rusk stated that the United States would be blamed for unauthorized raids, the Soviets would expect that we could stop them and they would

immediately take counter actions such as escorting ships, etc. On a minimum, we should act to disassociate ourselves and do all possible not to permit the continuance of unauthorized raids.

Dillon stated that we could not stop them because of the number of ports, small ships, inadequate coast guard facilities, etc. McNamara countered by saying that we could stop them by utilizing military resources. As a second alternative he suggested we might explore modifying our course of action and finally, should disassociate ourselves from responsibility. The Attorney General outlined various steps that could be taken to identify the leadership of the various groups and to either prosecute them or exclude them from the country through immigration procedures. Thompson and Harriman expressed particular concern over the reported airplane that was ready to bomb Soviet ship. Practically all in attendance thought that we should try and guide the operation away from attacks on Soviet ships because of obvious reaction of the Soviets. The Vice President felt that we would be criticized either from letting them go on the one hand, or stopping them on the other. He felt the military should immediately study that which should be done to stop them and all actions should be taken to halt the unauthorized raids.

The President then suggested a meeting be held this afternoon to determine a number of matters.

1. We should establish what our contacts are with the groups so that we can guide them effectively, whether we can stand down the operations.
2. A policy statement which State is undertaking.
3. The question of prosecution which the AG would undertake.
4. Discussing with UK since there is evidence that much of this originated in the Bahamas.
5. The question of any informal discussion with the Soviet Union.

At the meeting attended by AG, McNamara, McCone, Cottrell, Douglas Dillon, it was decided to send a group to Miami this afternoon for discussion with the Miami representatives of the FBI and CIA, Immigration officials, Coast Guard, etc. Principal purposes would be to:

1. Find out all we know about the groups, who they are, where they are, and what can be done about them.
2. Lateral transfer of information between CIA and FBI Miami. Apparently there is not sufficient exchange between CIA and FBI in Miami.
3. Ways and means of using Customs and Coast Guard for some of this.
4. Warning the unauthorized groups in advance of actions we intend to take against them. Also warning the suppliers of explosives, arms, etc.
5. FCC shut down illicit radio stations, provide a truck equipped with DF-equipment to locate the stations.
6. Explore what could be done to influence the groups away from Soviet targets. In this connection, the AG favored a complete stand down before any attempt was made to guide the groups.
7. Alexis Johnson expressed greatest concern over the plane matter and asked that the group take immediate action to immobilize the plane.

**Attachment/1/**

## Memorandum Prepared by Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, March 29, 1963.

/1/Secret.

### SUBJECT

#### Unauthorized Cuban Raids

1. Organizations such as the Second Front of Escambray, Alpha 66, and Lambda 66 are well-known in the Cuban colony in Florida and Puerto Rico. Their plans are discussed openly, are picked up by CIA and reported almost daily in our CIA bulletins.
2. There is no doubt that the individuals are in and out of Florida and Puerto Rico. The boats, outboard motors, guns, ammunition and explosives originate in the United States from legally licensed or unlicensed sources (of which there are many). We believe that the operations are staged out of the Bahamas and other non-U.S. areas.
3. The operations are skillfully executed by men of obvious courage and dedication. Apparently the organizations are building up and we can expect more rather than fewer instances in the future.
4. Obviously raids of this type will exacerbate problems with Castro and more particularly the Soviet Union and, from that standpoint, are undesirable. However, successful harassment will create very considerable annoyance, will stimulate internal dissension, will complicate Castro's problems and will have very considerable effect in discrediting Castroism in Latin America. Inability of Castro to deal with these raids might cause the Soviets to question the strength of his position and therefore reappraise their own position in Cuba. It is impossible to predict the result of such reappraisal. On the one hand it might cause them to question their presence in Cuba; on the other to reinforce it; and finally, might cause them to open up a discussion of their presence with the United States.
5. Finally, although it is outside of the competence of the Intelligence Community, it is my personal view that a concerted and publicized effort to "stand down" these operations would probably draw more public and press criticism in the United States than would result from tolerating these acts while officially disassociating the government from them through denial of both responsibility and control.

John A. McCone/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

### 305. Editorial Note

On March 31, 1963, British and Bahamian armed forces captured on Exuma Island in the Bahamas an armed motor boat, the Violyann III, carrying 16 Cuban exiles and 1 American. The United States had informed British/Bahamian authorities that the Violyann was seeking to refuel in preparation for an attack on a Soviet tanker.

At the 510th meeting of the National Security Council, April 2, the President and the Council discussed the status of the arrested raiders. According to Bromley Smith's summary record, April 2, the discussion went as follows:

"At this point Assistant Secretary Martin and Mr. Dungan joined the group at the President's request to discuss the current status of the Cuban raiders who have been arrested by the British in the Bahama Islands.

"Mr. Martin said the present plan was for the British to turn the raiders loose on their boat three miles off the Bahamas. The U.S. Coast Guard would pick them up there. If they refuse to go to Miami, the question before us is what do we then do?"

"After a discussion of the legal points involved, the President expressed his view that we should ask the British to take away from the raiders all their ammunition, and that we would ask the leaders to come peacefully to a U.S. port. If they refuse to come into the U.S. territorial waters, the U.S. Coast Guard ship would follow them but not fire on them. We would soon know the names of the raiders on the ship and would seek to apply pressures on them to agree to enter a U.S. port. If a threat to prevent them ever again from entering the U.S. was not effective, the Coast Guard would report the situation to Washington for additional guidance." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings)

According to a memorandum from Chase to Dungan, April 2, the U.S. Government's plan was to ask the British to confiscate the raiders' ammunition. When, and apparently if, it returned to Miami, the *Violynn* would be impounded, and the American and Cubans who were not parolees would be questioned and released within a few hours. Parolees would be questioned and released in 24 to 36 hours. (Ibid., Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 4/63)

### **306. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, April 3, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 4/1-4/20/63. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten "(a.m.)" was placed after the dateline on this memorandum.

#### **SUBJECT**

Cuba Coordinating Committee--Covert Operations in Cuba

Attached is an agenda/1/ which was discussed at a meeting of the Cottrell Committee on April 1. The meeting was attended by Secretary Vance, Joe Califano, Dick Helms, Dez FitzGerald, and Bob Hurwitch.

/1/The attached agenda lists items 1-6 included in this memorandum.

1. Balloon Operations Over Havana--The plan is well under way. Assuming the winds are right, CIA proposes to release balloons containing 300,000 to 500,000 leaflets on May Day (before daylight). The balloons will not be visible by radar or by the naked eye. The leaflets will (1) attack Castro's henchmen, and (2) contain cartoons illustrating sabotage techniques.

The decision on the balloons is scheduled for another review during the week preceding May Day.

2. Training of CIA-Sponsored Cuban Exiles on Military Reservations--CIA and the Army are now working on this one to find appropriate installations.

3. Russian Language Programs--The Committee decided in favor of instituting three programs (Radio Liberty, Radio Caribe, and an intrusion program). It decided against setting up an [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] on the grounds that it is an unnecessary duplication.

In approving the three programs for Special Group consideration, the Committee recognized that they will probably be of marginal value only; however, they will cost us very little, financial or otherwise.

4. Sabotage of Cuban Shipping (19 ships)--The Committee discussed three forms of sabotage--limpets, incendiaries in the cargoes, and abrasives in the machinery.

The Committee decided against limpets [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] and even though it would be a dramatic morale booster. Unfortunately, there is no certain way of controlling a limpet; it could sink a ship and the sinking could be billed as a U.S. submarine attack. Secretary Vance came down hard against sinkings.

The Committee will recommend to the Special Group the incendiaries which would be timed to go off in international waters and the abrasives in the machinery. While the propaganda boost might be nil, they are easier to effect than limpets and could really hurt Castro.

The Committee gave CIA the option of using either its own Cubans or of using DRE as a cut-out.

5. Redirection of Cuban Exile Group Operations--The Committee discussed this one briefly--i.e. what is an acceptable target? Dick Helms pointed out that although these groups may start out to get a non-Soviet target, once you let them go, you can never really be sure what they will do. Bob Hurwitch seemed to favor the approach that attacks and sabotage should appear to come from inside rather than from outside Cuba.

The Committee came to no decision on this one. More thinking is needed.

6. Propaganda Inside Cuba to Attack Soviet Troops--While Secretary Vance expressed some concern about the possibility that this would lead to a conflagration between the Cubans and the Soviets (what would we do), the Committee decided in favor of this course of action. While the results will probably not be startling for our side, the costs and risks are small. (I'm not sure a conflagration would be such a bad thing for us, even if it did occur. How much chance would these 5,000 combat troops have against the huge and well-equipped Cuban army? I don't think the Russians would dare try to impose their will by force; they would have to grin and bear it.)

Comment:

1. In considering specifics of a covert program, I think we should keep in the back of our minds the possibility that we may want to turn our policy around sometime in the future. This does not necessarily mean that we would rule out covert operations--rather, we would probably want to direct them towards splitting the Cuba/Soviet tie (e.g. a "Russki Go Home" campaign) instead of forcing Castro to embrace the Soviets more tightly (e.g. inactivation of Cuban shipping which would lead to further Cuban dependence on Bloc shipping). In this regard, we may wish to consider carefully the gains and risks involved in directing more violent efforts against selected Russian targets within Cuba. I have a feeling that the risks are not as great as they seem.

2. Assuming we continue our present policy or consider a turn-around policy very far down the road, I like an active covert program. It seems to me that a good sabotage program is one of the few tools we can use to really hurt Castro economically. Our present policy of isolating Cuba from the Free World is not going to bust Castro. Instead, I suspect that the Cuban economy is at its low right now. With no effective U.S. covert intervention, it will probably grow healthier from here on as the Cuban economy moves from the difficult transition stage between economic dependence on the West and economic dependence on the Bloc.

GC

**307. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, April 3, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 4/1-4/20/63. Secret; Eyes

Only. A handwritten "(p.m.)" was placed after the dateline on this memorandum.

## SUBJECT

Cuban Coordinating Committee--Covert Operations

The Cottrell Committee held a meeting on Wednesday afternoon to discuss covert operations. Secretary Vance, Dez FitzGerald, Bob Hurwitch, and Joe Scott attended.

### 1. Propaganda Inciting Cubans Within Cuba to Attack Soviet Troops

The Committee discussed the program outlined in the attached document/1/ and agreed to recommend it to the Special Group. These attacks will be useful since they will tend to exacerbate relations between every Cuban and every Russian in Cuba. Besides, the Communists are doing the same thing to us in Vietnam.

/1/Memorandum from Cottrell to the Special Group, April 3, entitled "Propaganda Inciting Cubans Within Cuba to Attack Soviet Troops." (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

There was an interesting discussion about where to stop regarding Cuban attacks on Soviet troops and installations. The general consensus was that it was O.K. for individual Cubans to attack Soviet troops or installations (e.g. throw a grenade over the camp fence) but that it was undesirable for groups of Cubans to organize attacks against the Russians. Dez FitzGerald pointed out that, under present circumstances, any action which requires organization is highly dangerous. Also, the Committee felt that the organized attacks would initiate wide-spread reprisals by the Castro government; this was not generally considered a good thing.

### 2. Shipping Sabotage--Limpets

Dez FitzGerald brought up again the issue of attaching limpets to Cuban ships; this had been turned down by the Committee on Monday/2/ because of the possibility that the limpets would sink a ship. Dez said that, upon further reflection, he felt we were giving up a good thing; also, the danger of a sinking was a very small one. Dez went on to say that he came away from Wednesday's meeting with the President/3/ with the feeling that the President would like some noise level in our sabotage program for morale purposes; limpets fill the bill.

/2/April 1; see Document 306.

/3/No further record of this meeting has been found.

Secretary Vance was reluctant to submit the limpet plan to the Special Group on Thursday. Instead, he suggested that the limpet plan be included on the list of major sabotage acts which is due to be submitted to the President next week. The Committee agreed.

GC

## **308. Memorandum From Attorney General Kennedy to President Kennedy**

Washington, April 3, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence, Vol. IV-A, 1/4/63-4/11/63. Top Secret. Drafted by Robert Kennedy; a copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy.

Mr. Markov of the Russian Embassy/1/ called this morning and said that the Russian Ambassador wished to come by and see me. I arranged for him to come in at 3:30 p.m.

/1/Petr I. Markov, Attache, Soviet Embassy.

We exchanged some pleasantries. He told me that Norman Cousins had asked to see Khrushchev and he had arranged it./2/ What was Cousins' relationship to the President? Then, as is his custom, he handed me a so-called "talking paper."/3/ This document was particularly long--approximately 25 pages. It was ostensibly to me from the Ambassador but in fact it was from Khrushchev to the President.

/2/Editor of the *Saturday Review* who met Khrushchev on April 12 to discuss the nuclear test ban treaty.

/3/For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, vol. VI, pp. 250-262.

The paper made five or six major points, among which were the following:

[Here follows Robert Kennedy's 2-page account of the talking paper's points on the test ban treaty; the full text is in *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, volume VI, pages 262-265.]

Another point that was made was a sharp and bitter criticism about the raids that had taken place against Russian ships. These were piratical acts and the United States must take responsibility for them. It isn't possible to believe that if we really wanted to stop these raids that we could not do so. They were glad to hear of the steps that are being taken lately but in the last analysis the specific acts, namely, the arrests that we made would be the criteria by which they would judge our sincerity. The Soviet Union questions whether in fact we wish to end these attacks for our criticism of them has been not that they were wrong but that they were ineffective. The clear implication was that if the raids had been effective they would have had our approval.

Further, our efforts to isolate Cuba, to build a virtual wall around it, was a barbaric act. Our actions to stifle Cuba's commerce and to create economic difficulties and isolate her from her neighbors in Latin America were completely unwarranted. The support given to counter-revolutionaries and the statements to the barbaric mercenaries in Miami by the President were also bitterly criticized.

The document also stated that the President should understand the continued pressure on the Soviet Union for the withdrawal of troops from Cuba was not going to be effective. The Soviet Union does not respond to pressure. As a matter of fact, they had already withdrawn twice as many troops as the largest number that had appeared in the newspapers here in the United States. However, he said that he was going to refuse to give the actual number that had been withdrawn because then public statements would be issued that they had been withdrawn because of pressure by the United States and "trumpets would have been blown" by us.

This letter took note of the criticism of the fact that the Russian SAM sites remained within Cuba. The author of the letter wanted us to know that those ground-air missiles were going to stay in Cuba for the protection of the Cuban people.

The overflights that were taking place were deeply resented by the Soviet Union and by Cuba. He then went on to say clearly and distinctly that these U-2 planes would be shot down and that this had better be clearly understood in the United States. The U-2 plane that Eisenhower sent over the Soviet Union was shot down and they had better understand the same thing would be done in those flights over Cuba.

The document then returned to the theme that we were treating the Soviet Union as inferiors; that this could not be continued; that the statements McNamara and Malinovski were making were not contributing to peaceful understanding; that Malinovski's statements were brought about by McNamara's warlike pronouncements. The United States was interested only in making profits from munitions, building up their efforts to dominate the world through counter-revolutionary activity. We were run by capitalists and we should understand that we could not push the Soviet Union around. He also expressed deep concern about the deployment of the Polaris

submarines in the Mediterranean, replacing the Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy.

At the end of the document it said that Mr. Khrushchev had felt in the past that this confidential exchange had been helpful but he said it had not been used lately because of the provocative statements that had been made by representatives of the United States Government which were offensive to the Soviet Union. However, if President Kennedy wanted to reopen this area of contact he would be glad to accept it. He also said that as far as a meeting between Khrushchev and President Kennedy he thought that that might be helpful. This was, however, left in rather enigmatic terms.

After I read the document I returned it to Dobrynin. I pointed out to him that I had met with him frequently and that he had never talked like this before. He said that was correct. I asked what was the explanation for this document and he said that I should understand that it came from the Soviet Union. I said it demonstrated a complete lack of understanding of the United States and President Kennedy and that I thought it was so insulting and rude to the President and to the United States that I would neither accept it nor transmit its message. I said if they had a message of that kind to deliver it should be delivered formally through the State Department and not through me. I said that during our conversations in the past we attempted to work out matters on a mutually satisfactory basis. I said we might disagree but I never insulted or offended him or his country or Mr. Khrushchev. I said I felt that was the only basis for any kind of relationship. I said I thought this kind of document did not further that effort or our mutual interests and I repeated that if they intended to transmit that kind of message that it should be done through the State Department. He said he could understand my position. He was obviously embarrassed./4/

/4/Thompson prepared a memorandum to Rusk, April 3, suggesting possible causes and motives for Khrushchev's message of April 3. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, Special US-USSR Files, 1963) See the Supplement. Thompson also met with Dobrynin on April 6, to discuss the message of April 3. Thompson said that there seemed to be a misunderstanding developing between the United States and Soviet Union. Thompson stated that he was thinking of suggesting to the President that a special envoy who had close contact with the President should see Khrushchev. Dobrynin thought it a good idea. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, Special US-USSR File, 1963) See the Supplement.

### **309. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Army's Special Assistant (Califano) to the Secretary of the Army (Vance)**

Washington, April 9, 1963.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77-0131, Sabotage/Destruction. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

#### **SUBJECT**

Presidential Action on Special Group Items Concerning Cuba

1. The President rejected the balloon item on the recommendation of Ed Murrow.
2. The President approved the propaganda item (inciting Cubans to harass, attack and sabotage Soviet military personnel in Cuba) provided every precaution is taken to prevent attribution.
3. The President approved the sabotage of cargoes on Cuban ships and the crippling of ships (through sand in the gears, etc.).
4. With respect to Russian language broadcasts, the President (a) rejected such broadcasts by exile groups over

Radio Caribe in the Dominican Republic, (b) rejected black intrusion on Radio Moscow Russian language broadcasts, and (c) withheld a decision on the use of such broadcasts on Radio Liberty from North Carolina, pending consultation with Llewelyn Thompson.

5. Pursuant to Special Group approval of the use of DoD facilities to support training of CIA agents, General Rosson and I met with CIA representatives yesterday and agreed to provide certain weapons training on a military reservation, under such circumstances that the trainees would not know they were being trained by military personnel and would not know they were on a military reservation. Such training will probably commence within the next several days. Parachute jump training under comparable circumstances will commence at a later date but within the next few weeks.

6. We have also agreed with CIA that we would spot about 20 inductees now in training at Fort Jackson whom we consider to have the necessary characteristics for CIA operations inside Cuba. These personnel, along with those given jump training under 5 above, would also be used in advance of the introduction of Special Forces, should there be a decision to invade Cuba.

7. It now appears virtually certain that Dr. Cardona will resign within the next day or two.

JACJr/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears these type initials.

### **310. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to President Kennedy**

Washington, April 10, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, JOB 80-B01285A, DCI's Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. A note on the top of the memorandum reads: "Read by the Pres 4/10 at 1:00 p.m. Note retained."

#### **SUBJECT**

Donovan Negotiations with Castro

1. James Donovan returned from Cuba yesterday after a four-day visit. As a result of talks with Castro, the Americans imprisoned on the Isle of Pines are to be released on 22 April. During the intervening period Castro will observe closely American policy toward Cuba and make sure that the Red Cross deliveries are being concluded in good faith.

2. The main thrust of Donovan's discussion, however, was political and can best be evaluated by a very confidential statement made to Donovan by Doctor Vallejo, a close personal advisor of Castro who was present at the meetings. Vallejo said Castro knew that relations with the United States are necessary and Castro wanted these developed. However, there are certain Cuban Government officials, communists, who are strongly opposed, even more than certain people in the United States. These officials are under close surveillance. They have no great following in Cuba; but if they rebelled at this time, Cuba would be in chaos. He believed that Donovan and Castro could work out a plan for a reasonable relationship between the two countries./1/

/1/The Donovan-Castro meetings were discussed after what McCone called an Executive Committee meeting on April 10. McCone was mistaken. it was a meeting of the full Council, dealing mostly with Laos, after which McCone and the President had a private meeting. In that meeting Kennedy expressed great interest in the information in paragraph 2 and raised questions about Castro's future within Cuba, with or without the Soviet presence. McCone stated that the matter was under study and he proposed to send Donovan back to Cuba on

April 22 to secure freedom of the remaining prisoners and also keep the channel of communication open. McCone worried that there might be a confrontation over U.S. aerial surveillance between then and April 22, but the President insisted it must continue and the U.S. Government must be prepared to act if a plane was shot down. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

3. Donovan had two sessions with Castro, one for five hours, the other for fourteen hours. A variety of subjects were covered including the role of Red China in world politics, the Cuban economy, and Cuba's role in Latin America. In discussing any subject Castro came around to relating it to Castro's plan for developing Cuba. Castro finds the Soviet Union useful, but Cuba under Castro he claims will never become a Soviet satellite. He emphasized that the Cuban role in Latin America depended upon Cuba's viability rather than the export of subversion.

4. Donovan has the confidence of Castro, who believes that Donovan is sincere and direct with no official ties to the United States Government. Our debriefing of Donovan is continuing.

John A. McCone

### **311. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, April 11, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 83, April 18, 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to U. Alexis Johnson, Gilpatric, and McCone.

#### **SUBJECT**

Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 11 April 1963

#### **PRESENT**

Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. McCone

Dr. Scoville, Colonel Ledford and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1-3

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 4

[Here follows discussion of items 1-3, unrelated to Cuba.]

#### **4. Cuban Operations**

Mr. FitzGerald expanded orally on the paper of 9 April,<sup>1/</sup> giving a summary of the recent results in the agent infiltration program, and outlining proposals in this field for the next month. The Group approved this projection. In response to a question about the status of Manolo Ray's people, Mr. FitzGerald said that CIA was in touch with him from time to time, and that any plan he has to offer for activity against Cuba will be sympathetically received, but that he has not to date come up with any such proposal.

<sup>1/</sup>Reference is to a paper from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs to the Special Group, which outlines three specific sabotage operations proposed for April 15 to May 15. (Ibid., April 11, 1963) Another more general paper, also dated April 9, entitled "A General Sabotage and Harassment Program Against Cuba," was sent from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs to the Special Group. (Ibid.)

The comments from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, dated 11 April,<sup>2/</sup> on the three papers being considered at

today's meeting were noted. The Group requested that these comments be withdrawn and destroyed for security reasons. With specific reference to the comment that a proposed sabotage action should not be carried out on the target date of the 20th or 21st of April, Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that this date had been set before the status of the Donovan negotiations was known. He said that of course no activity of this kind would be allowed to interfere with those negotiations at this stage.

/2/Cottrell commented on both papers in April 11 memoranda to U. Alexis Johnson. (Ibid.) The third paper has not been identified.

There then ensued a lengthy discussion of the entire question of sabotage. The Group agreed that the papers before it were responsive to requests which had been levied on CIA to come up with general and specific proposals. On the other hand, all members of the Group recognized that a searching examination must be undertaken in the light of all pertinent factors, to determine whether we wish to change the present policy. It was agreed that in order to provide a firm basis for judgment, we must get a clearer picture of capabilities, of the prospects of success, the extent of benefits to be gained from successful operations, the dangers of repercussions and of reprisals, etc., etc.

With respect to external operations to be mounted by exile groups, it was agreed that this sort of activity poses a real dilemma. Particularly in view of the recently-enunciated policy toward exile raids, it becomes increasingly difficult to disavow plausibly responsibility for such acts. The U.S. is thus placed in the position of either appearing to be ineffective in controlling the exiles or of bearing the onus of active involvement in the operations.

Mr. McCone expressed great skepticism about the desirability of proceeding with sabotage operations, to include training, until an over-all policy is made clear on steps to be taken to assure the removal of Soviet troops and on the problem of Castro. He also commented on the ineffectiveness of Cuban agents and the fact that they would undoubtedly talk if captured. Mr. FitzGerald confirmed the second point, but felt that these particular Cubans are perhaps more effective than the usual run.

It was decided that probably Friday, the 19th of April, a presentation should be made to higher authority at which time all responsible individuals should have an opportunity to express their views. A paper will be prepared, outlining: a proposed broad program for sabotage as well as examples of specific operations; a sense of the scale of activity which could reasonably be expected and the benefits from it; an estimate of what could be achieved by the use of internal assets; possible repercussions; and how such activity would fit into overall policy. CIA is to coordinate with State in the preparation of this paper./3/

/3/Apparent reference to Document 318.

[Here follows discussion of items 5-7, unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. Parrott/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

### **312. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev**

Washington, April 11, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence, Vol. IV-A, 1/4/63-4/11/63. Top Secret; Eyes Only; No Distribution.

Dear Mr. Chairman: It has been some time since I have written you directly, and I think it may be helpful to have some exchange of views in this private channel./1/ As we have both earlier agreed, it is of great importance that

we should try to understand each other clearly, so that we can avoid unnecessary dangers or obstacles to progress in the effort for peaceful agreements.

/1/In an April 11 memorandum to Rusk, Thompson stated that when delivering this message to Dobrynin on April 11 at 2 p.m., he told the Soviet Ambassador: "I wished to underscore one point in the message, and said that in doing so, I knew I was reflecting the views of my highest superiors, and that was the usefulness of continued withdrawal of troops from Cuba." (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, Special US-USSR Files)

[Here follow the President's remarks on the test ban treaty and the spread of nuclear weapons; the full text of the letter is in *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, volume VI, pages 265-268.]

Although together we found workable arrangements for ending the very dangerous crisis which was created when strategic weapons were introduced into Cuba last year, I am sure we can agree that the situation in that island is not yet satisfactory or reassuring to those who care for the peace of the Caribbean. Although the recent withdrawal of a number of your forces has been an important contribution to the reduction of tension, the continued presence of Soviet forces in Cuba can never be regarded with equanimity by the people of this Hemisphere and therefore further withdrawals of such forces can only be helpful.

Meanwhile, we on our side have been endeavoring to reduce tension in this area in a number of ways. For example, the fundamental justification of our practice of peaceful observation of Cuba is precisely that it is necessary to prevent further increase in tension and a repetition of the dangers of last fall. Without such peaceful observation in 1962, this Hemisphere would have been confronted with intolerable danger, and the people of the Hemisphere could not now accept a situation in which they were without adequate information on the situation in Cuba. It is for this reason that this peaceful observation must continue, and that any interference with it from Cuba would necessarily evoke whatever response was necessary to retain it.

We are also aware of the tensions unduly created by recent private attacks on your ships in Caribbean waters; and we are taking action to halt those attacks which are in violation of our laws, and obtaining the support of the British Government in preventing the use of their Caribbean islands for this purpose. The efforts of this Government to reduce tensions have, as you know, aroused much criticism from certain quarters in this country. But neither such criticism nor the opposition of any sector of our society will be allowed to determine the policies of this Government. In particular, I have neither the intention nor the desire to invade Cuba; I consider that it is for the Cuban people themselves to decide their destiny. I am determined to continue with policies which will contribute to peace in the Caribbean.

[Here follows a brief call for U.S.-Soviet cooperation on Laos.]

There are other issues and problems before us, but perhaps I have said enough to give you a sense of my own current thinking on these matters. Let me now also offer the suggestion that it might be helpful if some time in May I should send a senior personal representative to discuss these and other matters informally with you. The object would not be formal negotiations, but a fully frank, informal exchange of views, arranged in such a way as to receive as little attention as possible. If this thought is appealing to you, please let me know your views on the most convenient time.

In closing, I want again to send my warm personal wishes to you and all your family. These are difficult and dangerous times in which we live, and both you and I have grave responsibilities to our families and to all of mankind. The pressures from those who have a less patient and peaceful outlook are very great--but I assure you of my own determination to work at all times to strengthen world peace./2/

/2/Printed from an unsigned copy.

**313. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, April 11, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 4/1-4/20/63. Secret; Eyes Only.

**SUBJECT**

Cuba--Covert Actions

The Cottrell Committee met Wednesday afternoon/1/ to discuss a number of items which are to come up at the Special Group meeting. Secretary Vance, Sterling Cottrell, Dez FitzGerald, Bob Hurwitch and Joe Califano attended. Here are some of the points.

/1/April 10.

1. Black Operations--A number of new intelligence operations were approved with little comment.
2. Sabotage Targets for April/May--Dez FitzGerald presented three targets for approval--a railway bridge, some petroleum storage facilities and a molasses storage vessel. During the Committee's discussion and approval of the three targets, a number of points were made.
  - a. This will meet the President's desire for some noise level and for some action in the immediate future.
  - b. These are relatively soft targets. They will not hurt the Cubans terribly much. (Unfortunately, this is usually the case with soft targets--the ones that really hurt are hard and require extensive planning.)
  - c. These targets will not be attacked before April 22, if it looks as if the American prisoners will be released on that date.
  - d. The Special Group should be aware of the consequences of these raids. For example, raids from the outside may prompt Cuban firings near or at American ships.
3. Sabotage of Cuban Shipping--The Committee split on the question of limpets. Secretary Vance was against limpets because of the possibility of sinkings. While Cott went along with limpets, Bob Hurwitch pointed out that there are dangers in attaching them in Free World ports. It could prove very embarrassing to U.S. relations with other governments; this aspect should be considered on a port-by-port basis. Dez pointed out that operating in Havana harbor was difficult.
4. Attacks from the Inside--Dez pointed out that, as a general rule, it was difficult to control sabotage from the inside. So far, sabotage has been taboo; our people inside Cuba have been restrained. Once the taboo is lifted, it will be difficult to restrict them to certain targets; they may hit targets we never dreamed of. Also, we will not have control over the exact timing of the raids.

Dez said that probably one of the best targets inside Cuba is the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. It would really hurt the Cubans but would be a complicated and difficult job and would take about eight months to accomplish. He urged getting started on the planning.
5. Attacks from the Outside--The Committee agreed that these attacks could and should be approved on a project-by-project basis.

6. General--Dez feels that the President wants some action. Dez is working on a program which will show continuous motion. The soft targets, which are generally unimportant, will be first because they require the least preparation. As time goes on, however, we will be hitting some harder and more important targets.

GC

### **314. Memorandum Prepared by Director of Central Intelligence McCone**

Washington, April 15, 1963.

Source; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V. Secret.

As I analyze it, the situation in Cuba is about as follows:

1. Undeniably there has been a withdrawal. A figure of 4,000 can be supported by visual observation, analyses of shipping, refugee and clandestine reports.
2. There is no evidence of withdrawal of equipment. In fact, there is evidence of the recent introduction of some equipment of an undisclosed nature during the last several months.
3. Some reports, including statements by Castro and other high Cuban officials, would lead to the conclusion that a continuing, gradual Soviet withdrawal is to be expected and will be completed in about a year. At this time all Soviet equipment including SAM sites will have been turned over to the Cubans. This is contradicted by evidences of Soviet intention to stay in Cuba, the most persuasive being substantial permanent construction of facilities to house Soviet personnel.
4. At the present time the Soviets are manning the SAM sites, coastal defense missiles, KOMAR ships, MIG-21 aircraft and maintaining their 4 military encampments of about battalion size. The appearance of Cuban tents adjacent to each of the 4 camps could mean one of two things:
  - a. A Cuban training program, or
  - b. Utilization of Cubans for support activities such as camp maintenance, mess hall duty, etc.

Under the latter assumption, it could be that personnel withdrawn have been support personnel, and that the combat personnel remain intact. Soviet Cuban relationships remain strained but not as seriously strained as they were last Fall. A situation has evolved which both sides seem willing to live with. Castro is asserting and declaring his independence of the Soviets. He considers that he is not a satellite but he is obviously beholden to the Soviets for economic aid and military assistance.

5. We have no hard intelligence which would indicate a change in Castro's basic attitude toward other Latin American governments.
6. Castro's talks with Donovan have been mild in nature, conciliatory and reasonably frank. Of greater significance is Dr. Vallejo's private statements to Donovan that Castro realizes he must find a rapprochement with the United States if he is to succeed in building a viable Cuba. Apparently Castro does not know how to go about this, therefore the subject has not been discussed with Donovan.

### **315. Memorandum of a Conference With President Kennedy**

Palm Beach, Florida, April 15, 1963, 5:30 p.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on April 16.

## SUBJECT

Meeting with the President--5:30--15 Apr 1963

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

3. Discussed in some detail the Donovan negotiations in Cuba. Gave the President a copy of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] summary of the Donovan discussions/<sup>1/</sup> and a copy of my memorandum of April 15th on Cuba.<sup>2/</sup> President raised the question of Miro Cardona, stated that Cardona had misrepresented the facts. I urged that the President not involve himself personally in a public argument with Miro Cardona.<sup>3/</sup>

<sup>1/</sup>Not found.

<sup>2/</sup>Apparent reference to Document 314.

<sup>3/</sup>In an undated memorandum to McCone, written after April 13, FitzGerald reported that Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, had stated his intention to resign unless he had word that President Kennedy was prepared to discuss the matter with him or unless he had a clear indication that there was a plan for the liberation of Cuba. Miro planned to publish a resignation letter denouncing U.S. policy toward Cuba. FitzGerald stated that Miro's usefulness to the U.S. Government had ended, even if he should reconsider his decision to resign. (Central Intelligence Agency, McCone/DCI Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963)

I raised the question of the possibility of working on Castro with the objective of disenchanting him with his Soviet relations causing him to break relations with Khrushchev, to effect the removal of Soviet troops from Cuba, reorient his policies with respect to Latin America, and establish in Cuba government satisfactory to the rest of the Hemisphere. I explained to the President that the Cuban problem must be solved in one of two ways; either the manner outlined above or alternatively, by bringing consistent pressure of every possible nature on Khrushchev to force his withdrawal from Cuba, and then to bring about the downfall of Castro by means which could be developed after the removal of the Soviets troops (but not before) and thereafter establish a satisfactory government in Cuba. I stated to the President that we were studying both courses of action and I had not made up my mind concerning the feasibility of either plan. The President thought both approaches should be carefully examined and suggested the possibility of pursuing both courses at the same time. In any event it was decided that we should keep the Donovan channel open. I advised the President that Donovan has to return to Havana at the end of the week and that I will see him privately prior to his departure.

4. The President and I talked at some length concerning sabotage in Cuba. I expressed grave doubts and pointed out the hazards from his standpoint in view of the stand-down of the hit-and-run exile operations, the danger of attribution, etc. The President seemed to question whether active sabotage was good unless it was of a type that could "come from within Cuba." I said this was very difficult and that the initial operations conceived were from the sea. I said I thought a program should be engaged in only if it was an essential building block in an agreed program to remove the Soviets from Cuba and to take care of Castro.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

## 316. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, April 16, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meetings, 4/16/63. Secret. Drafted by Thomas A. Parrott of the National Security Council Staff.

SUBJECT

Review of Cuban Operations for the Standing Group of the NSC

Bromley Smith told me today that the "revived" Standing Group of the NSC/1/ would consider Cuba at its first meeting, next Tuesday at 5:00/2/ (the "regular" time will be 10:30 Tuesdays). He said that Cottrell will be asked to prepare a paper to be ready by the close of business this Thursday, the 18th./3/ This will be a status report, not an action document. Mr. Smith said Mr. Bundy had asked that he discuss with me the handling of the Special Group input.

/1/The new NSC Standing Group was comprised of the following officials: Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Harriman, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence McCone, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Taylor, Attorney General Kennedy, Under Secretary of the Treasury Fowler, Director of USIA Murrow, AID Administrator Bell, Special Counsel to the President Sorensen, and Special Assistant to the President Bundy who served as its chairman. The task of the revived Standing Group was to deal with matters of national security which did not require Presidential determination, a role different from the earlier Standing Group which had been established to organize and monitor the work of the NSC.

/2/April 23; see Document 322.

/3/Later--In view of the meeting with higher authority scheduled for Friday the 19th, it has been agreed that the covert annex would be more meaningful if prepared after that. Therefore, the deadline for this will be Monday afternoon. [Footnote in the source text. The annex is Document 318. Monday was April 22.]

I pointed out to Smith that while the members of the Special Group are also members of the Standing Group (with the exception of Harriman who replaces Johnson for State), some of the other Standing Group members have never been exposed to Special Group affairs and the remainder have been only sporadically. We agreed on the desirability of not spreading knowledge of covert operations any wider than absolutely necessary, if we are to preserve the principle of deniability.

I suggested that Cottrell be instructed to put the report on covert operations in a separate annex, and urged that this not be distributed in advance of Tuesday's meeting, as the basic paper will be. Mr. Smith agreed that this could probably be handled by passing the annex out at the meeting and retrieving it at the end.

Thomas A. Parrott/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

**317. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy**

Washington, April 17, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Hearings Before the Committee on Export Control. Secret. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson.

SUBJECT

Free World Shipping to Cuba

I. Present Status. Discussions which the United States has conducted with other maritime nations during the past several months about shipping in the Cuban trade resulted in positive action to remove Free World ships from the Cuban trade. Liberia, Turkey, Honduras and Panama have issued official decrees barring their ships from all trade with Cuba. West Germany has issued a decree prohibiting ships under its registry from trade between the Soviet Bloc and Cuba. More recently, a Greek decree prohibited Greek vessels not presently under charter to the Bloc from carrying cargoes to Cuba, and provided that Greek vessels will be withdrawn from the Cuban trade, as present charters expire. The Lebanese have assured us of their cooperation and state that they hope to rewrite their shipping laws within three months. Repeated approaches to the United Kingdom have not been productive, and HMG has reiterated its position that it does not have a legal basis for pulling its vessels out of the Cuban trade. However, HMG has engaged in informal discussions with British shipowners with some effect.

A further spur to action by foreign governments in this regard has been Section 107(b) of the Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1963, which in substance provides that no United States economic assistance (not including PL 480) shall be furnished to any country which "permits" ships under its flag to carry "items of economic assist-ance" to Cuba./1/

/1/Public Law 87-874, approved October 23, 1962; 76 Stat 1163-1170.

Another factor has been the fear of shipowners and operators that the ILA would not load cargoes in American ports if their ships engaged in the Cuban trade.

The result of all this has been that the number of Free World vessels calling at Cuban ports was reduced from 337 in the first three months of 1962, to 62 in the first three months of 1963. However, while the number of such ships reached a low point of 12 in January of 1963, it increased to 22 in February and to 28 in March. (The foregoing figures are in part based upon classified information and the public list of ships released by the Maritime Administration in accordance with NSAM 220/2/ shows 12 in January, 19 in February, and 23 in March.) However, as a part of the increased number of vessels shown for March arrived in ballast to carry out sugar cargoes, there has not been a corresponding increase in the goods brought to Cuba by Free World ships. Preliminary information indicates that the amount of such imports was about the same in March as in January.

/2/Document 277.

The following is a breakdown of the flags of the 78 ships which have arrived through April 17, 1963: United Kingdom 32, Greece 20, Norway 6, Lebanon 6, Italy 4, Yugoslavia 4, Spain 2, Japan 1, West Germany 1, Denmark 1, Morocco 1.

Since January 1, 1963, no Free World ship which has called at a Cuban port has subsequently called at a United States port. One vessel called at a United States port and then proceeded to Cuba. Pursuant to NSAM 220, commitments to withdraw their vessels from all Cuban trade have been or are in the process of being received from a line in each of Japan, Italy, Denmark, and West Germany.

II. Discussion. The Soviet Bloc has thus far readily replaced Free World vessels withdrawn from the Cuban trade, and can presumably do the same for the remaining vessels. Thus the effects on the Cuban economy are minimal. However, Free World vessels calling at Cuban ports have, in domestic opinion, become a symbol of the willingness of the Free World to cooperate with us with respect to Cuba. Replacement of Free World vessels also in some small degree may increase the cost to the Soviet Bloc of maintaining Cuba.

NSAM 220 was confined to vessels calling at Cuban ports rather than to all ships owned or controlled by a line largely in order at that time further not to exacerbate our relations with Poland and Yugoslavia. To have applied the NSAM to ships owned or controlled by would have meant that ships of those two countries could not have carried their customary share of PL 480 cargoes destined for those two countries. The shipping of those two

countries to Cuba has averaged one or two ships per month. It is likely that they will continue their participation in the Cuban trade irrespective of whatever measures we may take short of a naval blockade. Polish and Yugoslav ships are currently carrying United States-financed cargoes under the PL 480 agreements with those countries signed on February 1, 1963, and November 28, 1962, respectively. Yugoslav ships are also carrying some merchandise financed under an outstanding Export-Import Bank credit. Subsequently, a ship of the Moroccan Government line has called at a Cuban port. As this line is also carrying PL 480 cargo from the United States to Morocco, the effects on Morocco would be similar to those on Poland and Yugoslavia.

The strict application of Section 107(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act raises serious problems of fact and policy. Questions of fact are whether a country has "permitted" its ships to carry "economic assistance" and what cargoes may in fact be "economic assistance" as opposed to normal trade. Stringent and extreme application of the Act could result in the cutting-off of all economic assistance to the United Kingdom possessions such as Kenya, British Guiana, et cetera, as well as to Greece. The political disadvantages of such drastic action are of course obvious. Nevertheless, we have and are continuing to press the countries involved to purge themselves of all actions that could require us to invoke the Act. The Battle Act administrator (the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs) is, in accordance with the law, now assembling and transmitting to the AID Administrator factual information bearing on the application of Section 107 for legal determination required of the AID Administrator.

Because of measures now taken by the Greek Government, it appears that, as their charters expire, most if not all of the 20 Greek vessels which have called at Cuban ports since January 1 will be withdrawing from the Cuban trade. (The Greek Government is now assembling exact information on the terms of the various charters.) Commitments from the lines now being obtained will also assure the withdrawal of at least one of the four Italian ships, the one Japanese ship, the one Danish ship, and a West German ship which is now completing its charter. The principal remaining problem is thus the 32 British and six Norwegian ships.

The minimal additional public action that we could now take would be the extension of the provisions of NSAM 220 to all ships owned or controlled by anyone owning or controlling vessels engaged in the Cuban trade. Apart from the not inconsiderable problem of exacerbation of our relations with Morocco, Yugoslavia and Poland, this could have useful and important domestic and international psychological effects. At the request of the Department of State, the Maritime Administration is now urgently studying shipping patterns in order to arrive at some estimate of its practical effect. Preliminary information indicates that its practical effects might be minimal with respect to tankers, which comprise 16 of the 32 British ships engaged in the trade. Mr. McCone feels, and I agree, that it would not be desirable to take additional public steps during the present stage of Mr. Donovan's negotiations for the release of American prisoners in Cuba.

III. Recommendations. Considering all of the foregoing factors, I recommend that:

1. We make another approach to the United Kingdom, through their Ambassador here as well as in London, seeking United Kingdom cooperation and pointing out the necessity of our taking further action unless a prompt reduction in United Kingdom shipping to Cuba can be achieved.
2. Similar approaches be made to Norway, Italy and Spain.
3. We now make all administrative preparations for the issuance, at a time to be subsequently determined, of an extension of the provisions of NSAM 220 to ships owned or controlled by persons owning or controlling vessels engaged in the Cuban trade with a grace period of forty-five days to permit withdrawal of vessels in the course of a voyage at the time the extension is made public.
4. At a time subsequently to be determined, request United States owned or controlled oil companies to refrain voluntarily, within the Western Hemisphere, from bunkering vessels known to be engaged in the Cuban trade, and seek the cooperation of the United Kingdom in the application of a similar policy by British oil companies.

(This would have its principal impact on a number of very small vessels which now may be operating between Central American ports and Cuba.)

Dean Rusk/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.

### **318. Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs (Cottrell) to the Special Group**

Washington, April 18, 1963.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77-01131, Sabotage/Destruction. Secret; Eyes Only. A note on the bottom of this memorandum indicated it was prepared for the April 18 meeting of the Special Group, which deferred consideration of this paper until April 25. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 84 B, April 25, 1963)

#### **SUBJECT**

Proposed New Covert Policy and Program Towards Cuba

A. The following guidelines are being used in our present covert policy towards Cuba:

1. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to our basic policy objectives. (No offensive weapons reintroduced into Cuba, removal of Soviet forces, no aggressive Cuban military action, reducing subversion in the hemisphere, divorcing Castro from USSR, replacing present regime, maximizing cost to USSR, political isolation of Cuba and preparing for military contingencies.)
2. Intensifying covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime.
3. Supporting the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: a) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and b) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and c) secure intelligence.
4. The use of variety of propaganda media to stimulate passive resistance and low-risk, simple, sabotage actions by the populace of Cuba.
5. The placing of incendiary devices and/or explosives with suitable time delay within the hull or cargo to disable or sink Cuban vessels and/or damage their cargos while on the high seas.
6. Introducing abrasives or other damaging materials into the propulsion, communication and other systems of the ship to inactivate the ship.

B. The questions now to be decided are:

1. Should the U.S. move beyond the above policy to a program of sabotage, harassment and resistance activities?
2. What kind of effective action can be taken?
3. What capabilities do we possess?
4. What repercussions can we expect?

C. With respect to (1.) above, the following considerations apply:

1. U.S. policy statements have consistently reiterated the view that the liberation of Cuba is primarily a function of the Cuban people themselves.
2. The absence of continued harassment against the regime inside Cuba will consolidate its control and indicate the success of Castro in imposing Communism upon the Cuban people.
3. The absence of U.S. assistance inside Cuba to those who desire the overthrow of the Communist regime will deny an important asset.
4. The U.S. effort to assist the fighters for freedom inside Cuba will involve expense and risk of lives to those Cubans who are trained for this purpose.
5. The risk of U.S. involvement through confessions of captured personnel is a continuing one. However, world opinion in the event of such exposure is not likely to be severely damaging to the U.S. position.

D. With respect to (2.) (3.) and (4.) above, the following additional proposals are submitted for consideration (see Annex for details)./1/

/1/The annex, April 17, entitled "Prospects for and Limitations of a Maximum Covert Action Program Against the Castro Communist Regime," is not printed. (Ibid., Book I, Special Group) See the Supplement.

1. The placing of explosive devices with suitable time delays on the outside of ships either in Cuban or non-Cuban ports.

Considerations: UDT teams can be ready by June for attack in July on a once monthly basis. This measure would place increased strain on Cuban shipping and demoralize Cuban crews. Soviet reaction is likely in form of propaganda and UN demarche. Retaliation in kind or forceful reactions are probably unlikely.

2. Surface attacks by maritime assets firing on Cuban ships in Cuban waters. When the maritime asset cannot reach the target, shore based attacks on shipping in port or passing the offshore keys will be undertaken.

Considerations: Attack craft from the sea would be manned by Cubans. Shore based attacks by paramilitary trained Cubans firing on ships with recoilless rifles, rocket launchers or 20mm cannon. First sea attack in May and once monthly thereafter. First shore based attack in June. These operations would disrupt coastal commerce. US would probably be blamed. Cuban reprisal measures possible. Soviets likely allege US culpability. Probably no direct Soviet counter-action outside Cuba. Soviets would probably supply additional hardware to Cubans but caution against too aggressive Cuban response.

3. Externally mounted hit and run attacks against land targets. Examples: molasses tanker, petroleum storage dumps, naval refueling base, refineries, power plants.

Considerations: Operations conducted by Cubans with paramilitary training. High possibilities of complex operations going awry. First attack in April with one per month thereafter. Effects would be increased exile morale, some economic disruption. Repercussions would include charges of U.S. sponsorship, and increased Cuban security force activities. Soviet reaction likely to be propaganda-political moves and support to Cuban patrol activity but caution to avoid escalation.

4. Support of Internal Resistance Elements, providing materiel and personnel to permit them to undertake a variety of sabotage and harassment operations.

Considerations: The internal elements being supported will attack targets of their own choosing in their own manner. They will be targets of opportunity in line with their capabilities. Effect could be cumulative and snow-balling. The materiel will be introduced by maritime infiltration, diplomatic channels and concealment in open mail. Indigenous materials will be used and instructions provided. Initial sabotage results within 30 days. This program could produce major economic damage, lift morale and keep resistance alive. Repercussions would involve increased security measures. Soviet reaction largely propaganda and supplies.

## **Attachment**

### **SUBJECT**

A Covert Harassment/Sabotage Program against Cuba

I. This paper presents a covert Harassment/Sabotage program targeted against Cuba; included are those sabotage plans which have previously been approved as well as new proposals. While this program will cause a certain amount of economic damage, it will in no sense critically injure the economy or cause the overthrow of Castro. It may, however, create a situation which will delay the consolidation and stabilization of Castro's revolution and may cause some of his 26 July followers to doubt Castro's ability successfully to create a new Cuba.

Losses in men and equipment with the attendant adverse publicity must be expected. Even without such losses, U.S. attribution will be claimed.

When the policy and guidelines of the overall sabotage program are established, it will be possible progressively to develop up to a limit additional covert assets and support capabilities. However, materially to increase the pace of operations, a period of four to six months is required. Ultimate limiting factors are weather, length of "dark-of-the-moon" period each month and appropriate targets. A source of additional agent personnel is from Cuban personnel trained by the U.S. Military Forces under the recent programs, but released to civilian status.

### **319. Editorial Note**

At the 512th meeting of the National Security Council, April 20, 1963, the issue of Cuba was briefly raised. Most of the discussion at the meeting dealt with Laos; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, volume XXIV, pages 976-980. According to Bromley Smith's summary record, the discussion of Cuba was as follows:

"Director McCone said that our latest information was that the remaining twenty-three American prisoners would probably be leaving Cuba on Monday. He had reports that these prisoners were being moved from the Isle of Pines to Havana. Donovan appeared hopeful that the removal would be completed Monday.

"The President commented that with the prisoners out of Cuba, we might be in a position to act against Cuba if Khrushchev made no move to halt the deterioration in Laos. He asked what action we could take against Cuba.

"Director McCone said we should fly low-level reconnaissance missions which were necessary no matter what happens in Laos. He said we need to have pictures of Soviet convoys, some of which were described in considerable detail by Donovan upon his return from his last visit to Havana.

"Ambassador Thompson pointed out that a U.S. bombing raid on Pathet Lao forces in Laos would be easier for Khrushchev to accept than U.S. action against Cuba." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, National Security Council Meetings, No. 512, 4/20/63)

William Colby, Chief of the Far East Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, prepared an account of the meeting which he sent to Director of Central Intelligence McCone. Colby's extract relating to

Cuba reads:

"The President stated his belief that it was necessary to raise the pressure somewhat in Cuba. He felt that we could hardly continue to carry out a mild policy in Cuba at the time the Communists are carrying out an aggressive policy in Laos. He thus approved certain U-2 flights over Cuba. These flights and other activities against Cuba, however, will be delayed until the anticipated release by Cuba of prisoners on April 22. The President requested recommendations on April 22 for additional efforts which can be taken in Cuba." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963) The memorandum is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, volume XXIV, pages 985-988.

### **320. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Standing Group of the National Security Council**

Washington, April 21, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meetings, 4/23/63, Part A. Top Secret.

#### THE CUBAN PROBLEM

The attached papers are circulated as background material for the meeting of the Standing Group now scheduled for Tuesday, April 23, at 5:00 p.m./1/ This meeting will not aim at reaching agreed conclusions, but rather at an initial and wide-ranging discussion of the prospects and alternatives for American policy in Cuba.

/1/See Document 322.

The papers attached are intended mainly for reference, and much of their contents will be familiar. Except for Tab 1, which is a White House summary of the problem and of alternative approaches to it, these papers are forwarded from the Office of the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs. Through no fault of the Coordinator, these papers are not fully-up-to-date on certain special aspects of contingency planning, and they omit certain covert plans and operations on which there will be oral briefing Tuesday. The papers are as follows:

Tab 1--White House summary

Tab 2--(Annex 3), Current Situation/2/

/2/Annex 3 stated that the Cuban economy had continued to decline, with sugar production 60 percent of the 1961 levels, GNP 25 percent below the 1958 level with 20 percent less goods available. It concluded that Castro was the unchallenged leader of Cuba, with the mass of Cubans resigned to his rule and resistance weak and disorganized. The annex estimated that 9,600 Soviet troops and technicians had left Cuba, while in the same time 300-1,000 had arrived. Soviet withdrawals would continue slowly, but a large number of Soviet technicians would remain in Cuba indefinitely. See the Supplement.

Tab 3--(Annex 4), Multilateral Efforts to Isolate Cuba and Combat Castro-Communist Subversion/3/

Tab 4--(Annex 5), Cuban Hemisphere Subversion/3/

/3/Not printed.

Tab 5--(Annex 6), Economic Restrictions/4/

/4/Annex 6 suggested that economic restrictions were working. Free world shipping to Cuba was sharply

reduced, international civil aviation to Cuba had almost been entirely cut off, free world trade to Cuba was 20 percent of the 1959 figure, and strategic commodities had been blocked from going to Cuba. See the Supplement.

Tab 6--(Annex 7), Exile Problems/5/

Tab 7--Military Contingency Planning/6/

Tab 8--The Cuban Situation in Eighteen Months or Two Years (prepared by State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research)/7/

By separate distribution I am also circulating an unclassified compilation of the President's statements on Cuba./8/

/5/Annex 7 indicated that the U.S. refusal to support Miro Cardona's demand for an alliance of exile groups for military action under the Cuba Revolutionary Council (CRC) had caused Miro's resignation and would probably cause the disintegration of the CRC, a "desirable development." The annex noted that uncontrolled hit and run raids had been stopped, members of the Cuban Brigade were offered civilian and military opportunities, and 50,000 Cuban refugees had been resettled outside the Miami area, leaving 125,000 still in the Miami area. See the Supplement.

/6/Annex 8 contained a description of CINCLANT OPLANS for Cuba. See the Supplement.

/7/In this memorandum, April 18, INR concluded that the Cuban economy would deteriorate, the economic cost of Cuba to the USSR would be somewhat greater, the isolation of Cuba would increase, but otherwise the situation would remain essentially unchanged. It was therefore difficult to reach a definitive judgment on whether time was running out for Castro. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 4/1/63-4/20/63)

/8/Attached, but not printed.

McGeorge Bundy

## **Tab 1**

### **SUBJECT**

A Sketch of the Cuban Alternatives

#### **I. Present Policy and prospects**

Present U.S. policy toward Cuba has the following elements:

- (1) Prevention of a direct military threat to the U.S. or the Hemisphere from Cuba. To this end it is clear that all necessary measures will be taken.
- (2) Elimination of Soviet military presence from Cuba. Currently our level of effort here is limited to quite diplomatic pressure and careful public statement. Decisions on further action are deferred pending the result of current efforts.
- (3) Isolation of Cuba from the rest of the free world. To this end we are ready to exert considerable diplomatic and economic pressure on Western Allies.

(4) Counter-action against Cuban/Communist subversion in the Western Hemisphere. We are developing an extensive program of cooperation with Latin American governments in this field, and it is clearly our policy to develop this program energetically.

(5) Surveillance to Cuba by all appropriate intelligence operations. It is clear that the maintenance of this surveillance is essential in support of objective 1, above.

(6) Covert action to damage the Cuban economy. The possibilities of such action appear limited, but they have not been fully explored. It is current policy to develop additional resources for selective action in this field.

Opinions differ as to the probable result of this policy in the absence of major shifts inside Cuba or in Soviet or Cuban behavior. At Tab 8 is an informal memorandum from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department on this topic. This memorandum is to be supplemented soon by a community-wide intelligence assessment. The probability is that in the absence of new developments, the policy outlined above will not lead to early major change in Cuba.

## II. Possible New Directions

Broadly speaking, major changes in the situation can be produced in one of two ways: either we can await events which would permit or require new action by the United States Government, or we can initiate actions designed to produce major change, whether or not the actions of others produce crisis opportunities.

### 1. Contingency Planning

Contingency planning currently envisages three kinds of cases in which stepped-up action is intended:

- a. Interference with U.S. surveillance
- b. Any new major Soviet military intrusion or any significant military move from Cuba against the Hemisphere
- c. Possible general action against Cuba in the context of an international crisis originating elsewhere.

Contingency planning for b. and c. is limited so far to straight military planning on a wholly hypothetical basis. Planning for a. is primarily directed toward the immediate objective of insuring continued surveillance by a minimum necessary force. The broader political question is whether these or other contingencies should be regarded as opportunities for deliberately enlarged action aimed at a major political result. On the one hand, contingency planning can be based on the premise that we wish to protect and restore the situation existing immediately before the new crisis; this was essentially the purpose of U.S. policy in the October missile crisis. Alternatively, contingency planning can be developed with the purpose of using a given critical development as a means of changing the situation in ways advantageous to us. It is obvious that greater commitments of force and greater risks are inevitable in such alternative planning, and it is equally obvious that these greater commitments and risks may not be desirable in any given case. The point here is simply that such choices are a necessary element of the choice of responses to any particular contingency. Perhaps the Standing Group should give some attention to the question whether wider contingency planning--or at least contingency thinking--is needed.

### 2. Possible New Initiatives

- a. A decision to force a non-Communist solution in Cuba by all necessary means.

Such a decision would imply the development of pressures which would insure gradual escalation of the confrontation in Cuba to whatever point was necessary to produce the overthrow of the present regime. Such a

policy would not exclude the use of contingencies as a means for advancing U.S. policy, but it would require that the pace be forced and that pressures be sustained in such a way, at every stage, as to prevent solutions short of overthrow of the regime. A program of this kind might or might not be openly avowed at the outset. It might proceed at varying rates of speed and with varying concern for public support here and abroad. Probably its dominant feature would be a willingness to use military force to invade Cuba, and it seems probable too that this invasion would have to be carried through.

b. A decision to insist on major but limited ends.

The United States could deliberately adopt a policy of gradually increasing pressure designed to produce more limited results at least initially. Possible objectives are the total withdrawal of Soviet military forces, the verifiable abandonment of subversive training in Cuba, the reopening of the island to peaceful on-site visitation and inspection by non-Communists--or all three. Such a program again might be developed at varying rates of speed and with varying combinations of political and military pressure. Probably it would require a clear willingness to move to the level of a POL blockade, and at a guess such a blockade might in fact have to be established at some point.

c. The U.S. could move in the direction of gradual development of some form of accommodation with Castro.

Faint hints of this possibility appear in Donovan explorations and elsewhere. There is always the possibility that Castro or others currently high in the regime might find advantage in a gradual shift away from their present level of dependence on Moscow. In strictly economic terms, both the United States and Cuba have much to gain from reestablishment of relations. A Titoist Castro is not inconceivable, and a full diplomatic revolution would not be the most extraordinary event in the 20th century. The Special Group may feel that this possibility also should be explored.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the three possibilities sketched above are not wholly exclusive of one another. In particular, the process of gradual pressure outlined in b. could be developed in support of both course a. and course c. Indeed, it is possible to begin on course b. without deciding between a. and c., and conceivably the process of gradual pressure could be so developed that Castro could be made to confront a decisive choice between his overthrow and an accommodation on terms acceptable to us.

McGeorge Bundy

**321. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (Kent) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone**

Washington, April 22, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V. Secret. A note on this memorandum indicates it was part of the President's weekend reading of April 27.

SUBJECT

Cuba a Year Hence/1/

/1/A National Intelligence Estimate on the Cuban situation and prospects is now scheduled for USIB consideration in May. [Footnote in the source text.]

CONCLUSIONS

1. Various indications and evidence which have accumulated during the past two months seem to us to form a

pattern which permits certain tentative conclusions to be drawn respecting trends in Soviet-Cuban relations and in Soviet intentions respecting Cuba. It now appears that the Castro regime and the USSR have overcome for the most part the difficulties in their relations resulting from the October missile crisis and have managed to devise a common policy aimed primarily at easing tensions over Cuba in order to be able to consolidate the present regime. They probably intend to continue this policy until they are satisfied that Cuba can again be used as a Communist base for forward action without excessive risk.

2. The USSR has evidently decided to supply sufficient economic aid to sustain the Cuban economy at about the current level, and will probably train Cubans in the operation of the Soviet military equipment now in Cuba under Soviet control. It seems likely to us that a year hence most of this equipment, except perhaps for the SAM system, will have been turned over to the Cubans, and the Soviet military presence in Cuba will probably have been further reduced. Such a development would tend to improve considerably the Cuban and the Soviet image in Latin America, though it could not completely offset all the adverse effects of the missile crisis. For the time being, Castro, perhaps in Soviet persuasion, has toned down his inflammatory appeals for violent revolutions throughout Latin America. There is no indication, however, of a basic change in Castro's determination to promote insurgent movements. In his mind Venezuela in particular continues to be a priority target.

3. In our view, if present trends continue, both in the reduction of Soviet forces and the training of Cuban personnel, this would mean that the USSR did not contemplate an attempt to reintroduce strategic weapons into Cuba. It is true that the risks of detection would be less than those attending the original operation. The Soviet knowledge of US intelligence sources and methods would make it possible to adopt improved measures of camouflage and deception, and to avoid providing many of the indicators that US intelligence will be relying upon. Thus we cannot altogether rule out an attempt by the Soviets to reintroduce strategic missiles.

4. A year hence (barring Castro's death or some decisive US intervention in the situation) the Castro regime is likely to be more firmly established than ever. The mere passage of time tends to favor Castro as Cubans and others become accustomed to the idea that he is here to stay and as his regime gains in administrative experience and efficiency. The "year of organization" will result in the further development of the PURS, Castro's all-purpose political machine. The Cuban economy will probably not be much better than it is today, but also probably will not be much worse. Castro's prestige will have been enhanced by the acquisition of advanced weapon systems, and by the consequent demonstration of his "independence."

[Here follows the discussion portion of the paper, 14 pages; see the Supplement.]

## **322. Summary Record of the 2d Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security Council**

Washington, April 23, 1963, 5 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meetings, 4/23/63 (Part A). Top Secret.

The basis of the discussion was a memorandum prepared by Mr. Bundy entitled "A Sketch of the Cuba Alternatives."/1/

/1/See the attachment to Document 320.

Secretary McNamara stated that before the group discussed substance, it should consider whether the present policy we are following would produce a major change in Cuba. He expressed his firm view that Castro's position over the short term would improve if we took no actions other than those now under way or projected. He made clear his belief that the elimination of the Castro regime was a requirement and that, if others agreed our present policy would not result in its downfall, we should develop a program for approval which would produce changes acceptable to us. The program should aim at creating such a situation of dissidence within Cuba

as to allow the U.S. to use force in support of anti-Castro forces without leading to retaliation by the USSR on the West.

Mr. McCone summarized information leading him to believe that Castro's position in Cuba would be stronger a year or two years from now than it is at present. He expressed his belief that present policy would not cause a major change in Cuba and that the Russians could provide sufficient aid and technical assistance to permit the Cuban economy to remain about where it is now or slightly improve.

Assistant Secretary Martin did not fully agree with the views of the Secretary of Defense or Mr. McCone with respect to the effect of existing policy on the Castro regime. He cited evidence to indicate that present measures are crippling the Cuban economy, leading to shortages, lack of spare parts, and even sufficient food to permit full rations for Cuban militia. Mr. Martin saw no possibility of getting Castro to defect from the USSR. He said there was no way to finance Cuba during the transition period until Castro, by his deeds, had proved that he had broken his ties with the USSR. He said, for example, Congress would never approve the sugar quota for Cuba early enough to avoid a collapse of the Cuban economy cut loose from the USSR and not yet aided by the U.S. Furthermore, he said Castro was the kind of a man who might make promises and not keep them, i.e. he did not stay bought. The possibility of persuading Castro to leave Cuba was not feasible because Castro was a true revolutionary who could not be induced to give up his revolution.

The Attorney General proposed three studies:

- a. A list of measures we would take following contingencies such as the death of Castro or the shooting down of a U-2.
- b. A program with the objective of overthrowing Castro in eighteen months.
- c. A program to cause as much trouble as we can for Communist Cuba during the next eighteen months.

Under Secretary Ball stated the view that we should not look at Cuba from the point of view of Cuba alone. He said the Cuban problem was a part of our relations with the USSR and with our global battle against Communist aggression. He urged that our policy toward Cuba always be kept in this perspective. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Cuba and the disappearance of the Soviet presence in Cuba was of major importance to us.

USIA Director Murrow stated his view that we need promptly a statement of what we would think was an acceptable post-Castro Cuba.

Secretary Dillon raised certain questions as to what kind of a Cuba we could live with if it were no longer run by Castro or tied to Moscow. He said that American companies had written off their expropriated sugar properties in Cuba but the question remained as to who would own these properties in the event Castro and Communism disappeared in Cuba.

There was a discussion on what we would do for a non-Communist Cuba and what we could do to get Castro to defect from the USSR. There appeared to be some differing views as to whether economic measures we can take would wreck the Cuban economy or whether the only result would be to raise the cost to the USSR of maintaining Cuba.

Mr. Sorensen listed the seven objectives raised at the meeting as follows:

- a. Improve our present course of action by doing some things that we are not now doing.
- b. Agree on military responses which we should make to contingencies, such as the shooting down of a U-2 plane.

- c. Develop a program to get rid of Castro.
- d. Measures to disrupt the economy of Cuba.
- e. A program to induce Soviet withdrawal.
- f. The detachment of Cuba from Moscow.
- g. A program of support for dissident elements in Cuba./2/

Overriding all these points would be a statement of our views as to the kind of a regime we would want to see in Cuba post-Castro.

Bromley Smith/3/

/2/The Record of Action of this meeting, April 23, reads as follows: "Following discussion of U.S. Policy Towards Cuba, it was agreed that discussions would be continued at the next meeting scheduled for 10:30 am, Tuesday, April 30. It was also agreed that it is important that present lines of policy and operation should be continued." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meetings, 4/23/63 (Part A))

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

### **323. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, April 25, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, 303, Committee Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only.

#### **SUBJECT**

Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 25 April 1963

#### **PRESENT**

Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone

Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1-4

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 1-5

Mr. Jorgensen was present for Item 3

Mr. Tweedy was present for Item 6

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

#### **4. Low-Level Reconnaissance, Cuba**

The DCI said the USIB unanimously reaffirmed yesterday the priority intelligence requirements for low-level

coverage of Cuba. Mr. Bundy added that there is high-level interest in reviewing this situation.

Mr. Johnson said that in the view of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department, the Soviets would interpret a resumption of low-level flights as an indication of the adoption by the U.S. of a harder line toward Cuba. More significantly, Ambassador Thompson is very much opposed to such resumption at this time; he feels that this could result in a reduction in the rate of withdrawal of Soviet troops or a Soviet decision to withdraw none at all in the future, and it might affect Soviet policy in Laos in a manner adverse to U.S. interests. The importance of the Harriman mission with respect to this last proposition was noted. Mr. Johnson said we should know the results of the Harriman mission in a day or two.

It was agreed that the matter would be discussed with higher authority this afternoon./1/

/1/See Document 324.

## 5. Proposed New Policy and Program toward Cuba

Mr. McCone opened the discussion of this topic by pointing out that the overt and multilateral pressures now being applied to Cuba are useful; on the other hand, while they will slow Castro down they will not hurt him critically, and the interest of our allies in maintaining such pressures will almost certainly erode as time passes. Similarly, any sabotage program can hurt the Castro government, but not lethally; and in order to be effective at all, it must be done on a continuing basis and cannot be subjected to a stop-and-go treatment. The DCI went on to say that any such activity is bound to be attributed to the United States and if we are to carry through with it, we must be prepared to accept the accompanying noise level. He said that a sabotage program will not be entirely beneficial to U.S. interests; on the minus side, there is the fact that this will complicate the running of intelligence operations and it could result in Cuban retaliation. Additionally, Mr. McCone said he is not in favor of extreme types of sabotage such as complete destruction of crops, contamination of water supplies, etc. He would prefer open intervention to this kind of thing.

The DCI said that the combination of economic and other pressures with sabotage activities, might provide a feasible climate for a successful attempt to fragment the Castro organization. He foresaw the possibility of such fragmentation leading to assumption of power by a military dictatorship, which would probably be friendly to the U.S. In this connection, Mr. FitzGerald said that we have a line on certain high-ranking officers who are not entirely sympathetic to the regime. He pointed out, however, that a major operational obstacle to capitalizing on this situation is the difficulty of persuading individual Cubans of this type to place their trust in each other. In addition, we will have to be able to assure them that the U.S. will be sympathetic to possible successors to the present government, even though such people may have been former Castro supporters.

Mr. FitzGerald touched on the proposed support to selected Cuban exile groups, for autonomous operations, as being one of the key points of the possible new program. He made the point that there is no use in the U.S. trying to deny that it backs such operations, since it will be accused of this in any case, and the accusations will be generally believed; further, such a posture is not detrimental to U.S. interests. Mr. Bundy agreed with this point. He added, however, that a "scenario" will have to be worked out, clearly indicating who in the government should respond to accusations in this field and what in general they should say.

Mr. Bundy questioned a statement in the paper to the effect that covert action which might be used as a pretext for overt military intervention is ruled out. Mr. McCone and Mr. FitzGerald said that the purpose of this statement was to indicate that the covert program is not specifically directed toward the end of providing such a pretext, but that it is not intended to preclude such a situation if it should turn out to be desirable at some time in the future.

Mr. FitzGerald then described a number of possible sabotage operations. In this connection, he pointed out that the paper contains a proposal for the placing of limpets, carrying suitable delay mechanisms, on the outside of

Cuban ships so as to explode at sea. He noted that Secretary Vance does not particularly like this proposition because of the possibility that the explosions would be attributed to torpedoes. While recognizing the validity of Mr. Vance's argument, Mr. Gilpatric felt that this risk was acceptable.

The Chairman summed up the preliminary reactions of the Group to the proposals as follows:

- a. The proposition for dealing with selected exile groups is a good one, but the method of dealing with them will have to be more carefully defined.
- b. There is no objection to limpets, subject to further technical studies.
- c. Surface attacks on Cuban ships do not appear particularly attractive, nor do shore-based attacks of a similar nature.
- d. Externally mounted hit-and-run attacks against land targets appear worthwhile. The operations in this category which can be run in May, will be discussed with higher authority. Refineries and power plants seem to be particularly good targets. Operations of this kind will be especially valuable if done in conjunction with other resistance activities.
- e. Internal resistance should be stimulated, again in conjunction with related operations.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. Parrott

### **324. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, April 25, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone.

#### **SUBJECT**

Meeting with the President, Rusk, McCone, McNamara, and Bundy, 25 April, to discuss low-level overflights

Bundy presented the DCI paper/1/ and then explained the opposition which had been expressed to him by McNamara./2/ McNamara took very strong opposition to conducting low-levels because of political consequences, and furthermore stated that, in his opinion, there was absolutely no need for overflights from the intelligence point of view. McCone contradicted this statement stating that this matter had been carefully reviewed by USIB and that on last Wednesday/3/ each member of USIB, including all six representatives of DOD, the State representative, the CIA representative and others, had favored low-levels for the reasons expressed in the COMOR paper/4/ and because of the inadequacy of high-level reconnaissance. All of this was based on intelligence needs.

/1/Reference to an April 25 memorandum from McCone to the Special Group noting the USIB recommendation for low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. The request had been deferred until the end of the Donovan mission and then deferred once more while Harriman was in Moscow. On April 24 the USIB asked again for low-level reconnaissance on 10 priority installations and facilities and expected coverage of 15 more. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

/2/Evidence of McNamara's opposition can be found in a telephone conversation with Ball, April 19. (Kennedy

Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba) See the Supplement.

/3/April 17.

/4/Apparent reference to USIB-D-41, April 20, subject: "Priority Requirements for Low-Level Reconnaissance of Cuba," in which COMOR reanalyzed the requirements for such reconnaissance. The paper, which has not been found, is summarized in McCone's memorandum to the Special Group, April 25; see footnote 1 above.

Rusk very briefly reviewed the political consequences as expressed by Johnson in the 5412 meeting,<sup>/5/</sup> earlier in the day. However, he took no strong position. McNamara asked Rusk for a statement in writing of the political consequences. McCone put forth a very positive argument to the President, pointing out the areas in Cuba which had gone unsurveyed for as long as 12 days at a time and the incidents in which high-level photography could neither confirm nor deny reports which were ominous and gave McCone concern, and gave the intelligence community concern.

/5/Reference is to the 5412 Special Group meeting; see Document 323.

The President felt that the Administration could not very well ignore a request of DCI and USIB. He proposed three rather than six sorties on a trial basis and asked that such a recommendation be made. In any event, nothing will be done until Harriman's return.

Action: General Carter should review this whole matter and should develop three most desirable targets including one of the armed camps. He should write a precise and full justification. (COMOR's justifications are too broad and many other arguments are based on the need for increasing the total inventory of intelligence.) The President felt that justification should be on the basis of the fact that we did not know about specific locations, construction, or activities. He questioned whether we could justify low-levels which would be provocative if we were merely increasing our inventory of intelligence or technical information. DCI agreed this was to be done promptly.

*Note:* Rusk at one point mentioned that perhaps we should not escalate the tensions in Cuba but should wait until there was an indication of escalation by the Soviets and the Cubans, then go with low-levels. McCone reported that this might be too late, that it was possible that the Soviets would, in secrecy, develop some move which might threaten the United States and that we would not detect them. Therefore, we could not wait for the Soviet "escalation" to take place. What we have to do is keep the island under surveillance, develop all comprehensive intelligence, so that we would know in advance of any such escalation of ominous move on the part of the Soviets.

*Note:* I expect quite an argument over this problem. I therefore think our case should be very carefully prepared. I took the position that the intelligence community felt that they could not depend exclusively on high-level photography and still say with assurance that we knew all there was to know about what was going on in Cuba.

### **325. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy**

Washington, April 25, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30-2 Cuba. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch, and cleared by Cottrell, Martin, and Ball.

SUBJECT

U.S. Relations with the Present Cuban Revolutionary Council

Miro's resignation and the accompanying withdrawal of most of the CRC component organizations and personalities has converted the CRC into a rump organization of little attraction in the exile community. This CRC remnant, which within itself is divided, essentially constitutes "Tony" Varona's effort to preserve his personal political machine, established through his control over the years of fifty per cent of the U.S.-supplied CRC funds. Varona, who lacks wide support, is actively seeking adhesion from a wide variety of exile leaders including Batista elements. We doubt that unity of the exiles under present circumstances is an achievable goal. The highly individualistic Cubans, who were really not "unified" in the pre-Castro era, are usually not inclined to submerge differences and organize themselves. The frustrations of exile life in general and the absence of "proof that Castro's end is in sight" in particular combine to aggravate rather than decrease differences.

The CRC has been receiving \$137,000 monthly. In addition, seven exile organizations (some of which are CRC members) receive a total of \$103,500 monthly. The next monthly installment of U.S. financial assistance is due the CRC on May 1. While some possibility exists that the CRC may dissolve of its own accord before May 1, its demise would be virtually certain were U.S. aid withheld. If the CRC disappeared, some of its present and many of its former component organizations would require our financial assistance to enable us to accomplish the intelligence, propaganda and other clandestine tasks we have set.

In causing the CRC rump to disappear by withholding the May installment we would:

1. Reduce substantially our intimate involvement in exile politics.
2. Sever our relationship with an unrepresentative exile group, thus avoiding charges of imposing our will on the exile community.
3. Enhance the possibility of the eventual emergence of a more widely supported exile leader by enabling exile political forces to operate more freely.
4. Avoid the possibility of a "Miro resignation" recurring at a more inopportune time from the domestic political standpoint.
5. Create the opportunity for an unencumbered review in depth of what our basic policy toward the exiles should be.
6. Incur criticism from some sectors of the exile community and of U.S. public opinion that we were engaging in further "persecution" of the exiles.

Temporizing with the CRC by provisionally extending its life for another month or so would increase the difficulty of disengaging later.

On balance, the Department recommends:/1/

/1/A note at the top of the source text indicates Chase called from the White House to say that this memorandum was "O.K." and the decision to call off aid had been made. Chase stated that "something should be done for Varona."

1. that the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs at Miami be authorized to inform CRC officials before May 1 that while we wish to maintain cordial relations with exile leaders and continue to consult them frequently, we do not believe that the CRC as presently constituted warrants continued U.S. financial support. Discontinuance of salaries would be accomplished gracefully, i.e. accompanied by notice and lump sum termination payments.
2. that certain former and present CRC component organizations essential to achieving our intelligence and other missions continue to receive U.S. financial assistance.

Dean Rusk/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates the original was signed by Rusk.

[end of document]

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**FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES**  
**1961-1963**  
**Volume XI**  
**Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington

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## **Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath**

### **326. Memorandum of Conversation**

Moscow, April 25, 1963, 3 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-US. Secret. Approved in M on May 6. The source text indicates that it is Part II of IV.

#### **SUBJECT**

Cuba

#### **PLACE**

The Kremlin, in the Office of the Chairman of Council of Ministers

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

USSR

N.S. Khrushchev

Andrei Gromyko

S.G. Lapin

Viktor Sukhodrev--translator

US

Under Secretary W. Averell Harriman

Ambassador Foy D. Kohler

Mr. Michael V. Forrestal

Mr. William H. Sullivan

Governor Harriman raised the President's concern with Cuba. Khrushchev answered with some emotion: "What

can Cuba do with her seven millions? You have laid a dozen Cubas around us, Turkey, Greece, Iran, Norway, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Japan"--to which Gromyko added South Korea.

Harriman said we had no substantial troops in any of the countries the Chairman mentioned, except Germany and Japan. The President is concerned about Soviet troops in Cuba and had expected Khrushchev would make a significant reduction in Soviet forces on the basis of their understanding.

Khrushchev claimed they have removed three to five times the number of troops reported in the American press, but that he would not disclose the exact numbers "because if I do you will boast that you have squeezed new concessions from the Russians. Anyway, this is a question for us and the Cubans".

Harriman said that we had reported the removal of about 4,000 Soviet troops from Cuba since the end of the year; five times that number was 20,000 and since the Soviets presumably had only 17,000 in Cuba at that time this left us with a figure of minus 3,000 which was apparently some sort of special Russian arithmetic. Khrushchev replied he would have to have a special report prepared to know exactly what numbers were involved, and there wasn't time for this now.

Harriman said that because Soviet troops remain in Cuba President Kennedy was having a great deal of difficulty keeping the country quiet on the Cuba issue. If Mr. Khrushchev could either correct the President's understanding about the numbers of troops that had been withdrawn, or withdraw more, he was sure the President would cooperate in avoiding any embarrassment for the Soviets.

Khrushchev replied that this had become a very complicated and difficult question mostly because there was so much clamor in the United States. There is nothing the Soviets can do to satisfy those who are the chief critics of the President on this issue. The President must take care of them himself.

Harriman said the President would not want to use erroneous figures in confronting his domestic opposition and it would be very helpful to him if he could have some more accurate figures. Khrushchev, somewhat excited, replied that this matter affects the sovereignty and pride of the Soviet Union . . . the Soviet Union is not accountable to the United States and cannot appear before the world as constantly conceding to American pressure. While he did not want to complicate life for the President and would in principle be ready to furnish information to the President, the latter's critics would only say this proved the need for more pressure on the Soviet Union because only pressure produced results, and that would make the situation worse. He could state that the Soviet military personnel were there only temporarily, teaching the Cubans to use the equipment they had received from the Soviet Union, after which they would return.

Harriman asked why the Soviets could not remove all their organized troop units, leaving only the instructors behind. Khrushchev replied this was a matter for the Soviets and the Cubans, and they were not accountable to anyone else. Harriman said he hoped Khrushchev understood that this was a very serious subject and that organized military units are more difficult problems than instructors. If these units were removed, feeling would be improved. Khrushchev said if the United States wants normal relations with the Soviet Union, don't aggravate the issues, don't ask questions which cause tensions for us, don't irritate our national pride. Even with a million Soviet troops there, Cuba could not be an invasion springboard. Let the President deal with his own problems at home and keep the lid on the Americans. If he doesn't want to do that, let him escalate the matter. We are ready for friendship, but are prepared to deal with the other alternative. Neither of us wants to start anything over Cuba, but if anything is started, the Soviets have retaliatory strength.

Governor Harriman said Cuba is creating much tension in the whole Caribbean area and if it is not important to the Soviets to have troops in there why don't they take them out, and leave only instructors.

Khrushchev repeated sharply that that was the business of the Soviets and the Cubans. It is a question of sovereignty. He asked about the Polaris and American bases in the UK, Greece, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, all

directed against the USSR. Still we want them to report to the United States on their troops. The Soviets long ago raised the question, in the context of disarmament proposals, of mutual troop withdrawals from all foreign territory. Why don't the Americans agree to this? Moreover, why don't we leave Guantanamo? "By what right do you stay, because you are strong?" However, the Soviets will not raise this point; that is strictly between Cuba and the United States, even though the whole world knows the Americans aren't welcome there and that the Soviet Union supports Castro's position. The Soviets will not try to interfere in the internal affairs of Cuba and the United States in this regard. That sort of interference can only lead to war.

Khrushchev repeated that "we really have withdrawn a lot of troops," and "we have not replaced any . . . we have withdrawn. All the troops needed to guard the rocket installations were withdrawn after the rockets were taken out". He understood the President's difficulties and believed the President has a very sound understanding of the situation. Recent statements by the President and Secretary Rusk indicate there is in the United States a sober appreciation of the situation. This fact will help the Soviets in dealing with the Cubans, and the Soviets intend to train the Cubans as fast as possible in order to make the presence of Soviet instructors unnecessary. The Russians didn't like the Cuban climate.

Harriman pointed out that, in addition to United States statements, the President has taken many actions which should not be overlooked. Khrushchev agreed that the President's actions and his words were very encouraging. Immediately after the crisis last fall, United States policy had been somewhat irritating, but now it seemed quite reasonable. Moreover, he believed that an absolute majority of the American people were behind the President in his sober policy and that his opponents had no clear program.

### **327. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense McNamara**

Washington, April 29, 1963.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, Feb thru April 1963. Secret; Eyes Only.

Are we keeping our Cuban contingency invasion plans up to date? I notice that there have been a number of new judgments on the amount of equipment that the Cubans have. I thought last October the number of troops we planned to have available was rather limited and the success of the operation was dependent upon, in large measure, our two airborne divisions getting in and controlling the two airfields. It seems to me that we should strengthen our contingency plans on this operation.

John Kennedy

### **328. Editorial Note**

On April 29, 1963, President Kennedy received a letter from Chairman Khrushchev through a private communication channel. It was in response to President Kennedy's message of April 11; Document 312. The letter is printed in full in *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, volume VI, pages 265-268. The following extract of the letter relates to Cuba:

"Already for a protracted period, in the exchange of opinions between us no matter in what channels they took place, one and the same question has inevitably arisen--concerning the situation around Cuba. To a considerable degree this is understandable if one considers how we passed through a most dangerous crisis in the fall of last year. But it is impossible not to recognize also that tension around Cuba decreases too slowly and at times rises anew not unlike the way the mercury jumps in the thermometers of the present spring.

"And of course when one thinks about where the abnormalities are coming from which are making the atmosphere in the region of the Caribbean Sea ever more feverish, one comes to the conclusion that a one-sided

approach can least of all help the situation.

"If one allows that in the Western Hemisphere uneasiness is evoked by the presence in Cuba of a certain small number of Soviet troops which are helping Cubans to master the weapons delivered by the Soviet Union for the purpose of strengthening the defense capabilities of Cuba, then how much more uneasiness should be evoked in the countries of Europe, Asia and Africa by the hundreds of thousands of American troops in the Eastern Hemisphere? It is sufficient to make such a comparison in order that things can be seen in proper perspective. At our meeting in Vienna we seemed to have agreed to proceed from the fact that the forces of our states were equal. Well, then, if our forces are equal, then there should also be equal possibilities. Why does the United States forget about this?

"You know that we have withdrawn from Cuba a significant part of our military personnel. I can tell you that we have withdrawn several times more people than has been stated in the American press. How this matter will develop in the future depends on a number of circumstances and in the first place on the pace at which the atmosphere in the region of the Caribbean Sea will be normalized, and whether, as could be expected, the reasons which occasioned the necessity for assistance to the Cubans by Soviet military specialists and instructors will disappear.

"I would like to express the thought of how important it is in evaluating what is happening around Cuba that one rise above one-sided understandings and base his judgments on the respective estimate of the situation of the interested parties. From your point of view, as set forth in your message, the reconnaissance flights of American aircraft over Cuba are only "peaceful observation." But if one were to characterize these flights objectively, without even considering the point of view, understandable to everyone, of the country over which they are being carried out, then they cannot be described other than as an unrestrained intrusion into the air space of a sovereign government and as a flagrant violation of the elementary norms of international law and the principles of the UN Charter, to which are affixed the signatures of both the USA and Cuba. It is natural that no state prizing its sovereignty, no government solicitous of the interest and dignity of its people, can tolerate such flights.

"Perhaps it is desired that we recognize the right of the USA to violate the Charter of the United Nations and international norms? But this we cannot do and will not do.

"We have honestly carried out the obligations we assumed in the settlement of the crisis in the region of the Caribbean Sea, and withdrew from Cuba even more than we promised to withdraw. There are no grounds for you to doubt the readiness of the Soviet Union to carry out firmly in the future as well the agreement which was reached between us. Why then are reconnaissance flights by American aircraft over Cuba necessary? What are they looking for there when there is not a single thing, seen in the light of the agreement reached, which could cause concern? Trampling on sovereignty in this way can lead to quite serious consequences for us if it is not stopped in time.

"And can one pass over in silence or recognize as in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter the continuing efforts to strangle the economy of Cuba? I shall not address myself to this in more detail although of course I could find many words with which to characterize these actions, even from a purely humanitarian point of view.

"The Soviet Union gives due credit to the measures which have recently been undertaken by the USA, as well as by England, in connection with the attacks which have taken place on Soviet vessels near the Cuban coast. We of course do not underestimate the significance of these measures and hope that they will be sufficiently effective to preclude the possibility of a repetition of armed raids against Cuba.

"I read with a feeling of satisfaction that passage of your message in which you confirm that you have neither the intention nor the desire to invade Cuba and where you recognize that it is up to the Cuban people to determine their fate. That is a good statement. We have always stressed that, like any other people, the Cuban people

possess the inalienable right to determine their own fate as they see fit." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence, Vol. IV-B, 4/15/63-5/8/63)

### **329. Agenda for the April 30 Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security Council**

Washington, April 29, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Standing Committee 4/63. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Prepared by McGeorge Bundy.

I have not been able to make special assignments to individual members of the group in this first week, but I have had helpful discussions with several members, and I know that other members have had conversations with each other. What I hope we can do tomorrow is to fill out the outline which follows of major areas of interest, and to make preliminary decisions as to ways and means of getting forward with the necessary spade work.

1. The possible use of contingencies for the achievement of wider political objectives. Illustrations which come to mind here are:

a. Interference with overflights.

b. Possible death of Castro.

c. The occurrence of revolt or repression in the manner of Hungary./1/

/1/At this point Bundy wrote, "Cubans vs Cubans."

d. Attributable interference by Castro/2/ in other countries.

/2/After Castro Bundy wrote, "or USSR."

e. Reintroduction of offensive weapons.

2. Programs which might be initiated by the United States Government with both immediate and long-run objectives. Examples which come to mind are:

a. Greater pressure against the Soviet presence, perhaps by additional OAS resolutions and then naval action to interrupt all military traffic to Cuba./3/

/3/In the left margin of this paragraph Bundy wrote, "President." In the right margin he wrote, "talk to him hard?"

b. Expanded economic action,/4/ possibly including encouragement of cooperative sabotage on a much larger scale than anything attempted up until now. Within this category additional possible gambits are of great interest to higher authority and it is hoped that some may be offered./5/

/4/Next to this paragraph Bundy wrote, "sugar, POL, money."

/5/Bundy added by hand paragraph c which reads: "Appraisal of small-scale sabotage over a long period."

3. The possible defection of Castro. This is a wholly separate kind of undertaking and there seemed to be considerable agreement last week that it was not very promising, but it has been properly pointed out that it could be pursued on a separate track while some or all of the things proposed above were going on./6/

/6/Next to this paragraph Bundy placed a bullet.

4. An information program for post-Castro Cuba. There was general agreement last week that this also is a matter of high importance and that it could be pursued independently of decisions in other categories.

Documents which members may want to look at before the meeting are attached:/7/

/7/Not printed.

Tab A: Draft intelligence estimate of the situation in Cuba a year from now.

Tab B: The first outline of an OAS Resolution about the Soviet military presence. This item is of considerable present interest to higher authority.

It is recognized that the diet here is relatively thin, but I think we can usefully spend one more meeting making sure that we have the elements of the problem in proper shape before we go into more detailed work./8/

McGeorge Bundy/9/

At the end of the agenda Bundy wrote, "levels of attribution."8

/9/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

### **330. Summary Record of the 3d Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security Council**

Washington, April 30, 1963, 10:30 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/30/63. Top Secret.

#### **CUBA**

Under Secretary Harriman reported on his talks with Gromyko and Khrushchev on the subject of Cuba. (He read extracts from a long summary, copies of which he later left with the President and Mr. Bundy, copy attached.)/1/ Mr. Harriman did not think that Khrushchev was in trouble personally but his policies are being criticized by the hard line Communists. The Soviets are using Castro as an exhibit of the success of their Cuban policy. They are also seeking to handle him in such a way that he will not turn toward the Chinese Communists. Khrushchev does not think that Soviet troops in Cuba are really important, but Harriman believes the Russians will go to great lengths to ensure that Castro remains in control of Cuba. After Cuban troops are trained, the Russian troops can be expected to leave, but Soviet economic aid will be continued at a level necessary to ensure a going economy in Cuba.

/1/See Document 326.

The attached copy of Mr. Bundy's summary covers the assignments which have been made as a result of the discussion of Cuba./2/ Points not covered in that summary follow:

/2/See Document 333.

There was a discussion of whether the U.S. could destroy Castro's halo by an information program aimed at Cuba and Latin America. Under Secretary Ball said Castro was becoming a symbol and an effort should be made

to undermine this symbol. Mr. Harriman pointed out that we could make fun of Castro. This is an effective way of attacking Communists who, in his opinion, can take almost anything except ridicule.

Secretary McNamara noted that he had initiated a study of how to reduce to a minimum the reaction time of U.S. forces in the event a decision was taken to use force against Cuba. He has under study a plan which would mean that within ninety to one hundred days we would have a capability of destroying all the SAM sites in Cuba with twenty-six missiles.

The Attorney General commented that the President was hopeful that we could take actions now in the OAS which would permit us in the future to act effectively in the event the Russians or the Cubans started shipping large amounts of arms to other Latin American states. The purpose would be to prepare now a basis for drastic U.S. action to halt any attempt to introduce a Soviet military presence in another Latin American country.

It was agreed that pressure against the Soviet presence in Cuba will be kept low-key for the next month in order to give Khrushchev an option of carrying out quietly the prompt withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba.

The preparation of a study covering the possible defection of Castro was deferred for the present. All that can be done in this connection now is to keep open the line of communication to Castro which was opened by Mr. Donovan during the negotiations about the U.S. prisoners. Director McCone's interest in this matter prompted the postponement of the discussion of this possible course of action until the Director's return.

There was recognition of the importance of relating what we are now doing to what we are planning to do in Cuba. Secretary McNamara expressed his view that small-scale sabotage over a long period of time would produce no real change in the situation and therefore was not an acceptable course of action.

Bromley Smith/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

### **331. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk**

Washington, May 1, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Secret. A note on this memorandum indicates it was part of the President's weekend reading, May 11.

#### **SUBJECT**

#### **Probable Soviet Reaction to Low-level Flights Over Cuba**

Obviously, Soviet reaction to low-level flights over Cuba would be affected by a number of factors, such as timing and scope. The reaction to a one-shot mission would be far less than that to a sustained series. Also, if the flights were such that they were widely known in Cuba, the reaction would be stronger than it would in the case of a single mission in an isolated area. Soviet reaction would, to some extent, be affected by Castro's reaction, which I should think would be quite strong, particularly as indicated above if knowledge of the flights was widespread.

So far as timing is concerned, the present would appear to be an extremely unfavorable time. Castro is in Moscow and will be there apparently for several weeks. It is assumed that he is putting the squeeze on the Soviets for more economic aid and low-level flights would put him in a position both to press the Soviets for some radical action such as firing on a U-2 flight, or at least would increase his leverage to get more economic assistance, as well as possibly to cancel or slow down any intended removal of Soviet troops.

In addition, it would appear that the Soviet Government is in the process of making a number of important decisions which could be affected by low-level flights. These include determination of Soviet policy on Laos, a general review of Soviet policy toward the United States specifically, as well as probable negotiations with the Chinese Communists over Communist Bloc policy as a whole. There would appear to be sufficient evidence to believe that Khrushchev has been having a difficult time recently, and it is quite possible that he would read into low-level flights an intention on the part of the United States to proceed vigorously to bring down Castro, which, if accomplished in a short period of time, would put him in an almost impossible situation in maintaining his leadership position and in withstanding pressures to turn Soviet policy in the direction desired by the Chinese Communists. In addition, there are important decisions pending on internal affairs which will probably be taken at the meeting of the Central Committee on May twenty-eighth.

Finally, there are some indications that Khrushchev may be having trouble with his own military, and, if so, low-level flights at this time might give the military ammunition to force a change of policy, or even challenge Khrushchev's leadership. Whatever the decision on low-level flights in general, I should think that the next six weeks would be about the worst possible time in which to take this action.

**332. Letter From Acting Director of Central Intelligence Carter to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, May 2, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V. Secret.

Dear Mr. Bundy: With respect to the Lisa Howard report,<sup>/1/</sup> Mr. McCone cabled me this morning stating that he cannot overemphasize the importance of secrecy in this matter and requested that I take all appropriate steps along this line to reflect his personal views on its sensitivity. Mr. McCone feels that gossip and inevitable leaks with consequent publicity would be most damaging. He suggests that no active steps be taken on the rapprochement matter at this time and urges most limited Washington discussions, and that in these circumstances emphasis should be placed in any discussions on the fact that the rapprochement track is being explored as a remote possibility and one of several alternatives involving various levels of dynamic and positive action.

<sup>/1/</sup>Lisa Howard of the American Broadcasting Company had a 10-hour interview with Fidel Castro on April 22. During that interview Castro made a number of points, the most important of which was that Cuba was looking for ways to establish a rapprochement with the United States. Cottrell summarized the main points of the interview in a May 2 memorandum to Martin, and Richard Helms prepared a more detailed account in a memorandum to McCone, May 1. The President read Helms' summary. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 Cuba and Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V)

In view of the foregoing, it is requested that the Lisa Howard report be handled in the most limited and sensitive manner.

Faithfully yours,

Marshall S. Carter<sup>/2/</sup>

Lieutenant General, USA

<sup>/2/</sup>Printed from a copy that indicates Carter signed the original.

**333. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the**

## **Members of the Standing Group of the National Security Council**

Washington, May 2, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

The following assignments have been made as a result of the discussion in the Standing Group on Tuesday, April 30th:/1/

/1/Document 330.

1. There will be an examination of the possible developments in Cuba if Castro were to disappear from the scene. This analysis will be developed by Mr. Sherman Kent and will be available for discussion at the meeting of the Standing Group on May 14th.
2. There will be an analysis of the possible use of contingencies for the achievement of wider political objectives. This analysis will be conducted under the direction of Mr. Alexis Johnson and Mr. Paul Nitze, and its first results will be available for discussion at the meeting of the Standing Group on May 14th. This first analysis will provide: a. A detailed examination of possible action in the event of interference with surveillance; and b. a more general assessment of possible use of other contingencies in Cuba or in the waters around Cuba.
3. The Central Intelligence Agency will prepare a general paper on the possible forms of effective interference with the economic life of Cuba by sabotage or other means. In particular, CIA will report on the oil problem in relation to Cuba. It is hoped that a first report on this study may be available next week for distribution.
4. The Department of State will examine the possible use of the sugar market as a means of complicating the life of the Castro regime. It is hoped that this study will be available next week.
5. The principal topic of discussion for the meeting of the Standing Group on May 7th will be the development of a U.S. program and policy toward post-Castro Cuba, and the initial lead in the discussion will be taken by Mr. Wilson for USIA. Appropriate papers will be circulated before noon on Monday, May 6th.

McGeorge Bundy

### **334. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to Acting Secretary of State Ball**

Washington, May 3, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Sugar

I have been requested to comment on a suggestion made at the meeting of the Standing Group on April 30/1/ that we try to figure out some way to diminish the Cuban income from the sale of sugar. It was particularly noted that the present high prices and tight market have prevented Cuba from suffering the losses which would normally be expected from the sharp fall off in her production.

/1/See Document 330.

I attach an INR memorandum,<sup>/2/</sup> a copy of which has already been sent to Mr. Bundy, on the sugar situation.

<sup>/2/</sup>Memorandum from Hughes to Rusk, RES-15, April 19. (Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 50, Cuba-Standing Group) See the Supplement.

From this memorandum and discussions with sugar experts I am convinced of several things:

1. The present high prices and tight market represent a real shortage of sugar in the world.
2. The Soviet Union is not holding sugar off the market--Cuban or otherwise. In fact there is some evidence that satellites are exporting more than usual. Therefore the high price is not the result of Soviet rigging of the market.
3. To keep United States prices down the Department of Agriculture is doing everything it can to increase supplies of sugar in the world and for the United States in the foreseeable future.
4. Even with a good beet crop in Europe this year and a good cane crop in early 1965, the sugar situation will still not return to the surplus and low price condition of a year ago. It will take until the end of 1964 with another beet crop but more probably into 1965 before there is any material change in the situation.

I conclude from this that there is no feasible way in which the Cubans can be deprived of the prices they are now getting for their sugar or of free world markets for a year and a half and possibly two years. I therefore suggest that this idea be shelved for at least a year.

### **335. Record of Actions at the 4th Standing Group Meeting of the National Security Council**

Washington, May 7, 1963, 10:30 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/7/63. Secret.

There was a discussion of a U.S. program and policy toward post-Castro Cuba.

a. There was preliminary agreement on the need by mid-summer for a U.S. Government statement from a high source, possibly the President, expressing our view of post-Castro Cuba.<sup>/1/</sup>

<sup>/1/</sup>On May 4 USIA Deputy Director Wilson sent Bundy a memorandum advocating making a statement and attaching a proposed one. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

b. An analysis is to be prepared by State, CIA, and USIA covering specific aspects of the Cuban society (1) under Batista; (2) under Castro, including the revolution's aims as stated and as realized to date; and (3) under a post-Castro regime, including actions we would be prepared to take to help in the reconstruction of Cuba. Among the subjects to be included in the comparison are: education, tax system, defense, housing, land ownership, economic development, religion, and civil rights, including press freedom, race relations, and the administration of justice.

c. There was a recognized need to interest non-governmental institutions such as the Council on Foreign Relations or the Brookings Institution in preparing studies on post-Castro Cuba. A White House officer is to initiate action on this problem.

PRESENT

Under Secretary of State (Ball)

Attorney General

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Acting Director of Central Intelligence

Administrator of AID

Deputy Director of USIA

Deputy Under Secretary of State (Johnson)

Major General A.J. Goodpaster (JCS)

Special Counsel

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

### **336. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy**

Washington, May 7, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Top Secret.

#### **SUBJECT**

Contingency Plans for Cuba (U)

1. In response to your inquiry, dated 29 April 1963,<sup>1/</sup> I wish to assure you that our contingency plans for invasion of Cuba have been and are being maintained up to date. A revision of CINCLANT's basic invasion plan for Cuba was reviewed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 February 1963.

<sup>1/</sup>Document 327.

2. Intelligence reports received since last October do indicate the assignment of additional materiel to the Cuban armed forces. Responsible commanders are being kept fully informed of the changing intelligence picture and our plans are continually updated to insure that the U.S. forces and equipment and their planned employment reflect the latest information available. For example, the order in which U.S. forces and their supporting equipment are committed is being restudied in the light of the estimated increases in Castro's T-34 medium tanks and self-propelled anti-tank guns.

3. The most significant change in the basic invasion plan since last October has resulted from our increasing capability to introduce larger numbers of troops and heavy combat equipment into the objective area early in the operation. This capability is being achieved by the reactivation of 11 LST's, which will materially expedite the delivery of combat forces and equipment. In the longer term, programmed acquisition of additional C-130 aircraft into the air lift force will expedite the delivery of airborne and airlanded forces during the initial assault. Through these measures the weight of our early attacks will be increased and the probability of their success further enhanced.

4. The time factors for the Cuba operation are today as follows:

[6 lines of source text not declassified]/2/

/2/Duration of air attacks depends upon post-strike reconnaissance, supporting intelligence, and readiness to execute the assault. [Footnote in the source text.]

Robert S. McNamara

**337. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, May 10, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/14/63. Top Secret; Sensitive.

**SUBJECT**

Contingency Studies with Respect to Cuba

In accordance with the request made at the Standing Group meeting of April 30, 1963,/1/ there are attached:

/1/See Document 330.

- 1) A paper setting forth a possible scenario whereby an attack on a United States reconnaissance aircraft could be exploited toward the end of effecting the removal of the Castro regime;
- 2) A paper discussing in broad outline other contingencies which might be exploited to the same end.

We desire to emphasize that while we have used a few members of our staffs in preparation of these papers, they have not been fully staffed in either State or DOD, have not been seen by the JCS, and thus do not necessarily represent the views of our respective Departments. We also make no recommendation with respect to the possible courses of action set forth in these papers, which are presented only in accordance with the desires of the Standing Group to provide a basis for discussion.

U. Alexis Johnson/2/

Paul H. Nitze

/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.

**Attachment 1/3/**

**Memorandum for the Standing Group**

/3/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Top Secret; Sensitive.

**SUBJECT**

## Cuban Attacks on Reconnaissance Flights--A Contingency Plan

### 1. The Problem.

To capitalize on an attack on a US aircraft engaged in reconnaissance of Cuba by taking reprisals designed to place pressure on, or to effect the removal of, the Castro regime.

### 2. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

a. U-2 flights are currently conducted over Cuba at the rate of approximately two sorties per day. These flights have come to be accepted as a US right emanating from Cuban refusal to fulfill the Soviet commitment of October 28, 1962, for on-the-ground safeguards against the presence and reintroduction of offensive weapons.

b. Alternative methods of carrying on surveillance are available, but the quantity of data that could be obtained by these alternative methods is smaller than that obtainable with the U-2 and would not meet the stated requirements. A prolonged hiatus in high altitude surveillance would be intolerable in view of the continuing Soviet option of reintroduction of MRBMs. This need has also become public knowledge as a result of the widespread news coverage and the Secretary of Defense's briefing of the public; hence, there would be substantial political support for the US insistence on maintaining an acknowledged vital right.

c. Present intelligence resources give a considerable degree of confidence that Washington would have reliable information on the destruction of a U-2 by a SAM shortly after the attack. There is also a probability that correspondingly reliable information would be available with respect to an unsuccessful firing of a SAM on a U-2. A possibility exists that a U-2 could be attacked by MIG aircraft using air-to-air rockets and special attack techniques. In this case also, information would probably be available promptly. However, there remains a possibility that a U-2 could disappear under circumstances in which we had no positive information on the cause of its loss.

d. If the US did institute increasing surveillance by low and medium altitude aircraft, ostensibly and partly in order to acquire more detailed information, the chances of an incident triggered by the firing on a US reconnaissance overflight would be increased.

### 3. Political Considerations.

a. Balancing Objectives--The fundamental political judgment in this problem involves balancing the opportunity to achieve our long term objective in Cuba, the overthrow of Castro's regime and elimination of Communism from Cuba, with the risks of the US-USSR confrontation and the political acceptability of our means of attaining that objective. Since the political and power realities argue against arbitrary and unilateral action without provocation, the exploitation of Cuban provocations is the most feasible means for taking the action necessary.

The political costs of using an incident to press courses of action and reaction leading to the achievement of US objectives in Cuba, possibly including the removal of the Castro regime, have been considered. We conclude that such costs will be least, and will be acceptable, if (a) initial Cuban provocation is internationally recognized, and (b) a measured pattern of increasing US military reprisal, in reaction to escalating Cuban actions, is established.

### 4. Scenario--Phase I.

a. The most appropriate reprisal to destruction of a US reconnaissance aircraft engaged in overflying Cuba would, if the attack were made by a SAM, be either (1) a limited number of SAM sites in the vicinity of the action (depending on the geographical location, three or four nearby sites), or (2) to eliminate all SAMs in the initial attack. In the case of an interceptor attack, either (1) the facilities of the nearest (or, if known, the

offending) fighter airfield, or (2) facilities of the few active fighter airfields, should be completely taken out. At the same time, the US would initiate a high volume of harassing medium and low level reconnaissance overflights, in addition to maintaining the U-2 coverage.

b. The US would promptly initiate (without publicity) generation of the necessary invasion force, so that it would be ready as soon as possible, in the event Cuban escalation were to lead to a decision to invade.

c. US forces would be placed on appropriate readiness (DEFCON 3 for SAC).

d. The US would inform selected heads of government, NAC, and the OAS governments immediately prior to the reprisal action, of the reprisal and of the UN proposals we planned to make, and would initiate promptly consultations with the NAC and OAS groups on possible future measures which might be required--especially a new quarantine.

e. The US would call for prompt consideration of the crisis in the Security Council, and would vigorously attack Cuba and defend the necessary but limited US reprisal. We would concentrate our charges against Castro's regime, rather than the Soviet Union, and we would take the initiative in hauling him before the UN. We would, in addition to defending the requirement for reconnaissance, offer to end all aerial reconnaissance over Cuba if the Cubans would accept UN (including US) ground inspection adequate to insure against the presence or introduction of offensive weapons or offensive training, and when all Russian military personnel were returned promptly to the USSR.

## 5. Phase II.

a. It is unlikely that the USSR would react to the US Phase I actions by instituting serious counterpressures at Berlin or elsewhere, unless of course they had shot down the first reconnaissance aircraft intending to use our reaction as a pretext to create a crisis in Berlin or elsewhere. If that were the case, we would in any event be faced by a Soviet created crisis. If this were not a deliberate Soviet action to touch off a crisis, the Soviets would probably be cautious at least while assessing our intentions in Cuba. During this period, they would probably give strict orders to Soviet personnel manning the SAMs and in other positions on Cuba to avoid any reprisal or provocative action.

b. The Cubans would almost certainly initially reject the US offer. The Soviets and Cubans would exert maximum political and propaganda pressure on the US in the UN and in general.

c. It is possible that the Cubans might shoot down another US aircraft, either through lack of discipline or miscalculation of the consequences. As a general principle, the most appropriate level of reprisal would seem to be graduated suppression of Cuban air defenses. Thus, if the first plane had been destroyed by a SAM and only a few SAMs had been knocked out in the initial reprisal, and if a second aircraft were attacked by a SAM, all SAMs would be destroyed. If the initial attack had been by a fighter, and the second by a fighter or a SAM, any remaining SAMs and fighter airfields would be taken out on the second offense. If the second attack were by AAA, the problem would be more complicated but all AAA in the area of the attack could be promptly suppressed, as well as any remaining SAMs.

## 6. Phase III.

a. In the second round of US initiative (Phase III), there are two broad alternative courses of action, depending upon whether the enemy reaction (Phase II) had involved military engagement.

b. Alternative 1. If the Cubans have made a second military attack in Phase II, the US, in addition to the immediate further military reprisal sketched above (in 5.c.), would note that since the Cubans did not accept our offer of an equitable arrangement to dispense with US overflights, and were continuing to interfere with them, a

quarantine (on everything but food and medicine) was being established. The US would either seek OAS authorization, for which a majority but not unanimity could probably be gotten, or would undertake it unilaterally on the basis of its earlier consultations with the OAS and NAC, and the OAS resolution of October 1962.

(1) US justification for a quarantine would include stress on the vital Hemispheric need for information on military activities in Cuba, the fact that the Cuban action demonstrated a determined effort to overthrow the status quo established in October-November 1962, and the fact that such action further raised suspicions of Cuban military intentions. We were compelled by these facts to interdict all direct and indirect military support to the Island until complete assurance of the security of the Hemisphere could be obtained. We could further note that the US had chosen to exercise a restrained course of action which would involve minimum sacrifice by the innocent Cuban people. We might publicize our earlier offer, and the reasons why the quarantine was necessary, in leaflets to be dropped over Cuba.

(2) Quarantine might be initiated even in the absence of a second Cuban attack, for example if our reconnaissance detected suspicious signs of new threatening military activity, or perhaps if the Cubans or Soviets instituted reprisals elsewhere.

(3) Once the quarantine was established, in due course something would have to give. Assuming the Soviets would comply with the blockade, Castro or some other element of Cuban leaders might decide that there was nothing that the Soviets could or would do to help them, and that agreeing to the removal of Russian military men and inspection, in exchange for withdrawal of the quarantine and harassing reconnaissance, would be their best deal. The US would, in that case, settle for that agreement.

(4) The Soviets would, in the case of a quarantine, be under conflicting pressures to do something but not to overcommit themselves. They might risk an incident in challenging the quarantine, which would have to be strictly enforced. If they did undertake counterpressure on access to Berlin, the existing contingency plans would be put into effect as necessary. The US would have to persevere in maintaining the quarantine until Castro cracked or capitulated, or the deterrent effect of our will to stand up to Soviet pressures and counterpressures in other cases would be badly undermined.

(5) It is possible that an effective quarantine would provoke an uprising. In that case, the US would support the uprising by whatever means are necessary, up to and including invasion, to insure its success. (This represents a new situation for which a different scenario applies.)

c. Alternative 2. If there is no military counteraction to the harassing reconnaissance, and no other persuasive trigger for a quarantine, the US could undertake various measures designed to stimulate the Cubans to provoke a new incident.

(1) The US might initially intensify its reconnaissance with night flights, "show-off" low-level flights flaunting our freedom of action, hoping to stir the Cuban military to action.

(2) The US might extend its actions to large scale leaflet drops, drops of agents, "CARE"-type packages delivered to known or possible guerrilla areas, and the like. This course might stir the Cubans to military action or induce them to agree to the US terms. It also might stimulate an uprising. In any of these cases the subsequent course of action would be clear, and would be to our advantage: either invasion if an uprising occurred or the Cubans undertook military action, or removal of the Russians and ground inspection if the Cubans agreed. If, however, the Cubans did not react, this kind of activity on our part would give them propaganda ammunition. Such measures must therefore be gradual, geared to world political reactions.

(3) Perhaps the US could use some drone aircraft as "bait," flown at low speeds and favorable altitudes for tempting Cuban AAA or aircraft attacks.

(4) Soviet politico-military counterpressures elsewhere, beyond a vigorous political offensive and propaganda, would not be likely. Soviet commitments to Cuba might rise at whatever time the Soviets decided we did not intend to escalate the crisis--perhaps a few weeks after the invasion force had been readied but not committed. It is possible that the Soviets might approach us privately with an offer of quiet withdrawal of their military men from Cuba in exchange for our dropping the harassing reconnaissance (by implicitly accepting the U-2's only) and our demand for inspection.

d. Thus, depending above all on whether the Cubans were or could be made to be trigger-happy, the development of the initial downing of a reconnaissance plane could lead at best to the elimination of Castro, perhaps to the removal of Soviet troops and installation of ground inspection in Cuba, or at the least to our demonstration of firmness on reconnaissance and, if our initial reprisal had eliminated all the SAMs, we would have greatly increased our future military freedom of action and political options.

## 7. Conclusions.

If this course of action were to be pursued,

(1) Medium and low level reconnaissance overflights of Cuba, on a scale paralleling present U-2 high altitude flights and as a supplement to them, should be instituted.

(2) Authorization should be given for programs to reduce the present eighteen day period required for the generation of invasion forces, by prepositioning some equipment, buildup of sealift, etc., so that the US would be able to support more quickly an uprising on the Island, if that were necessary.

## Addendum

We have considered the question of a fabricated incident and conclude that it would not be feasible or desirable to contrive a mock Cuban attack on a US reconnaissance aircraft. This plan applies to a genuine attack on a US aircraft over to near Cuba.

## Attachment 2/4/

### Memorandum for the Standing Group

/4/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Top Secret; Sensitive.

#### SUBJECT

Certain Cuban Contingencies

The Problem.

To capitalize on various Cuban provocations by taking reprisals to place pressures on, or to effect the removal of, the Castro regime.

#### A. Internal Revolt

1. An internal revolt could take one of two general forms: (i) a revolt within the structure of the existing regime or (ii) a revolt essentially outside the governmental structure against which the full power of the Government might be arrayed. In addition (i) might trigger (ii) or vice versa. Either might also involve Soviet troops in countering the insurgency. Any of these cases could provide the basis for increasing US military pressures to

eliminate the Castro regime.

2. Case (i) is the most likely, and also the case most likely to succeed without outside intervention. It would draw its inspiration and support from nationalistic elements who had become disenchanted by the abject dependence of the regime on the Communist Bloc, isolation within the Hemisphere, deepening of the economic crisis, a threatened or actual Communist accession to complete control of the regime at the expense of the remaining members of the 26th of July Movement, or the death of Castro.

3. Case (ii) might take the form of widespread disruptive behavior supported in whole or in part by elements of the militia, or an uprising in one of the mountainous areas which might attract local militia elements.

4. There are several variants to case (i), in particular:

(1) A "palace coup" either by hard-line Communists, or by members of the 26th of July Movement.

(2) A revolt by the Cuban armed forces or militia.

a. Palace Coup.

1) A palace coup by hard-line Communists might be the trigger for a counter-coup by elements of the armed forces or militia. Each of these cases has a great danger of involvement by Soviet forces, but presumably the Communist coup is most dangerous from this standpoint. Since the world is on notice that the US would tolerate no interference by local Soviet forces in an attempt by the Cuban people to throw off the Castro yoke, it would provide a platform for US intervention on behalf of the Cuban people.

2) A palace coup by members of the 26th of July Movement would probably arise from a broad conspiracy involving support from elements of the armed forces and militia. Such a coup might start with the assassination of Castro and a plea to the US to fend off intervention by Soviet forces. Clearly, if both Army and militia arrayed themselves against the putschists, the opportunity for US intervention would be fleeting. The attitude and actions of Soviet forces would vitally affect the outcome. The most favorable case for persistence of the coup would ensue if both elements of the Cuban forces supported them and the Soviets remained aloof. On the other hand, were the latter to intervene, the basis for forceful US action would be more solid.

b. Military Revolts.

Local or general revolts by the Army or militia coupled with attempts to seize the seat of Government or proclaim an alternate regime are possible quite apart from any links to a conspiracy within the regime. It is possible that an action within one of these elements might be the catalyst for similar action within the other. A militia revolt opposed by the Cuban Army and the Soviet troops would provide the least time for the US to react while the revolt was still alive. It is conceivable, however, that the revolutionists could take to the hills, prolonging resistance and giving us more time to react.

5. Popular Uprising. Case (ii), a revolt outside the governmental framework, could manifest general discontent through the appearance of a number of guerrilla bands operating at widely separated points and supported with food by the peasants. Alternatively, a single guerrilla leader, operating in a particularly disaffected province, might expand his operations to the point where the Government was compelled to react massively. Suffice it to say, in the atmosphere of present-day Cuba neither of these possibilities is very likely. The Government has an excellent surveillance network, both internally and with respect to the air and sea approaches to the Island, and the peasants as yet are unwilling to risk their necks until the Government's chances appear poorer than they now are.

B. Cuban Intervention in Latin America

1. A flagrant case of Cuban interference and violence in the internal life of another country (such as Venezuela or the Dominican Republic) could provide the basis for OAS sanctions, including a quarantine or perhaps a demand for inspection at Cuban ports and airfields. It would be difficult to use such an incident directly as justification for an invasion. However, in addition to the institution of a quarantine, the US could use the resulting tension as justification for a quiet buildup of the invasion force, and then use a new incident in quarantine enforcement, Cuban incursions on Guantanamo, or an uprising as justification for invasion.

2. It might be desirable in preparation to highlight Cuban training and dispatch of subversives, instruction for sabotage, etc., as background for "the incident." The incident itself should be domestic, violent and quickly identified as part of a pattern of Castroist export of revolution which would threaten other Latin American governments. (A "one-two" series of incidents would excellently serve to underline this point.) In this manner, the need for a drastic quarantine would be established.

3. A quarantine should cover POL as well as all arms entering, and arms and "agents" leaving, Cuba; it should probably not cover food and medicine. In the long run, a POL blockade should be effective in disrupting Cuba internally. If Castro sought to negotiate an end of it, we should set an unacceptably high price such as unlimited inspection to verify no subversive training being undertaken, no arms shipments in or out (except returns to the USSR), etc.

4. An "uprising" in this situation would be similar to any other, except that the US would have been able to generate US invasion forces for its support during the blockade.

#### C. Incidents at Guantanamo

1. An incident at Guantanamo, such as a Cuban incursion, or cutting off of the water supply (the source of which is off the US reservation), could provide an opportunity for protective action beyond the perimeter of the base. In particular, restoring the source of water and protecting it from further interference would provide a reasonably good justification for the US to react with whatever degree of force was deemed necessary for this task. Assuming the Cubans resisted, the security of the element would justify broadened actions. This could come to involve pitched battles, and require US invasion.

2. Expansion and escalation from an incident at Guantanamo would be fully supported in the US and by some Allies, but it would have the political disadvantage of stemming from a US base held against the desires of the incumbent government. In general, justification based on protecting US rights would be less suitable than support to a Cuban uprising or strong action after Cuban export of revolution.

3. While the scenario of events following from an incident might escalate to full-scale US-Cuban combat, it might not. The Cubans might, at once or after some initial skirmishes, break contact and withdraw to permit the US to restore the water supply and even to keep guards outside the US military reservation. In that case, especially if the Cubans had offered to restore the water supply, it would be very disadvantageous for the US to appear to be "picking a fight" over a broad definition of our base rights.

4. An uprising fortuitously located within range of US assistance from the Guantanamo Bay base would be militarily favorable, but it might appear to be contrived by the US.

#### D. Incidents at Sea

1. There are two categories of possible incidents at sea which might justify reprisal against Cuba:

a. Castroite hi-jacking of a Latin American vessel; or

b. Cuban naval attacks on or harassment of a US or Latin American ship.

The former would not, in itself, seem to provide clear opportunity for reprisals of a direct effective nature. The latter could be met by attacking the offending Cuban vessels and perhaps counter-harassment of Cuban ships with the possibility of an incident arising.

2. Escalation at sea might lead to US reprisal against Cuban gunboats in port as well as at sea, but unless such action led to shooting down a US plane it is difficult to see how it would justify US quarantine or invasion. If a US attacking aircraft (at sea or over a Cuban port) were attacked, we might start the scenario of reprisals against Cuba's air defense. Thus, an incident at sea could trigger the air defense scenario; otherwise, incidents at sea do not seem promising.

### **338. Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency**

Washington, May 13, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a covering memorandum from Sherman Kent to McGeorge Bundy, May 13, while this memorandum was a "draft" at Bundy's instruction, it "represents our best and most careful effort in the time available. A number of knowledgeable people from parts of the Agency other than the Office of National Estimates participated."

#### **SUBJECT**

Developments in Cuba and Possible US Actions in the Event of Castro's Death/1/

/1/This memorandum is a general analysis of the situation and prospects for US action after Castro's death. We have not sought to work out in detail Latin American, Western European, or other third party reactions in the various contingencies adverted to in our examination of the problem. In paragraph 13 we consider very generally the problem of Soviet reactions. [Footnote in the source text. Paragraph 13 stated that the Soviet Union's interest in Cuba would not be lessened by Castro's death, but it would react cautiously behind the scenes to influence events if a power struggle developed. If the struggle reached open conflict or the United States intervened, the Soviet Union would have to act. Such potential action was outside the scope of the paper.]

#### **SUMMARY**

We believe the odds are that upon Castro's death his brother Raul or some other figure in the regime would, with Soviet backing and help, take over control. However, there is a good chance that a power struggle would ensue, and a lesser chance that such a struggle would spread, either into a many-sided conflict or with the Moscow-oriented Communists lined up on one side and those who are essentially Cuban nationalists on the other. In any case the loyalties of the military commanders, now committed to Fidel but probably divided after his death, would significantly influence the outcome. Anti-Moscow Cuban nationalists would require extensive US help in order to win, and probably US military intervention.

[Here follows the 12-page discussion portion of the memorandum.]

### **339. Summary Record of the 5th Standing Group Meeting of the National Security Council**

Washington, May 14, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/14/63. Top Secret.

Mr. Alexis Johnson presented the paper he and Mr. Nitze had prepared entitled "Cuban Attacks on Reconnaissance Flights--a Contingency Plan."/1/ He said two basic problems are (1) getting the Cubans to act in such a way that we can escalate in a manner adequate to achieve our objectives of overthrowing Castro, and (2) how to go about this in such a way as to obtain the maximum amount of support in the UN and domestically. He said a major effort could be made to deal with the resulting situation in the OAS, but we should acknowledge now that we would not be able to keep our action from being discussed in the UN. Therefore, we should go to the UN immediately after our actions as a plaintiff rather than as a defendant. We will receive far less support for any of the actions contemplated in the paper than we did last October at the time of the crisis over the Soviet missiles.

/1/Printed as attachment 1 to Document 337.

Following a discussion of medium-level aerial reconnaissance, it was agreed that a paragraph would be added explaining the rationale for such expanded aerial surveillance.

Mr. Johnson agreed that if the Cubans or the Russians do not react to our actions, we are unable to make them do so.

There was some discussion as to whether the paragraph on page eight/2/ stated the reaction of the Soviets accurately. There was also discussion as to whether the Soviets would respond in another area, such as Berlin, if we put into effect a full quarantine of Cuba.

/2/Reference is to sub-subparagraph (4) of subparagraph b of paragraph 6, "Phase III."

Mr. Sorensen suggested that a paragraph be inserted listing as an alternative a situation in which the U.S. would announce that a state of war existed with Cuba. This might be done in lieu of a full blockade. If a state of war were announced in Phase 2, a blockade would become legal.

In connection with aerial surveillance, Mr. Bundy referred to the new international law of peaceful observation./3/ He suggested that more public attention be drawn to our belief that observation from outer space is entirely peaceful and not a violation of national sovereignty.

/3/Not further identified.

Mr. Ball read part of page five,/4/ commenting that the Soviets would have to respond elsewhere if our actions in Cuba resulted in our killing Soviet soldiers.

/4/Reference is to paragraph 5, "Phase II," subparagraph a.

The Attorney General said he believed the Russians would attempt to force upon us a choice involving the continuation of our aerial overflights of Cuba. He said Khrushchev had said he would try to bring about termination of our overflights. He foresaw a situation in which the Russians might take the overflights case to the UN after withdrawing their forces from Cuba.

It was agreed that a paper would be prepared to deal with the contingency of the Russians' attempt to end our U-2 and aerial surveillance flights by measures short of force./5/

/5/Reference is to a May 27 memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63) See the Supplement.

There was a discussion of the April 24 paper which is the current draft of our contingency plans in the event a U-2 plane is shot down./6/ This paper has been approved by Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, but has not been presented to the President. It is being held in the event that the contingency materializes and will be used by the President at that time in deciding how to retaliate against a shutdown.

/6/Not printed. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, U-2 Flights--Contingency Plans) See the attachment to a May 15 memorandum from Johnson to Brubeck in the Supplement.

Mr. Bundy suggested that the threat of Cuba to the U.S. was an appropriate subject for officials to emphasize publicly. He referred to the study on post-Castro Cuba, adding that we are not in a position to undertake some of the actions described in the Johnson-Nitze paper unless we are convinced an improved situation in Cuba will result.

On page ten,/7/ the heading "Conclusions" was deleted in order to avoid confusion. The actions which follow this heading are aimed at building up the importance of aerial reconnaissance, thereby serving as a rationale for serious actions taken following an attempt to prevent us from continuing aerial reconnaissance.

/7/Reference is to paragraph 7.

The paper is to be revised to include the state of war suggestion by Mr. Sorensen and other suggestions. It will be considered further at a later meeting.

The second paper, entitled "Certain Cuban Contingencies" was discussed briefly./8/ It consists of a catalog of other contingencies which have not been studied in depth as was the contingency of an attack on a reconnaissance plane. It contains no recommended actions or plans. Study of actions to meet these possible contingencies was not thought profitable. The military question centers around the necessity of obtaining a tenable presence in Cuba in a very short time after a decision has been made to react. The political problem is how to generate a right of intervention. The catalog of contingencies reveals that all are either unlikely or unhelpful. Even the contingency of a so-called Hungarian situation, namely, Russians attacking Cubans, is highly unlikely. Our statement that we would not permit such a situation to develop in Cuba is a good noise but deals with a highly unlikely contingency.

/8/Printed as attachment 2 to Document 337.

There was a discussion of the sugar paper presented by the State Department./9/ Mr. McCone disagreed with the State recommendation that nothing be done to affect the world sugar market. He thought this was an area where action could be taken to prevent the Russians from financing their aid to Cuba by means of buying Cuban sugar cheaply and selling it at the much higher world market price.

/9/Apparent reference to Document 334.

There was a discussion of the current world sugar market. Mr. McCone cited a 4% increase in sugar consumption and an 8% decrease in production, very low stocks, resulting in a sugar price of 10# per pound.

It was agreed that Secretary Freeman be asked to produce a study of the current situation with particular reference to the effect of the very high sugar price on the future Cuban economy./10/ This study will consider increasing U.S. production to force down the world market price, as well as to benefit domestic producers.

/10/See Document 340.

The paper produced by Sherman Kent of CIA entitled "Developments in Cuba and Possible U.S. Actions in the Event of Castro's Death,"/11/ was not discussed because of lack of time./12/

/11/See Document 338.

/12/McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting, May 16. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/14/63)

Bromley Smith/13/

/13/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**340. National Security Action Memorandum No. 244**

Washington, May 15, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Confidential. Copies sent to all members of the Standing Group of the National Security Council.

TO

The Secretary of Agriculture

SUBJECT

The Future of the World Sugar Market

The current situation in the world market for sugar is a matter of considerable concern to the Standing Group of the National Security Council. The unusually high price of sugar is significant both in its relation to the economic prospects of Cuba and in its relation to restrictions on the production of sugar in free countries, and not least in the United States. It is requested that you take the lead in a study of the current situation and of alternative courses of action that might best serve the economic interests of the United States and of other free countries, bearing in mind the particular interest which we have in preventing any long continuation of unjustifiably high prices for Cuban sugar on the world market.

It is hoped that a report might be available for distribution not later than Monday, May 27,<sup>1/</sup> and that you might be willing to join with the Standing Group in a discussion of this matter on Tuesday, May 28, probably at 5:00 p.m.<sup>2/</sup>

<sup>1/</sup>The paper, May 27, is *ibid.*, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63. See the Supplement.

<sup>2/</sup>See Document 344.

Both the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency have expressed their interest in this study and their readiness to cooperate, and I assume that you will draw on other agencies of the government in any way you wish. Here at the White House I am ensuring that Myer Feldman is informed of the Standing Group's interest in the problem.

McGeorge Bundy

**341. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, May 21, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone.

## SUBJECT

Memorandum of Discussion of Low-Level Flight Over Cuba, attended by The President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, General Taylor, Secretary Ball, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCone

1. Colonel Steakley presented a plan for a flight over Remedios. Lundahl displayed the relative photography of high- and low-level from previous missions. McCone stated that high-level photography gave no evidence of whether people were at a base. He said the intelligence community did not know whether the four military bases were fully occupied, partially occupied, or not occupied at all. Low-level photography might (but this is not absolutely sure) throw some light on this important question.

2. Ambassador Thompson pointed out that a low-level flight during Castro's visit in Moscow would exacerbate relations with Castro and would enhance the prospect of Castro and Khrushchev agreeing to some retaliatory action against our missions. After a brief discussion concerning the pros and cons of the issue, the President decided as follows:

1. that low-level flight was necessary, however, there was no immediacy and therefore he suggested it be postponed until after Castro had departed the USSR, now estimated to be about May 28th;

2. if we run one low-level flight, there should be at least two and possibly three, and he therefore would like one or two additional missions to be developed.

The issue is to be raised again.

Action: NRO and Colonel Steakley should develop three priority missions, following the established groundrules, to cover the most important COMOR targets.

### **342. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Members of the Standing Group of the National Security Council**

Washington, May 22, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/16-5/31/63. Secret. This memorandum was briefly discussed at the 6th meeting of the Standing Group, May 21. It was circulated with general agreement to the assignments. (Summary Record of 6th NSC Standing Group, May 21; *ibid.*, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/21/63)

## SUBJECT

Committee Responsibilities in Cuban Affairs

1. The Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, acting as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Cuba, is responsible for the coordination of day-to-day actions. Examples of such problems are: efforts to reduce Cuban Free World shipping, problems of refugees, problems of countering Cuban subversion, and supervision of ongoing propaganda and information efforts. This list is illustrative and not exhaustive. On covert matters, the Coordinator reports to the Special Group (NSC 5412).

2. The Standing Group is responsible for the development of contingency plans and the assessment of long-range policy objectives and means for meeting them.

3. The Special Group (NSC 5412) is responsible for covert activities, with appropriate liaison to the other two committees.

McGeorge Bundy/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

### **343. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Members of the Standing Group of the National Security Council**

Washington, May 28, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63. Top Secret; Sensitive.

The meeting this afternoon will be devoted to a number of special problems on Cuba, but I hope we may have a few minutes at the end to take a reading on the general position as it appears to be developing.

1. First, we will turn to the problem of sugar as presented in the papers of the Department of Agriculture./1/ For this part of the discussion, Under Secretary Sundquist will be present for Secretary Freeman.

/1/Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman sent Myer Feldman a preliminary memorandum of May 16, bringing him up to date on what the Department of Agriculture had been doing about sugar and its thoughts on future action. Freeman also sent a copy to Bundy. (Ibid.) On May 24 Agriculture submitted another more definitive paper without any indication of authorship. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

2. We should briefly discuss a paper on possible U.S. actions in the event of Castro's death./2/ For this part of the discussion Mr. Sherman Kent will be present.

/2/Document 338.

3. There are two highly sensitive CIA papers which Mr. McCone has requested that we hold for distribution at the meeting. They deal with a list of possible actions under consideration at CIA and with the specific problem of Cuba's oil supplies./3/

/3/The analysis of Cuban supply and demand of crude oil and refined petroleum products, May 6, and an undated annotated list of additional covert actions against Cuba. (Both in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series) See the Supplement.

4. I propose at the end to make a brief oral comment on the results of our discussions thus far, as I understand them. My own preliminary conclusions are not optimistic, but that is not an excuse for avoiding the issue.

McGeorge Bundy

### **344. Summary Record of 7th Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security Council**

Washington, May 28, 1963, 5 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting,

5/28/63. Top Secret; Sensitive.

The discussion of the attached sugar paper/<sup>1</sup>/ emphasized the necessity of increasing domestic and world sugar production. Deputy Under Secretary of Agriculture Sundquist was asked to develop for consideration a program of action to force down the world sugar price. The interest of the Standing Group in this subject is a desire to deny high sugar prices to the Castro government. The attached Record of Action summarizes the study which the Department of Agriculture and a task force will make.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>/Reference is to the second paper cited in footnote 1, Document 343.

<sup>2</sup>/According to Bundy's May 28 record of action, the Department of Agriculture would develop for consideration a U.S. program to reduce substantially the price of sugar on the world market. The program should outline measures to be taken, their estimated costs, and take into account U.S. balance of payments consequences as well as consequences to friendly sugar-producing countries. The Department of State, CIA, and IAD would make available to the Department of Agriculture experts to assist in the study. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series)

There was a brief discussion of Sherman Kent's paper on "Possible U.S. Actions in the Event of Castro's Death."<sup>3</sup> The general view was that all of the courses of action discussed were singularly unpromising.

<sup>3</sup>/See Document 338.

Mr. Bundy asked the question: What do we do about Cuba? He said he was coming to believe that we could not say that by a date certain we could overthrow Castro. He believed that we should face this prospect. Of the various contingencies which we might exploit, none were controllable by us. It is possible that changes in the Castro government cannot be brought about until Soviet troops are out of Cuba. Even a blockade involves a naval confrontation with the USSR. Because the level of danger is now equal to that of last October, a nuclear confrontation with the Soviets is not feasible. He suggested that at the next Standing Group meeting the comments he had made should be fully discussed.

Mr. McCone argued for courses of action which would increase economic hardship in Cuba. Such actions, supplemented by sabotage measures, would create a situation in Cuba in which it would be possible to subvert military leaders to the point of their acting to overthrow Castro. He acknowledged that any sabotage measures taken in Cuba would create a very high noise level.

Secretary McNamara repeated his view that sabotage measures would not be conclusive and suggested an examination of those economic pressures which could upset Castro.

Mr. FitzGerald summarized a paper containing a list of all covert actions which could be taken against Castro Cuba. (Copy attached)<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup>/Reference is to the second paper cited in footnote 3, Document 343.

Secretary McNamara said there were three lines of action. The first would be to over-react to some action taken by Castro or made to appear to have been taken by him. For example, a Cuban attack on Guantanamo, even one inspired by us, might create a situation which we could exploit and thus justify courses of action adequate to overthrow Castro. The second line would be long-range economic warfare against Cuba. The third would be to buy off Castro.

Mr. McCone said Castro's visit to Moscow was inspired by a Russian desire to forestall any effort by the U.S. to negotiate with Castro. Under Secretary Harriman flatly disagreed, saying that Khrushchev invited Castro to Moscow in order to prove the success of Russian policy toward Cuba and to refute Chinese accusations that

Khrushchev's "softness" toward the U.S. had produced no returns.

There followed a discussion as to where we thought Cuba would be five years from now. Secretary McNamara indicated his belief that the Russians would and could make Cuba a showcase for Communism in the Western Hemisphere. Under Secretary Harriman doubted they would try to do this and stated that they could not, even if they tried.

The Attorney General, who entered the meeting in the middle of Mr. FitzGerald's briefing, said the U.S. must do something against Castro, even though we do not believe our actions would bring him down.

Mr. Bundy acknowledged that we can give an impression of busyness in Cuba and we can make life difficult for Castro.

Mr. McCone said that economic measures, such as restriction of trade, were wasting assets because of the increasing reluctance of our allies to act with us. In addition, Cuba has money obtained from selling sugar futures. Such sales amount to \$40 million already. Thus, economic warfare is very difficult to carry on. In response to a question by the Attorney General as to what Mr. McCone recommended should be done, the Director repeated his earlier proposal of sabotage and subversion of the Cuban military.

Mr. Bundy summarized by saying that the best we could do was to decide now what actions we would take against Castro, acknowledging that the measures practical for us to undertake will not result in his overthrow.

Bromley Smith/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**345. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, May 28, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 5/63-6/63. Confidential. A handwritten "P.M." follows the dateline.

SUBJECT

Cuban Exiles

Attached is a draft paper, prepared by the Cuban Coordinator, on the subject of U.S. policy towards exile unity. It is being circulated to Coordinating Committee members for comments and clearance.

The Coordinator recommends that the U.S. follow a "hands-off" policy towards exile efforts to achieve unity and that public statements of all U.S. officials be consistent with the recent Ed Martin statement,<sup>/1/</sup> as amended. Judging from the tenor of the last Coordinating Committee meeting, I suspect that the draft will be approved with few substantive changes.<sup>/2/</sup>

GC

<sup>/1/</sup>The statement is quoted in the paper. It was made on May 22 before the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees and is attached to a May 28 memorandum from Chase to Bundy, on U.S. policy toward exile unity. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

/2/Bundy wrote the following on Chase's covering memorandum: "Good: I have cleared this in principle with the President (altho I would not exclude a shift if Bobby felt strongly the other way)."

## **Attachment**

DRAFT MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT

United States Position on Efforts by Cuban Exiles to Achieve Unity

Problem

To determine the position of the Government with respect to efforts by Cuban exiles in the United States to achieve unity.

Background

A. As a result of developments in the past two months especially the U.S. measures against hit-and-run raids, Miro Cardona's resignation as head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, the withdrawal of U.S. support for the Council, and its consequent decline--a vague, confused and still embryonic movement toward "unity" (usually conceived of as a single body or organization speaking or acting for all exiles) has taken place in the Cuban exile community. The search for a unifying formula arises from a variety of motives: a psychological need on the part of the exiles for a single organization which they can consider as their repre-sentative an instructive belief that unity in itself will advance the cause of liberation; the desire for an organization which can address governments, international bodies, and public opinion; the belief that to work toward unity is to conform to the wishes of the U.S. Government, which is the only potential source of major material support; and the hope on the part of the ambitious that participation in unity will lead to political preference in post-Castro Cuba.

B. So far the developments in the effort for unity have resulted in the following line-up:

Left. The Second National Front of Escambray, Alpha-66, the Anti-Communist Liberation Front, and elements of the People's Revolutionary Movement and the 30th of November Movement have reached a working agreement. Although the working agreement is essentially action-oriented, the member organizations tend to the view that the original revolution promised by Castro should be reclaimed and redirected. The adherence of Manuel Ray's Revolutionary Junta (JURE) would increase the influence of this grouping, which probably has the most potential appeal to Castro's opponents within Cuba, but which is an object of concern to more conservative exiles.

Center. Revolutionary Unity (UR), Revolutionary Recuperation Movement (MRR), Christian Democratic Movement (MDC), Revolutionary Student Directorate (DRE), and other less well-organized center groups, have held aloof from attempts at unity.

Right. The Alliance for Cuban Liberty (ALC), and the Association for Economic Recovery of Cuba (AREC) have had difficulty attracting adherents. They principally look to the return of their lost property, rather than action and politics. Recent discussions by these groups with U.S. nationals promising large-scale financial support appear to have had no results.

"Letter of Integration." Stimulated by old-line politicians, Alonso Pujol and Carlos Prio, this grouping has secured a number of signatures of prominent exiles on a document which calls for the liberation of Cuba, the extirpation of Communism, and the return to the 1940 Constitution. Rightist in makeup, heavily weighted on the side of discredited politicians, it is unlikely to have much support within Cuba.

Plebiscite. Jose (Pepin) Bosch (Bacardi Rum) is forming a committee to organize a plebiscite to elect a single leader. There has been little forward movement to date.

Enrique Ruiz Williams. He has formed a unity committee and claims the personal support of Attorney General Kennedy. His efforts have shown only limited results thus far.

Students. Student sectors of eleven organizations are reported to have reached a working agreement. The extent and significance of this attempt is unknown. Significantly, the DRE is not included in this bloc.

Brigade. An association of Brigade veterans, formed in April and claiming a membership of 900, is primarily--at least at present--a fraternal organization, but some of its leaders appear to have hopes that the group might form a nucleus for unity of all exiles.

C. The public attitude of the Government toward unity efforts was expressed by Assistant Secretary Martin last week as follows:

Although many proponents of unity claim to have the approval of the United States Government, we have not been involved in these efforts, which are entirely Cuban in origin and direction. Of course, we believe that in principle a sound and broadly representative unity which reflects real identity of views is desirable. This, however, must come from within the Cuban community if it is to have vitality.

It is desirable that a point implicit in the foregoing statement be made explicit, that is, the requirement that unity reflect the basic desires of the people within Cuba.

D. It is unlikely that the exiles will be able to achieve a unity which meets the criteria set out in the Martin statement. So far the efforts toward unity have been tentative and competitive. Political divisions, both ideological and personal, are deep and there appears to be little disposition or ability to effect a real accommodation of views. The groups on the left distrust those on the right and vice versa; the center groups are wary of both. Any formula for unity would have to be so diluted as to be almost meaningless. Moreover, the ability of a united exile organization to reflect, to any meaningful degree, the attitudes and aspirations of those within Cuba would be minimal.

## 1. Support of Unity Efforts

Considerations: Through judicious use of our resources, we might be able to force or induce unity among all or the principal democratic groups from right to left. Such a movement or organization would have to be of the least-common-denominator type. It would generally be recognized as an artificial creation of ours, although it might have some favorable effect on domestic public opinion. Our interference would probably be resented by many of the best exile elements (as in the case of the CRC), would deprive any unity movement of spontaneity (one of the sole virtues of a Cuban-originated and directed effort), would commit us to continuing support of the movement or organization, and would probably be suspect within Cuba. Even beyond these considerations, unity in itself does not significantly contribute to the achievement of our present objectives in Cuba. In fact, it is quite possible that a continuation of the present situation in which there is no pre-eminent central organization would be easier and more effective from an operational standpoint.

## 2. Opposition to Unity Efforts

Considerations: By judicious use of our resources, we probably could thwart movements toward unity. Our interference in this sense would be strongly resented and would be widely interpreted as a demonstration that we are "giving up" on the Cuban question. It would be very difficult to explain, particularly to domestic public opinion, since "unity" on its face is attractive. In any case, the prospects for a spontaneous, effective, and

meaningful unity are hardly good.

### 3. Hands-Off

Considerations: If we were to remain as aloof as a decent public posture allows, the chances are considerably better than even that unity efforts would fail. There is an outside possibility, however, that a unified organization or movement meeting our standards would emerge. If it did, it would have the strength endowed by the free, undistorted (by U.S. interference), competitive play of political currents, and it would not carry the taint of U.S. sponsorship.

A "hands-off" policy incurs the risks of permitting the possibly embarrassing intensification of division among the exiles, of sacrificing some sound but poorly financed groups to the necessities of exile politics in which less sound but better-financed elements might become dominant, and of being faced, should a unity movement or organization be formed, with demands for U.S. support. In the last case, the fact that we had not participated in the formation of the movement would give us maximum flexibility.

### Conclusions

1. The U.S. Government should follow a "hands-off" policy toward exile efforts to achieve unity.
2. The statement of position made by Assistant Secretary Martin is a good expression of this policy, provided it is expanded by a reference to the requirement that unity reflect the basic desires of the people within Cuba.

### Recommendations

1. That the U.S. Government follow a "hands-off" policy toward exile efforts to achieve unity.
2. That public statements by all officers of the U.S. Government on the subject of exile unity be consistent with the following:

Although many proponents of unity claim to have the approval of the United States Government, we have not been involved in these efforts, which are entirely Cuban in origin and direction. Of course, we believe that in principle a sound and broadly representative unity which reflects real identity of views is desirable. This, however, must come from within the Cuban community and be consistent with the desires of the people within Cuba if it is to have vitality.

### **346. Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency for the Standing Group of the National Security Council**

Washington, June 8, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/63. Secret; Eyes Only. According to a covering memorandum from Smith to Bundy, June 10, this paper was to be submitted to the NSC Standing Group on June 11. The next (8th) meeting of the Standing Group was held on June 18, not June 11. Bundy's record of action of the June 18 meeting indicated that the group discussed this paper and approved it for final decision by the President. (Ibid., Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 6/18/63)

### SUBJECT

Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Program of Action towards Cuba

### I. Introduction

1. Submitted herewith is a covert program for Cuba within CIA's capabilities. Some parts of the program have already been approved and are being implemented. Being closely inter-related, the total cumulative impact of the courses of action set forth in this program is dependent upon the simultaneous coordinated execution of the individual courses of action.

2. This program is based on the assumption that current U.S. policy does not contemplate outright military intervention in Cuba or a provocation which can be used as a pretext for an invasion of Cuba by United States military forces. It is further assumed that U.S. policy calls for the exertion of maximum pressure by all means available to the U.S. Government, short of military intervention, to prevent the pacification of the population and the consolidation of the Castro/Communist regime. The ultimate objective of this policy would be to encourage dissident elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the eventual liquidation of the Castro/Communist entourage and the elimination of the Soviet presence from Cuba.

3. While the effect of a program of maximum pressure is unpredictable, it is suggested that a sustained intensive effort undertaken now to prevent the consolidation of the Castro/Communist regime may in the future present the United States with opportunities and options not now foreseeable. The consequences of a policy of allowing Castro to "stew in his own juice," however, are foreseeable. According to current estimates, barring Castro's death or a decisive change in the U.S. posture or Soviet policy towards Cuba, the Castro regime is likely to be more firmly established a year hence, despite possible economic setbacks. The mere passage of time tends to favor Castro as the population and elite groups in Cuba become accustomed to the idea that he is here to stay and as his regime gains in administrative experience and the security organs become more efficient. Over the longer run, the existence of an organized party apparatus as well as a stable governmental machinery could reduce the indispensability of Castro's personal leadership. Thus, if left to chance, the U.S. must be prepared to accept for the indefinite future a Communist regime in Cuba closely tied to and a significant component of the Soviet world power structure.

4. Within the context of the policy assumptions and estimate of the situation in Cuba outlined above, CIA submits a program consisting of the following interdependent courses of action:

A. Covert collection of intelligence, both for U.S. strategic requirements as well as for operational requirements.

B. Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance.

C. Exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in the Cuban military and other power centers.

D. Economic denial actions on an increased basis.

E. General sabotage and harassment.

F. Support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban groups to supplement and assist in the execution of the above courses of action.

5. A vital feature of the foregoing program to exert maximum pressure on the Castro/Communist regime is the dependence of the impact of each course of action on the simultaneous and effective execution of the other courses of action. Thus, intelligence information is needed to permit the planning and mounting of operations against economic denial and sabotage targets. Covert propaganda actions are designed to produce a psychological climate in Cuba conducive to the accomplishment of the other courses of action in the integrated covert program. Only after the effects of economic denial and sabotage actions are deeply felt by the populace and the elite groups can one hope to convert disaffection in the armed forces and other power centers of the regime into militant revolt against the Castro/Communist entourage. It is also at this point where CIA-controlled and autonomous activist elements in the Cuban exile community can begin to assume genuine resistance

proportions. As a consequence of this inter-related and continuous process, it is reasonable to expect a considerable increase in the volume and quality of the intelligence product on the basis of which additional and increasingly more effective operations can be mounted. Unless all the components of this program are executed in tandem, the individual courses of action are almost certain to be of marginal value, even in terms of achieving relatively limited policy objectives. This is clearly a cause where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

## II. Discussion of Components of an Integrated Program

6. In amplification of the courses of action listed in paragraph 4 above, the following additional description and terms of reference are offered:

### A. Covert collection of intelligence, both for U.S. strategic requirements as well as for operational requirements.

Covert collection of intelligence continues to be a major CIA mission. Without detracting from our strategic intelligence efforts, emphasis is being given to increasing the volume and quality of intelligence needed for planning and mounting the operations contemplated in the integrated program described in this paper, particularly for defections and penetrations and for economic denial and sabotage actions against vulnerable sectors of the Cuban economy.

### B. Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance.

In accordance with a previously approved psychological program in support of U.S. policy on Cuba, CIA-controlled radio programs and other propaganda media directed at Cuba encourage low-risk simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance. These media also seek to stimulate and exacerbate tensions within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc, taking advantage of Sino-Soviet tensions. All of these propaganda operations are calculated to create a psychological atmosphere within Cuba which will facilitate the accomplishment of the other courses of action within the integrated covert action program.

### C. Exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in the Cuban military and other power centers.

We are undertaking an intensive probing effort to identify, seek out and establish channels of communication with disaffected and potentially dissident non-Communist elements in the power centers of the regime, particularly in the armed forces hierarchy. The objective is to promote the fragmentation of the regime and possibly lead to an internal coup which would dislodge Castro and his entourage, and make it possible to eliminate the Cuban Communists from positions of power and force the withdrawal of the Soviet military presence and the termination of its economic aid. Several promising operations are already underway.

### D. Economic denial actions.

Overt official U.S. economic sanctions in conjunction with covert economic denial operations (such as denial of *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*) is causing a marked adverse effect on the Cuban economy. For maximum impact on the Cuban economy this effort must be coordinated with sabotage operations. We propose to continue and intensify economic denial operations which would be greatly enhanced by an inter-agency committee with a charter enabling it to call upon member agencies for rapid action.

### E. General sabotage and harassment.

Sabotage in this program is both an economic weapon and a stimulus to resistance. As an economic weapon, it is a supplement to and therefore must be coordinated with the economic denial effort. As a stimulus to resistance, there must be visible and dramatic evidence of sabotage to serve as a symbol of growing popular defiance of the Castro regime.

These operations will be conducted either by externally held assets now available or by existing internal assets or those to be developed. Assets trained and controlled by CIA will be used as will selected autonomous exile groups. Initially, the emphasis will be on the use of externally held assets with a shift to internal assets as soon as operationally feasible.

The types of sabotage considered appropriate for this program are:

- (1) Simple low-risk sabotage on a large scale stimulated by propaganda media (approved and being implemented).
- (2) Sabotage of Cuban ships outside Cuban waters (approved and being implemented).
- (3) Externally mounted hit-and-run attacks against appropriately selected targets.
- (4) Support of internal resistance elements, providing materiel and personnel to permit them to undertake a variety of sabotage and harassment operations.

It must be recognized that no single act of sabotage by itself can materially affect the economy or stimulate significant resistance. However, it is our opinion that a well-planned series of sabotage efforts, properly executed, would in time produce the effect we seek. Each action will have its dangers: there will be failures with consequent loss of life and charges of attribution to the United States resulting in criticism at home and abroad. None of these expected consequences should cause us to change our course if the program as outlined can be expected to be successful.

Annex A is an elaboration of a proposed sabotage and harassment program against Cuba.

F. Support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban groups to supplement and assist in the execution of the above courses of action.

In the past, CIA has utilized only fully controlled and disciplined agent assets as a safeguard against unilateral and irresponsible action by Cuban exiles intent upon the liberation of their country. If sabotage and resistance activities are to be undertaken on a larger scale, it will be necessary to accept the risks involved in utilizing autonomous Cuban exile groups and individuals who will not necessarily be responsive to our guidance. CIA proposes the following "rules of engagement" to govern the conduct of these autonomous operations:

- (1) It is the keystone of autonomous operations that they will be executed exclusively by Cuban nationals motivated by the conviction that the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime must be accomplished by Cubans, both inside and outside Cuba acting in consonance.
- (2) The effort will probably cost many Cuban lives. If this cost in lives becomes unacceptable to the U.S. conscience, autonomous operations can be effectively halted by the withdrawal of U.S. support; but once halted, it cannot be resumed.
- (3) All autonomous operations will be mounted outside the territory of the United States.
- (4) The United States Government must be prepared to deny publicly any participation in these acts no matter how loud or even how accurate may be the reports of U.S. complicity.
- (5) The United States presence and direct participation in the operation would be kept to an absolute minimum. Before entering into an operational relationship with a group, the U.S. representative will make it clear that his Government has no intention of intervening militarily, except to counter intervention by the Soviets. An experienced CIA officer would be assigned to work with the group in a liaison capacity. He would provide

general advice as requested as well as funds and necessary material support. He may be expected to influence but not control the conduct of operations.

(6) These operations would not be undertaken within a fixed time schedule.

### III. Recommendation

7. Policy authority already exists for courses of action described in paragraph 6 A-D. In order that full advantage can be taken of an integrated covert action program, the Standing Group is requested to approve courses of action outlined in paragraph 6 E and F within the terms of reference and rules of engagement therein.

## **Annex A**

### SUBJECT

#### Sabotage/Harassment Program

The broad target categories against which the sabotage/harassment operations would be mounted and a preliminary evaluation of their effect, can be summarized as follows:

##### A. Electric Power

Disruption of any of the existing power grids which might be effected by damage to or destruction of the generating facilities or of the critical sub-stations in the distribution network, would significantly weaken the existing economic and social structure, particularly in view of the fact that in many areas the power now available is not adequate to meet the demands of industrial and public consumers. Smaller acts of sabotage/harassment by the populace such as throwing chains over high tension lines to short them out, would also exacerbate the current power shortage, and the cumulative effect of all such actions could cause a prolonged breakdown of the power system as there is already a shortage of spare parts and replacement materials.

##### B. Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL)

Damage to or destruction of POL production and/or storage facilities would seriously affect almost all aspects of the Cuban economy. The electric power industry depends almost entirely upon POL as fuel for the generating plants and the sugar industry depends upon POL powered processing and transportation facilities as does all intra-province transportation. Production and storage facilities are susceptible to external attacks by heavy weapons or by more subtle methods if internal assets having an appropriate degree of accessibility can be developed. The loss of refining facilities could be offset by increased Bloc shipments of refined products but such a shift would require a period of readjustment during which there would be a heavy strain on the Cuban economy. An additional burden on the Bloc refining capacity would also exist until Cuba's refining capacity is restored.

##### C. Transportation

Damage to or destruction of railway and/or highway rolling stock or the destruction of key bridges would lead to breakdowns in the regional economics which to a large degree are dependent on the distribution of imported products. The processing and export of the vitally important sugar crop is also entirely dependent on transportation. It is not anticipated that we could achieve that degree of disruption which would cause a collapse of the economy or social structure, but even a minor degree of disruption will adversely affect the standard of living and the output of the economy, both of which are key factors in the stability of the regime. The type of operations envisioned in this category would range from fairly sophisticated attacks by external or internal assets against the rolling stock, key bridges and repair facilities to simple low risk acts by the populace such as the

derailing of rail transportation or placing tire puncturing material on highways.

#### D. Production Processing and Manufacturing Facilities

While the Cuban economy primarily depends on imports for indigenous consumption and even though the sugar crop is by far the most important item in Cuban exports, there are still a number of other facilities such as the nickel complex at Nicaro, cement plants, distilleries, and the myriad industries associated with the provision of food, clothing and shelter, which are worthwhile targets in that stopping or lessening their output will weaken the economy and breed discontent against the regime. These targets are particularly susceptible to attack by external or internal assets in that due to their profusion and their relatively low strategic importance they are not well guarded or otherwise secured against attack.

The selection of specific targets within the above categories and the determination of timing and tactics will be predicated upon detailed analysis of the following factors:

1. The extent to which the target can be physically damaged.
2. The resultant effect upon the Cuban economy.
3. The cost or effort required if additional burdens are placed on Bloc support.
4. The psychological effect on the Cuban population.
5. Anticipated adverse reactions.
6. Operational capabilities and limitations of CIA assets.

### **347. National Intelligence Estimate**

NIE 85-63

Washington, June 14, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret. According to covering sheets this estimate was submitted to the U.S. Intelligence Board by the Central Intelligence Agency on June 14. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the National Security Agency participated in its preparation. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred with it with the exception of the representative of the Atomic Energy Commission who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. This NIE superseded NIE 85-2-62, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba," August 1, 1962, and SNIE 85-3-62, "The Military Balance in Cuba," September 19, 1962. For texts, see *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, vol. X, Documents 363 and 433.

#### SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA

##### Conclusions

A. After a period marked by bitterness on Castro's part and by restraint on the part of the Soviets, the two parties now appear to have agreed to emphasize the consolidation of the Castro regime. We believe that the current situation within Cuba favors this consolidation. The mere passage of time tends to favor Castro as Cubans and others become accustomed to the idea that he is here to stay and as his regime gains in experience. It is unlikely that internal political opposition or economic difficulties will cause the regime to collapse. All our evidence points to the complete political predominance of Fidel, whose charismatic appeal continues to be the most

important factor in the forward drive of the Cuban revolution. (Paras. 1, 15, 18, 31-32, 41)

B. Dependence on the person of Castro is, however, a major vulnerability of the regime. Without leadership and without goals--and these would have to be revolutionary and reformist to appeal to a majority of Cubans--no opposition force is likely to develop the power to challenge Castro, however much equipment or support it might get from the outside. But his death could result in one form of disorder or another ranging from power struggles within the regime's leadership to open civil war. Any successor is likely to be more dependent upon the Soviets than Castro has been because he will lack Castro's ability to command the loyalty of substantial numbers of Cubans. Furthermore, even under the most favorable circumstances, any opposition would have to have the support of a large part of the military before it could hope to overthrow the Communist regime, and would have to take account of the presence of Soviet troops. (Paras. 15, 42-43)

C. On balance, we estimate that there has been little or no reduction in overall military capabilities in Cuba since the end of the missile crisis. The Soviet military picture in Cuba is in transition with a scaling down of their forces becoming apparent. The total Soviet military strength in Cuba is now estimated to be about 12,000 to 13,000, but we cannot exclude the possibility that there could be several thousand more. The Soviets remain in control of the key weapons systems, while training the Cubans to operate some of them. We believe the Soviets have told the Cubans that they intend eventually to turn various weapons systems over to them. This is not to say that all Soviet military personnel will be withdrawn from Cuba; indeed, it is highly likely that the Soviets will maintain a significant presence there. (Paras. 2, 5, 12-14, 35, 37)

D. With respect to the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, we doubt that the Soviets have specified an exact date for transfer of operational control or would carry out such an agreement if subsequent developments produced new dangers. We believe that the Soviet Government remains acutely aware of the risks involved. (Para. 36)

E. The capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces have been augmented by increased training, new equipment, and some reorganization. The Cuban ground forces are probably well able to control internal resistance and to repel small-scale external attacks. In the event of US invasion, however, they would have to revert fairly quickly to static defense or guerrilla operations, but only a relatively small proportion of the Cuban military establishment would be likely to carry on prolonged operations of this type. (Paras. 8, 12-14)

F. In our view, it is unlikely that the USSR contemplates an attempt to reintroduce strategic missiles into Cuba. Continued US aerial surveillance remains a major deterrent. We cannot, however, altogether rule out such an attempt. Greatly enhanced Soviet knowledge of US intelligence sources and methods with respect to Cuba would make it possible to adopt improved measures of concealment and deception, during both shipment and deployment, and to avoid providing many of the indicators that US intelligence would be relying on. At some point the Soviets might attempt to increase their military strength in Cuba by introducing other weapons previously labeled "offensive" by the US. In such cases they would almost certainly recognize the great risk of US counteraction. (Paras. 38-40)

G. The joint Khrushchev-Castro communique<sup>/1/</sup> held up Cuba as an example for the rest of Latin America, but without endorsing Castro's earlier general incitement to revolution throughout the area. Castro probably still believes that revolution will come only through violence, but the regime's exhortations on the subject have been muted recently. The outlook is for a mixture of tactics. We believe that during the next phase the Soviets and Cubans, seeking to avoid a crisis with the US, will be careful not to engage in flagrant or gross actions which would invite US reprisals or countermeasures. The Soviets will continue with the more traditional efforts at penetration through diplomacy and economic overtures. In general, we believe that situations are unlikely to develop in which Castro could intervene with substantial force without rendering himself vulnerable to US or OAS counteraction. (Paras. 46-48)

<sup>/1/</sup>The Joint Soviet-Cuban Statement signed in Moscow by Castro and Khrushchev, May 23, 1963; for a partial

text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963*, pp. 269-271.

H. While the Soviets and Cubans have probably resolved their more immediate problems we foresee varying degrees of friction in their future relations, particularly over the long run. They probably have not reached a fundamental reconciliation of their appraisals of the situation in Latin America, and Castro appears to insist on a unique position in the Bloc without submitting to the discipline and control imposed on Soviet Satellites. Nevertheless, Castro has taken a long step toward the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet controversy. In turn Castro has received a strong boost to his ego; assurances of continued economic support; the commitment of Soviet prestige to the Cuban revolution; and recognition of Cuba's special importance as an example of what the revolutionary struggle can achieve in Latin America. Overall, Soviet and Cuban fortunes have been bound more closely together and their respective freedoms of action have been somewhat narrowed. (Paras. 49-51)

[Here follow a 13-page discussion section and an annex listing major Soviet military equipment in Cuba. See the Supplement for both.]

### **348. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, June 19, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963. Secret. Prepared by FitzGerald.

#### **SUBJECT**

Meeting at the White House concerning Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Program of Action towards Cuba

#### **PRESENT**

Higher Authority

Secretary McNamara

Under Secretary Harriman

Mr. McCone

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

Mr. Thomas Parrott

Mr. Desmond FitzGerald

Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, General W.F. McKee

1. The program as recommended by the Standing Group of the NSC/1/ was presented briefly to Higher Authority who showed a particular interest in proposed external sabotage operations. He was shown charts indicating typical targets for this program and a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages ensued. It was well recognized that there would be failures and a considerable noise level. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Bundy described the integrated nature of the program presented and made the point that, having made the decision to go ahead, we be prepared to take the consequences of flaps and criticisms for a sufficient period to give the program a real chance. Mr. Harriman stated that the program would be "reviewed

weekly" by the Special Group. (It is believed that an arrangement can be made with Mr. Bundy for less detailed control by the Special Group than was indicated by Mr. Harriman.)

/1/See Document 346.

2. Higher Authority asked how soon we could get into action with the external sabotage program and was told that we should be able to conduct our first operation in the dark-of-the-moon period in July although he was informed that we would prefer to start the program with some caution selecting softer targets to begin with. Higher Authority said this was a matter for our judgment. Although at one stage in the discussion Higher Authority said that we should move ahead with the program "this summer" it is believed that Mr. Bundy will be able to convince him that this is not a sufficiently long trial period to demonstrate what the program can do./2/

Desmond FitzGerald

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

/2/McCone added an addendum to this memorandum stating that he emphasized to the President "the importance and necessity for continuous operations," and he also pointed out that the activities "would create quite a high noise level." McCone also stated that the noise level "must be absorbed and not create a change in policy." He concluded that "no single event would be conclusive."

### **349. Paper Prepared by the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs of the Department of State**

Washington, June 20, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Cuba--1963. Top Secret. According to a covering memorandum, Assistant Secretary Martin sent this paper to U. Alexis Johnson on June 20.

#### **FUTURE RELATIONS WITH CASTRO**

##### **I. Background**

The cardinal point of Castro's foreign policy until the missile crisis was to bind Cuba tightly to the USSR as a means of ensuring the regime's survival in the shadow of United States power--based on the proposition, as Cuba goes so goes world communism. Soviet refusal to run the quarantine and its acquiescence in withdrawing the missiles shook the foundation of Cuban foreign policy.

Since the missile crisis, Castro has indicated, sometimes vaguely, sometimes rather clearly, through various channels, public as well as private, that he is interested in an accommodation with the United States. His immediate disillusion over the Soviet missile crisis posture probably prompted him to grope for a policy which would diminish his dependence upon the Soviet Union, lessen his ties with the communist world and enable him to establish counter-balancing relations elsewhere. In casting about for some sort of new alignment, he may possibly have envisioned Cuba's emergence as a neutralist state. (Given Castro's temperament and ambition, any such neutralization would have to be dynamic and proselytizing rather than passive.) Although it is of course impossible to be certain, it would seem that Castro, at least in his early post-missile crisis flirtings with accommodation, was acting essentially in his own interest and may have been prepared to move further from the Bloc than the USSR, despite its general urging that Castro seek ways to reduce tensions, would have liked.

Castro's Moscow visit re-cemented Cuban-Soviet relations, at least for some time. In his TV broadcast upon his return to Cuba, Castro left no doubt that he accepted Khrushchev's leadership of a communist world that included Cuba, and he specifically and flatly rejected the possibility that he might stray. Whatever possibility may have existed immediately after the missile crisis that Castro might in fact adopt an independent and more

neutralist policy has probably vanished under present circumstances. Viewed in this context, Castro's latest gesture toward "normalcy" in United States-Cuban relations appears clearly to constitute a concerted Soviet-Cuban initiative, encouraged by the Soviets and fully consistent with the policy of "peaceful co-existence."

Castro's comments have not made clear what he envisages as the terms of such an action. Castro has indicated a willingness to negotiate concessions for expropriated properties, though his opening position is a rather onerous one, involving the use of Cuban receipts from the sale of sugar to the United States in excess of 3 million tons at 5.56¢. He has implied that his subversive activities in Latin America would be no problem, but largely by denying that he is currently engaged in anything of the sort. He has made clear that nothing can change the fact that his regime is Communist and must continue to have the closest of political ties to the Soviet Union.

There have been indications from Soviet sources that Soviet military presence in Cuba could be removed if that is an obstacle.

The general tone of Castro's discussion of this subject in his TV broadcast on his return from Moscow is that we need a settlement more than he does and therefore we should offer the concessions. In this connection he again mentions the abandonment of Guantanamo as one of the conditions he would affix to a reconciliation.

## II. Motivation

It seems likely that the motives both for Castro and the Soviets in seeking some kind of an accommodation are both economic and political. Castro's economy is not doing well, and he needs trade with the United States both as a market for sugar and source of supply for spare parts and equipment generally. He may even hope to get some United States technical aid to supplement that from the bloc with which he seems to have considerable dissatisfaction.

The Soviets probably wish to get some relaxation of the burden they are now carrying to keep the economy going at all. It would certainly cost them nothing not to have to buy Cuban sugar whatever the price.

It may be also that Castro retains some interest in such an accommodation in order to have more maneuverability vis-a-vis the Soviets. From a long-term standpoint as well as in the incidents at the time of the missile crisis, an independent egoist such as Castro must find his dependence on the Soviets galling.

From a longer-term standpoint Castro and the Soviets may also feel that there will be a better opportunity to make Cuba more nearly a showcase of communism in the hemisphere rather than a glaring example of economic failure, if an accommodation with the United States is possible. Not only would economic benefits accrue but the respectability and prestige that Castro would derive from successful accommodation, which would be played as "victory over the United States," would significantly advance both the Soviets and Castro toward their long range goals in the hemisphere. Support for the regime from within Cuba might well become wider and more active with an effect on economic prosperity as well as political attitudes.

## III. Concessions

For any negotiation to have a prospect of success, we should probably have to agree to the following:

1. Stop overflights.
2. Stop giving support to Cubans who are attempting to overthrow the regime.
3. Pass legislation restoring a sugar quota to Cuba.

4. Take legislative action, and executive action in consultation with Congress, permitting trade with Cuba on at least as extensive a basis as the Soviet bloc.
5. Possibly seek to remove the strictures against Cuba and her activities in the hemisphere adopted in the Inter-American System and perhaps accept Cuba back into the OAS and its subordinate bodies.
6. Agree to continuation of political, economic and some international ties with the USSR.

In return it may be presumed that Cuba might agree to the following:

1. Send back Soviet personnel except for training missions in connection with Soviet military assistance programs of a type similar to those which accompany United States military assistance programs.
2. Halt Cuban assistance to subversion in Latin America.
3. Agree that Cuban armed forces will not be used outside of Cuba except in accordance with decisions of the Inter-American System.
4. Agree that the Soviets will not be permitted to use Cuba as a base for armed action.
5. Negotiate an agreement for some compensation for seized properties, presumably tied to the level of export earnings from sales of sugar to the United States.

#### IV. Conclusion

This is not an acceptable arrangement for the following reasons:

1. It would be an agreement with Castro and in no general sense with the regime as a whole or the people as a whole. It would fall with his fall. Even with his continuation, his word has too frequently been demonstrated as worthless to give us much long-term assurance of quiet in the Caribbean.
2. Without the political break with Moscow a precedent would be established for other communist regimes in the hemisphere and the whole effort to keep them out of this area and to establish its special status would fall to the ground. It could mean the death of the Inter-American System.
3. Since subversive activities in Latin America are to a very considerable extent covert anyway, there would be no effective means of ensuring that Castro had kept his word. Moreover, it would be all too simple for activities which he has been conducting to be shifted in large part to other bloc countries, who are already extensively engaged.
4. Approval of a communist regime would be a great encouragement to native communists in Latin America and would increase their power.
5. With the threat perhaps increased or at least substantially unchanged, there would inevitably be a major relaxation of anti-communist effort on the part of the Latin American countries since there has been so much focus on the threat of Cuba. The prospect of communist take-over would thus be enhanced.
6. It is exceedingly difficult to envisage this as a two stage operation with the second stage the elimination of communism or Castro. Any such compromise would enormously strengthen him with the Cuban people and make the regime less dependent on him personally than it has been. A communist regime in Cuba would be even more securely entrenched than it is now.

7. An essential component of the economic aspects is legislative action by the United States Congress. This must take place before Castro limits in any way his present dependence and close relations with the Soviet bloc. He cannot afford economically the possible gap. It is probably not feasible at any time, but particularly under these circumstances, to secure Congressional assent to the economic measures while Castro maintains his full present relationship with the bloc. The sugar legislation will be made particularly difficult by the need to deprive other friendly countries of sugar quotas and to assign a sugar quota before adequate assurances have been secured with respect to compensation for United States sugar property owners.

8. Any such settlement will cause serious problems of order within the United States so far as a couple hundred thousand Cuban exiles are concerned. They, and all parties of the right in Latin America, in many cases supported by Cuban exile groups, will denounce the United States for surrendering to communist pressure. Our posture in Latin America would be seriously prejudiced in important circles heretofore friendly to us.

9. The United States attitude toward communism and expropriation which such an accommodation would reflect and the encouragement to subversion in Latin America from this acceptance of a communist regime will completely dry up investment there as well as encourage capital flight. The success of the Alliance for Progress will become clearly impossible.

### **350. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, June 22, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record. Secret. The meeting was held on June 21 from 3:40 to approximately 4:40 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)

#### **SUBJECT**

Meeting in the Office of the Secretary of State re Discussion of Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Program of Action towards Cuba

#### **PRESENT**

The Secretary of State

Under Secretary Harriman

Deputy Under Secretary Johnson

Director Hughes

Mr. McCone

Mr. FitzGerald

1. The undersigned briefed the Secretary concerning the components and rationale of the program.

2. The first specific item in the program to be discussed in detail was "autonomous operations." It was explained that these operations would be based outside of the United States and that every trace of U.S. involvement in the program possible would be concealed. It was also pointed out that the concept of autonomous groups is open-ended and the purpose is to develop resistance capabilities inside Cuba. Any exile group having capabilities in the field of resistance could be included and supported. For instance, Manolo Ray and his JURE will be offered financial support within the next day. The Secretary stressed the need to document and publicize Castro's

subversive and terrorist operations in Latin America and to seize the opportunity to place raids against Cuba in the guise of retaliation for these acts on Castro's part. It was pointed out that autonomous operations are particularly well designed to fit into this concept.

3. There ensued a discussion of sabotage and harassment operations and their place within the program. It was stated that the hit and run operations, whether staged by autonomous groups or unilaterally by the Agency, are primarily designed to encourage resistance within Cuba which must in turn bear the main burden of coordinated and extensive sabotage. Commencing in mid-July the frequency of hit and run operations would be two to three per month with a probable average of two. The Secretary noted that the mid-July date for the commencement of these operations would coincide with Governor Harriman's presence in Moscow.

4. Mr. McCone stated that the program should be considered as an integrated and continuing thing which could not be put on a stop and go basis if it could be expected to achieve its goal. He stated that the Special Group would have the program under continuous review but would recognize the need to permit the program to flow forward as planned without requiring each operation to be justified in political and economic terms without regard to the total plan.

5. Governor Harriman said that it was obvious that the Soviets have put their prestige on the line in Cuba and will undoubtedly deliver aid, both military and economic, on any scale deemed necessary. Governor Harriman said that this aspect of the matter should be kept under continuous scrutiny with the realization that these Soviet efforts may well affect the present program one way or the other.

6. The Secretary pointed to certain signs of trouble in the Berlin area early next Fall. He said that this should be watched carefully as again Soviet actions in Berlin might influence and be influenced by the program under discussion.

7. Mr. McCone asked the Secretary whether he favored the program. The Secretary replied that he did but that the only portion of it which gave him concern was the hit and run operations. He underlined the desirability to have these tied in some manner to retaliation against Castro's actions in Latin America.

8. The Secretary asked for views concerning the prospects of Castro's reconciliation with the United States and his Latin American neighbors. He mentioned that Castro's statements since his return from Moscow had appeared to be on the whole conciliatory. Mr. McCone said that he had read these statements of Castro's as meaning that Castro was even more firmly tied to the Soviet Union and that any reconciliation with the U.S. would have to be on Castro's and the Soviet Union's terms. He said that he felt that any rapprochement on the part of the U.S. with Castro which retained Soviet troops in Cuba, maintained Cuba as a closed society and permitted no on-site inspection could not be acceptable to the U.S. He also pointed out that it would make Castro respectable in the eyes of Latin America without reducing Castro's ambitions and pressures there. It was agreed however that we should continue to probe wherever possible to find out what Castro really has on his mind. The Swiss Ambassador to Cuba should be debriefed in detail and Donovan should be encouraged to return to Cuba if invited.

Desmond FitzGerald

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

[end of document]

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**FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES**  
**1961-1963**  
**Volume XI**  
**Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington

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## **Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath**

### **351. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, June 24, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A. Secret. Prepared by McCone.

#### **SUBJECT**

Meeting with Secretary Rusk--21 June 1963--re Cuba

#### **IN ATTENDANCE**

Secretary Rusk, Gov. Harriman, Secretary Johnson, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. McCone

1. Details of the meeting are summarized in Mr. FitzGerald's memorandum,<sup>/1/</sup> which is complete. However I have the impression that Secretary Rusk is not enthusiastically behind the CIA program. He seems to feel that there is some opportunity of a rapprochement with Castro as referred to in the FitzGerald memorandum. I insisted on the meeting with Rusk because I sensed his reservations and, although he approved the program, it was obvious he did so reluctantly and I think the first evidence of "noise" will call for reconsideration. This is a subject that I have discussed with him on several occasions in the past. Mr. Rusk offers no explanation for his attitude but it has prevailed for a long time.

<sup>/1/</sup>Document 350.

2. [5 lines of source text not declassified] I made it abundantly clear during the meeting, and privately to Secretary Rusk afterwards, that I felt a rapprochement out of the question in view of the relationship between Castro and Khrushchev resulting from Castro's trip. Therefore I felt nothing could be done until some event occurred which would impair this relationship. I emphasized both in the meeting and afterwards that it was a very dangerous subject to approach from a political point of view; I did not think the American people would accept the concept of a rapprochement unless:

- a. Castro disavowed any ideas of exporting his revolution;
- b. That he broke his Moscow tie and expelled the Soviets from Cuba together with such equipment as they chose to take with them; and
- c. He open up his country for free access and travel by Americans so that we could have continuing on-site inspection and hence knowledge of what is going on.

**352. Telegram From Acting Secretary of State Ball and the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) in Ireland**

Washington, June 25, 1963, 7:45 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, 6/24/63 Cuban Protest Note, 6/63-8/63. Top Secret; Eyes Only. President Kennedy was in Ireland June 25-29. Rusk was in the United Kingdom during the same time.

Sitto 8. From Ball and Kaysen. Bundy eyes only for the President and Rusk. In note from Cuban Government/1/ (delivered by Czech Ambassador this afternoon but intended for delivery June 21 or 22) protesting various exile activities directed against Cuba, following passages included:

/1/The full text of the note, June 24, is *ibid.* See the Supplement. Ball had telephone conversations with McCone, Kaysen, McNamara, U. Alexis Johnson, and Martin on June 25 on the question of the Cuban note and U-2 reconnaissance. (*Ibid.*, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba) Memoranda of these conversations are in the Supplement.

(A) "GOC protests . . . the recent low-level flight over Cuban territory, for the purpose of espionage, of a US military plane, which the US press itself has taken upon itself to reveal and warns that Cuban gunners have orders to fire against any foreign war plane which flies at a low level over our territory."

(B) (After referring to recent seizure by US customs of small plane loaded with explosives apparently for attack on Habana refineries.) "This event, as well as the attack carried at the end of April against this same Cuban refinery by a plane which took off from US territory carrying powerful explosive charges, obliges us to accelerate our defensive preparations in order to be in conditions to intercept and shoot down any war plane which violates our air space at any altitude."

On June 22, GOC requested Swiss Embassy Habana notify USG urgently that GOC did not intend publicize note in order avoid increasing existing tensions and that GOC protesting precisely because fact which motivated note increases tension. GOC added that if USG gives publicity GOC will do same.

This note must be read against fact that on three occasions from June 19 through June 24 MIG 21s have engaged in zoom climbs that have brought them in general proximity of U-2s. As a result, U-2s have followed existing procedures and aborted.

Have discussed foregoing situation with McNamara and Kaysen, and we are agreed on following procedure:

As previously decided, there will be no low-level flights before President's return. High-level flights will continue under existing procedures which call for aborts when Cuban aircraft within 40 miles of U-2 and at altitude in excess of 40,000 feet.

Taking into account need for current intelligence, we believe this provides proper margin of safety to justify continued flights even under special conditions when President out of country.

**353. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in the United Kingdom**

Washington, June 26, 1963, 8:21 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/24/63 Cuban Protest

Note, 6/63-8/63. Secret; Priority. This telegram was apparently also sent as White House telegram CAP 63345 to Ireland. There is a notation on it that the President read it.

Tosec 17. Deptel Sitto 8./1/ FYI. Following is ARA and INR analysis of Cuban note:

/1/Document 352.

Since (a) references to action against overflights surrounded by protests against exile activities even though purpose note clearly was to get across message on overflights, and (b) there was unusual lapse time between June 10 incident in which two Cuban coast guard personnel captured and another killed and delivery Cuban note, Department concludes note carefully considered (very likely in consultation with Soviets) and drafted. Only prior reference June 10 incident which would normally have resulted swift stiff protest occurred June 19 in Castro speech at Cardenas when incident mentioned only in passing.

General tone of note (as distinct from substance) restrained and appears designed to be unprovocative. Although overflights have evidently been object continuing concern Cubans, tone, together with express desire transmitted through Swiss avoid publicity (which otherwise Castro could have based upon public references to "violation air space" contained both joint Cuban-Soviet communique during Castro visit and Castro TV interview in Habana thereafter), would indicate GOC, very likely in concert Soviets, proceeding cautiously. Fact that Cubans went unusual length stress intention give no publicity suggests they may be anxious avoid locking themselves or us in. They may look upon note as at minimum probe our determination on overflights.

Differences in language between reference to low-level flights and reference to flights at any altitude indicate harder line on former than latter which can be accounted for by Soviet control SAM's. Note that reference to overflights at any altitude significantly refers to taking steps "in order to be ready" (official translation) and refrains from flat commitment they will fire.

In sum Department regards note as (a) cautiously and unprovocatively worded and carefully handled warning against overflights which affords Cubans flexibility with respect actual response they might make at least to high level flights; and (b) as important step (additional to use MIG-21's vicinity U-2 flights) in effort force cessation overflights. High-level flight today was without incident.

Ball

### **354. Summary Record of the 9th Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security Council**

Washington, July 9, 1963, 5 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/9/63. Secret; Sensitive.

#### **1. Progress report on integrated action program toward Cuba**

Desmond FitzGerald reviewed developments and actions of the past three weeks since the approval by the group of the integrated action program for Cuba. He mentioned two events which are scheduled for the 26th of July. He was reading from notes.

Mr. Harriman called attention to the relation of action in Cuba to his mission to Moscow./1/ He said he hoped to be out of Moscow by the 25th or 26th of July. He appeared anxious to avoid giving the Russians an opportunity to raise with him our Cuban policy on the basis of actions which had taken place during the time he was in Moscow.

/1/Reference is to Harriman's trip to Moscow to negotiate the nuclear test ban agreement, signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963.

It was agreed that the next meeting would be a discussion of the State/USIA paper containing a draft statement of what we hoped to see develop in a post-Castro Cuba./2/

/2/A draft of the statement is in the Supplement attached to a memorandum from USIA Deputy Director Wilson to McGeorge Bundy, May 4. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/7/63) A revised version of the paper, July 12, is *ibid.*, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63. See the Supplement.

There was a discussion as to how to handle press inquiries about developments in Cuba such as raids from outside Cuba and sabotage actions within Cuba. It was agreed that we should flatly deny any U.S. Government involvement in any of these activities. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]/3/

/3/McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting, July 9, which stated that the Group heard an oral report on the integrated action program toward Cuba. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/9/63)

[Here follows a report on U.S. policy toward Spain.]

Bromley Smith

**355. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, July 13, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63. Confidential.

**SUBJECT**

NSC Standing Group Meeting Tuesday, July 16, 5 P.M.: Cuba/1/

/1/See Document 356.

Attached for circulation to members of the Standing Group for the July 16th meeting are the following papers:

1. A proposed statement on Cuba to be made by the President, drafted jointly by ARA and USIA./2/

/2/See footnote 2, Document 354.

2. A proposed statement on Cuba drafted by ARA as a statement to be made by the President on July 26./3/

/3/The draft statement, undated, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63. See the Supplement.

3. A "Cuban Balance Sheet" prepared by INR and incorporating the suggestions of CIA./4/

/4/The 12-page paper was an undated memorandum from Hughes to Johnson. The paper compared the Batista and Castro regimes in terms of their abilities to respond effectively to the needs and aspirations of various parts

of the Cuban population. The paper also weighed the promises of the Castro regime before and upon its attainment of power against its performance. The CIA reviewed the paper, and its suggestions were incorporated into the final version. The paper gave Castro some credit for reforms in such areas as health care, housing, education, lowering rents, honest administration, and racial equality, but noted in other areas like civil liberties, economic diversification, new investment, and independence from foreign influences Castro's record was worse than Batista's. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63)

The first draft statement represents the draft ARA and USIA were requested jointly to prepare, and meets the minimum views of both of them. It could be issued at any time; a possible occasion would be the Alliance for Progress Commemorative Ceremony in Washington on August 17, to which the President was been invited.

The second statement, which is addressed specifically to the July 26 date, represents the flavor, content and approach to a statement that would be preferred by ARA.

The INR paper examines group attitudes in Cuba toward Batista and Castro Regimes and seeks to assess performance in certain key sectors during the Batista period as well as against Castro's promise and performance. It should be read in conjunction with the proposed statements.

U. Alexis Johnson

### **356. Summary Record of the 10th Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security Council**

Washington, July 16, 1963, 5 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63. Secret.

#### **1. Proposed U.S. Statement on Cuba**

Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson introduced the three papers which were circulated to the group under his memorandum of July 13th.<sup>/1/</sup> Because any Presidential statement on Cuba would have an impact on the Harriman negotiations in Moscow, no one favored asking the President to issue a statement on July 26th. If it is decided to issue a statement, consideration will be given to making it on August 17th, which is the anniversary of the Alliance for Progress.

<sup>/1/</sup>See footnotes 2, 3, and 4, Document 355.

With respect to the content of the statement, Mr. McCone called attention to the following sentence which appears in both the proposed statements: "I am confident that all true friends of the Cubans share my conviction that the day is not too far distant when these aspirations will be fulfilled." His view, shared by Mr. Johnson and Mr. Martin, was that this prediction was too strong and gave a false impression that there would soon be a free Cuba.

General Goodpaster noted that in both papers it appeared that we were saying that Castro was sincere at the time he made promises to the Cuban people prior to his coming to power. He doubted that we should indicate that we believed that his promises were genuine. It was agreed that changes would be made to reflect Castro's promises as being assertions without appearing to give him the benefit of saying that his promises were genuine.

The Attorney General asked what effect the Harriman talks would have on the timing and content of the statement on Cuba. Mr. McGeorge Bundy replied by saying that Harriman had asked that there be no loud noises about Cuba during the time he was in Moscow.

Mr. Martin said that the State Department had given Secretary Rusk a paper covering suggestions to negotiate with Castro.<sup>/2/</sup> Although this paper recommended against such negotiations, Mr. Martin felt that the paper should be considered by the Standing Group before the group made any decision on a proposed Presidential statement on Cuba. He said a number of proposals had been made which involve negotiation with Castro. Two Congressmen had asked whether or not we should find out if Castro was ready to make a deal with us. One Congressman volunteered to go to Havana to talk to Castro along these lines.

<sup>/2/</sup>See Document 349.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested that the group should look at the negotiation paper. It was agreed that at the next meeting the paper would be considered. In the meantime, a decision on a proposed Presidential statement on Cuba would be deferred.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that he felt that things would have to get much rougher for Castro before he would consider any deal with us which we could accept. However, this did not mean that we should say now that we would never talk to Castro.

Mr. Johnson said that the State Department recommendations covering suggestions that Cuba shipping orders be made more restrictive would be coming to the White House tomorrow. Following an intense study of this problem, Mr. Johnson said he had reached the conclusion that no sharpening of the existing orders would reduce the amount of free world shipping to Cuba. The ships now in the trade are beyond our control. He concluded that the only way to reduce free world shipping would be to make the orders apply to the flag of the ship rather than the ownership. Unless we did this, which would result in our banning British ships such as the Queen Mary, the problem was not within our control. If we acted against the Yugoslavs and the Poles we would hurt our relations with them and gain little in terms of reducing trade with Cuba. For example, one Yugo ship a month goes to Cuba. In order to stop that ship, we would have to be ready to prevent forty-six Yugoslav ships coming to the U.S. monthly.

General Goodpaster referred to the INR paper on the Cuban balance sheet and asked whether the economic estimates contained in it meant that we believed the Cuban economy was as far down as it would go. Mr. McCone acknowledged that he did not know whether the economic predictions in the balance sheet paper were consistent with those in the latest National Intelligence Estimate.<sup>/3/</sup> Mr. Martin said it was impossible to predict with accuracy what would happen to the economic situation in Cuba. Some believed that it would not get worse and would gradually improve in view of the massive Soviet aid now going to Cuba. He was not persuaded that the Russians could organize the Cuban economy in a way which would result in a very great improvement. He was not prepared to say that the Cuban economy had reached the bottom, adding that there was a possibility that the situation would get worse than it now is.

<sup>/3/</sup>Not further identified.

[1 paragraph (18 lines of source text) not declassified]<sup>/4/</sup>

<sup>/4/</sup>On July 8 the United States blocked all assets of Cuba in the United States or of persons in Cuba; prohibited the transfer by persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction of U.S. dollars to or from Cuba; and prohibited all unlicensed transactions with Cuba or Cuban nationals or transactions involving property in which there was a Cuban interest. For text of the announcement of the decision, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 276-277.

## 2. Contingent Plan to Reduce Price of Sugar

Deputy Under Secretary of Agriculture Sundquist commented on the contingent plan which he had been asked to

prepare./5/ He noted that sugar producers throughout the world had reacted quickly to recent sharp rise in the price of sugar.

/5/The report, dated July 5, was entitled "A Contingent Plan for Increasing World Production of Sugar." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63) See the Supplement.

Mr. McCone thought that nature was doing pretty well in solving the sugar shortage. Hysteria had gone out of the situation and the price had dropped from 14# to 9#. Sugar producers were actively planning increased production. He personally opposed increasing the domestic quota and favored borrowing from existing quotas.

Mr. Sundquist said that very shortly we would have an over-supply of sugar facing us. He opposed the plan he presented because it would cause more problems than it would be worth, i.e. approximately \$22 million annually to Cuba.

The group agreed that the plan should not be undertaken, but that we should adopt a policy of watchful waiting. Mr. McCone added that there was nothing else that we could do.

Report by Mr. FitzGerald--There was a discussion of the wide-spread press reports that the U.S. was backing Cuban exiles who are planning raids against Cuba from Central American States. One news article shown the Attorney General was headed "Backstage with Bobby" and referred to his conversations with persons involved in planning the Cuban raids./6/

/6/The story, by Hal Hendrix, was in the Miami Herald, July 14, 1963.

In the discussion as to how to deal with the press reports, the Attorney General suggested that we could float other rumors so that in the welter of press reports no one would know the true facts. Mr. McCone agreed that it would be possible to confuse the situation in this manner. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. McGeorge Bundy mentioned to Mr. Alexis Johnson the President's interest in a declaration or doctrine which would put the Russians and the Latin Americans on notice that the U.S. would not accept a second Castro in this hemisphere. Mr. Bundy said some work on this declaration had been done, that the President had it very much in mind, and suggested that the State Department continue its work on a draft declaration./7/

/7/McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting. Bundy noted that the President would not make a statement on Cuba on July 26, that further consideration would be given to a statement on August 17, and that the content of the statement would be reexamined after consideration of the Department of State paper on negotiations with Castro. Second, Bundy noted that U. Alexis Johnson reported that tightening existing restrictions on free world shipping would only be effective if restrictions were revised so that they affected the country whose flag the ship was flying rather than the country of ownership. Third, Bundy noted that Agriculture's contingent plan for increasing world production of sugar would not be acted upon because of the drop in sugar prices from previous actions. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63) See the Supplement.

Bromley Smith/8/

/8/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**357. Memorandum From the Chief, Special Affairs Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (FitzGerald) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, August 9, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63-9/63. Secret.

## SUBJECT

### Luis Somoza's Involvement in Cuban Exile Operations

1. The so-called Somoza plan has probably not yet jelled. Recent talks between ex-President Luis Somoza and Manuel Artime, prominent exile leader, may have resulted in modifications. Inconclusive secondhand reports would seem to suggest that Somoza's thinking on the subject of Cuba is oriented toward commando raids, guerilla warfare and sabotage of mounting scope and intensity, culminating in a general uprising. Hardly concealed is his conviction that such an uprising would give the United States Government little choice but to intervene militarily on the side of the insurgents, especially should Soviet troops be committed to quell the uprising.

2. As a corollary to the above-mentioned long-range considerations, the brothers Somoza, especially Anastacio who is director of the National Guard, have taken into consideration the prospect of exposure to a serious military threat if Nicaragua lends herself as a base for aggressive acts against Cuba. Reportedly Luis Somoza has stated that in the event that Cuba takes retaliatory action against Nicaragua, the United States would be forced to come to the aid of Nicaragua and thereby a confrontation would be achieved. In this context, the assurances which Luis Somoza claims to have been given by leading United States Government officials take on particular significance and continuing probing by him for more tangible promises of support can be anticipated.

3. Attached herewith is a listing of the names of prominent Cubans reported as having talked with Somoza about operations against Cuba from Nicaraguan bases./1/ These include one former President of Cuba (Carlos Prío Socarras), one former Prime Minister (Jorge Garcia Montes) and one former Ambassador to Washington (Guillermo Belt).

/1/Not printed.

4. It remains to be seen whether the Somoza concept can be sufficiently refined to accommodate and keep out of the limelight of public curiosity a project which, as we now see it, is essentially designed to rebuild an indigenous resistance movement inside Cuba. There is some question whether the Somozas could temperamentally adjust to the essential characteristics of such a program representing a long-term effort that can only prosper in an atmosphere of conspiratorial tranquility.

5. We consider that most if not all of the exile plans (with the exception of Artime's) which have been discussed with Luis Somoza will probably come to naught in typical exile fashion. As to Artime, we believe that any ill effects of Somoza's long-range concepts could be contained by the following lines of action:

a. Artime to forego raids and externally based sabotage actions and to concentrate on resistance within Cuba.

b. While leaving elements of his operational mechanism in Nicaragua and not breaking with Luis Somoza, Artime to shift to the use of the more limited facilities Costa Rica has to offer.

c. If additional pressures be needed, it should be remembered that ex-Ambassador Whelan, who is considered to enjoy the trust of the Somoza brothers, could be asked to help in tempering their zeal.

*[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]*

6. Sources of varying reliability have cited Luis Somoza as claiming to have received the following assurances:

- a. The "green light" to run anti-Castro raider and resistance operations obtained in Washington discussions with President Kennedy and the Attorney General.
- b. Asked by President Kennedy and the Attorney General to take four Brigade leaders to Nicaragua.
- c. Appointed by President Kennedy to represent him in dealings with the five Central American presidents who are interested in overthrowing Castro.
- d. To have talked with United States Government representatives who promised "not to intervene" (i.e., in Somoza's plan to offer Nicaragua as a base for operations against Cuba).
- e. To have found "that there are no obstacles, despite the fact that the United States Government did not tell me anything concretely."

Desmond FitzGerald

### **358. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to President Kennedy**

Washington, undated.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-77-131, OSD Misc.--1963. Top Secret; Sensitive. This memorandum was undated and unsigned, but it was attached to an August 20 memorandum from Califano to Gilpatric recommending that the Deputy Secretary send it to the President. On August 26 Bundy sent Gilpatric a memorandum indicating that the President had signed this memorandum on August 22. The President asked Gilpatric to undertake the Top Secret and Sensitive distribution of this addition to rules of engagement.

#### **SUBJECT**

U.S. Action in the Event of Cuban Attack on U.S. Aircraft/Ships (U)

At your direction on 28 February 1963, Rules of Engagement were promulgated with respect to action by U.S. forces in event of a Cuban attack on U.S. aircraft or ships operating outside Cuban territory./1/ These rules prohibit U.S. forces from penetrating Cuban territory in pursuit of Cuban forces involved.

/1/See Document 290.

Under these rules, overflight of Cuban territory while en route to the scene of attack is not included in the authorized military options for responses to an attack by Cuba on U.S. aircraft or ships operating outside Cuban territory.

Incidents of Cuban attack on U.S. forces operating outside Cuban territory, which are considered most likely, would involve aircraft engaged in reconnaissance efforts, but also could involve U.S. shipping and cases where lives of U.S. nationals or national interests are in jeopardy. Should attacks occur, for example, south of western Cuba and north of eastern Cuba, the en route time for U.S. fighter support can be reduced by 10 to 30 minutes, with a comparable increase in time for action at the scene, by routing over Cuban territory. This quicker en route reaction time could be the difference between providing an effective defense for U.S. interests and arriving too late for action.

In light of the fact that occasions may arise where the presence of U.S. forces on the scene with least possible delay would be in the best national interests, a draft statement of policy which would authorize overflight of

Cuban territory in certain instances, and under certain conditions, has been prepared and is attached. The draft policy has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, coordinated with the Department of State and, based on the recommendation of that Department, delineates the individuals in the military chain of command authorized to approve overflights of Cuban territory.

I recommend its approval.

### **Attachment**

#### STATEMENT OF POLICY ON US ACTION IN EVENT OF CUBAN ATTACK ON US AIRCRAFT/SHIPS (U)

The following policy is issued pertaining to US action in the event of Cuban attack in the area surrounding Cuba against US aircraft/ships:

a. In specific instances in which adherence to international airspace would delay significantly the arrival of US fighter aircraft at the scene of a Cuban attack against US aircraft/ships operating outside of Cuban territory, overflight of Cuba by fighter aircraft is authorized subject to the following:

(1) It must be established that the US aircraft/ship is being attacked, or the US aircraft/ship has been attacked and lives of US personnel are endangered.

(2) Overflight times are minimized with due regard to risk to aircraft. While en route every effort will be taken to avoid provocative acts. Engagement will not be undertaken during the overflight except for self-defense against aircraft attack.

(3) From the time of arrival at the scene current rules of engagement will pertain, with return to home or diversion airfield via air space over international waters, if practicable.

(4) The most expeditious means possible will be used to inform highest national authorities that overflight of Cuba has been directed, and details on the action shall be furnished in the same manner.

b. Decision to overfly Cuban territory may be delegated to but not below the level of Commander Naval Base, Key West and Commander Naval Base, Guantanamo.

### **359. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, August 26, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Drafted by Thompson, approved in the White House on August 28 and in Thompson's office on August 29. The discussion was held at the White House and lasted from 11 to 11:53 a.m. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book)

#### SUBJECT

Possibility of further agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States

#### PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

The President

Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, Department of State

[Here follows discussion of other subjects; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, volume V.]

The President then referred to Cuba, and said that apparently the Soviets had withdrawn many of their troops, but we did not know how many were there now.

Dobrynin said that Khrushchev had recently stated that all combat units had been withdrawn from Cuba. The President asked what would happen over the next six months with the Soviets. Would the Soviets withdraw more or would the number remain the same?

Dobrynin said that he had no instructions to say anything on this point, but his strong impression was that when the Soviet instructors there had finished their jobs, they would leave.

Dobrynin said it was Khrushchev's intention to go to Cuba toward the end of the year, but that no exact date had been set. He inquired whether the President intended to go to the United Nations General Assembly and make a speech there.

The President said that he had not yet decided.

Dobrynin said that Khrushchev definitely did not plan to go to the opening of the United Nations General Assembly, although there had been some thought that he might appear in connection with his trip to Cuba.

The President said he was sure Mr. Khrushchev was aware of the sensitivities involved in his visiting Cuba. This was Mr. Khrushchev's affair, but he wanted him to know of these sensitivities.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

**360. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, August 22, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/24/63 Protest Note, 6/63-8/63. Secret.

SUBJECT

Reply to Cuban Note on Overflights/1/

/1/For a summary and discussion of the note, see Documents 352 and 353.

We have for various reasons, including most recently a request of the Swiss Ambassador in Habana who is negotiating on Cuban efforts to take over our Embassy building, delayed replying to the Cuban note of June 24 on overflights. However, in order to keep the record clear, we feel a reply should now be made.

As you know, the Cubans have thus far taken no action to follow up on threats made in that note on overflights. Secretary Rusk feels that our reply should be non-polemical and not of a nature that would encourage the Cubans to feel it necessary to respond in strong verbal terms and possibly match their actions to their words.

The attached draft, upon which I would appreciate your comments, has therefore been drawn along these lines.

In referring to the "publicly expressed position" of the USG in the attached note, we particularly have in mind Secretary Rusk's statements of March 12 and April 13, 1963,<sup>/2/</sup> and, when handing the note to the Czechs, we would orally call these statements to the attention of the Czechs.

<sup>/2/</sup>Attached, but not printed.

U. Alexis Johnson

**Enclosure<sup>/3/</sup>**

<sup>/3/</sup>On August 26 Bundy sent Johnson a memorandum stating that he had shown the President the draft reply to the Cuban note. The President approved it. Bundy suggested when passing the note to the Czechoslovaks, the United States should call to their attention the public statements by the President on the importance of surveillance.

DRAFT

The Government of the United States has taken note of the statements contained in the note of the Government of Cuba of June 24, 1963, that Cuban gunners have orders to fire at any foreign war plane that makes low-altitude flights over Cuban territory; and that the Government of Cuba is stepping up its defense preparations in order to be ready to intercept and shoot down any war plane that violates Cuban air space at any altitude.

The Government of the United States wishes again to call the attention of the Government of Cuba to the well-known, publicly expressed position of the Government of the United States on this question. The position of the Government of the United States on this matter has not changed.

**361. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, August 26, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63-9/63. Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

Cuban Note Protesting Exile Raids

The Cubans will probably circulate a note in the UN<sup>/1/</sup> today protesting one of three recent exile raids on Cuba; [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. USUN recommends that, in view of the Department's press disclaimer last week,<sup>/2/</sup> we wait for UN reaction before deciding whether or not to reply to the note.

Bill Bowdler tells me that it is standard procedure for the Cubans to circulate this sort of note in the UN; for example, they also circulated the note protesting US blocking controls. State agrees with USUN's decision to wait for UN reaction before deciding whether or not to reply to the note. If asked, State's public position is roughly "Beyond the reports of the Cuban Government, we have no knowledge of these events."

GC

<sup>/1/</sup>The Cuban Permanent Representative sent the note to the United Nations on August 20, where it was received on August 23. A copy was sent to the Department of State in airgram A-257, August 28. (Department of State, Central Files, CUBA-US)

/2/Apparently a reference to a press briefing of diplomatic correspondents at the Department of State.

### **362. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, August 26, 1963.

[Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63-9/63. Secret; Eyes Only. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

### **363. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, September 10, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. II. Top Secret. Drafted by Thompson. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy and Rusk.

#### **SUBJECT**

United States Actions in Cuba

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

Ambassador Dobrynin said he had a personal message for the President, and he considered it so confidential, that he had not had it typed but would read from his handwritten notes.

He said that the Soviet Government considered that things had recently taken a turn for the better in the international situation and in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. With the signing of the Test Ban Treaty and the exchange of views with Secretary Rusk, there had developed a relaxation of tension and the prerequisite for the settlement of other questions had been established. This could lead to a real turning point, and the end of the cold war. The Soviet Union took satisfaction from the willingness of the United States to look for the solution of other international problems. If both countries were determined to accomplish this, it was important that nothing be done contrary to this intention. The Soviets wished to tell the President, frankly, what was of concern to them. There were certain facts which did not fit in with the situation and these were the provocative actions against Cuba, which had increased in recent weeks. Unknown planes had shelled industrial establishments and there had been landings of saboteurs on the Cuban coast. These actions had been intensified after the conclusion of the nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It had been stated that the United States had nothing to do with these actions, but no one could believe this. When the United States took a position against the attacks on Soviet ships in Cuban waters, these attacks had stopped. This action had been understood by the Soviet Union as a measure showing the good intentions of the United States. How then could these recent actions be interpreted? If such attacks continued--and they could only be taken from the United States proper or from countries allied with the United States and with the knowledge and connivance of the United States--this could only lead to a new crisis.

The Soviet Union did not want a new crisis to emerge. Both sides had expressed their satisfaction over the elimination of the last crisis, which had been resolved after each side had undertaken certain commitments. The President had said that these commitments should be carried out. The Soviets agreed with this. They believed

that for the future of our relations, it was important that effective measures be taken to stop the piratic attacks against Cuba. The Soviet Union had undertaken certain commitments in respect to the protection of the independence of Cuba which were aimed exclusively at preventing Cuba from becoming a victim of aggression, and the Soviet Union would certainly fulfill its commitments if aggression were unleashed against Cuba.

The Soviet Union hoped for understanding of the motives that prompted them to convey to the President, personally from N.S. Khrushchev, this assessment of the effect of the activation lately of provocative actions against Cuba.

### **364. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, September 10, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. II. Top Secret. Drafted by Thompson. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy and Rusk.

#### **SUBJECT**

United States Actions in Cuba

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

Llewellyn E. Thomson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

On the occasion of his call on me today, Ambassador Dobrynin referred to the possibility of Mr. Khrushchev stopping in New York and the possibility that at that time there might be demonstrations against him or other unpleasant developments. He said he realized that I had mentioned this in a private way, and he had so informed his Government. He also referred to the fact that the President had told him how deeply the Cuban problem was felt in the United States. He said his Government understood that these remarks were prompted by good intentions. He said, however, that when one side expressed concern about speeches that had not yet been made, how should one regard speeches that were being made, particularly in connection with the Test Ban Treaty.

He said Mr. Khrushchev wished to convey to the President that he did not have in mind to speak on subjects that do not arise from the situation, but this depended not only on the Soviet Union, but on the United States. If provocations against Cuba continued, Mr. Khrushchev would be put in such a position that he would be compelled to react. The Soviet Union believed that if there were a real desire to improve relations, there is a wide field for action. If there is such a desire, it would have complete understanding and support on the part of the Soviet Union. It was expected that the United States Government and the President would adhere to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. In this case, it is only the Cubans, as the President himself had said, who should decide how Cubans are to lead their lives. If the principle of noninterference were violated in Cuba, a situation would arise where both the Soviet Union and the United States would be driven to extreme poles. It was the conviction of Mr. Khrushchev and the Soviet Union that we should make every effort to avoid such a development in the interests of our countries and of peace.

I asked Ambassador Dobrynin if his remarks about speeches meant that the Chairman had decided to speak at the General Assembly. Dobrynin said he had no information other than the fact that before leaving Moscow to return to the United States he had asked the Chairman what his plans were. The Chairman had said he would probably visit Cuba about the end of this year or the first of next year, and that then might stop over in New York. Dobrynin said he understood that U Thant had suggested to the Chairman that he visit the United Nations.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked if it were true, as indicated in the paper this morning, that the President would address the General Assembly. I said this had not yet been decided and probably would not be before the end of the week. I said that we would let him know and added that it was my understanding that if the President did speak, he would probably remain in New York only one day.

**365. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, September 12, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63-9/63. Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

Exile Raids From Outside Areas--Pros, Cons, and Public Position

I understand that the President may be interested in stopping free-lance exile raids which originate from outside the U.S., as well as those which originate from the U.S. I find the case for stopping raids from the U.S. vaguely convincing because the possibility of Russian reaction to our direct involvement is greater. However, I find less convincing the case for trying to stop raids which originate from outside the U.S. Here are a few thoughts I jotted down, admittedly in a hurry, this morning; anyway, you might find them useful for the press conference./1/

/1/Reference is to the press conference of September 12, at which questions were asked about Cuba in general, but none specifically about exile raids. For a transcript of the conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 672-679.

Arguments in Favor of Trying to Stop Raids Originating from Outside the U.S.

1. They might provoke a Russian reaction.
2. They don't hurt Castro much.
3. They are haphazard and kill innocents. Inter alia, this might mean a bad press in some friendly countries.
4. They might provoke the Cubans to extreme retaliatory measures.
5. They increase Cuban alertness, [*1 line of source text not declassified*].

Arguments Against Trying to Stop Raids Originating from Outside the U.S.

1. The exile action program seems to be gaining momentum. Pretty soon, as they become more expert, they may start to hit something worthwhile.
2. There is a fair chance that these raids hurt Castro more than we think; he seems to be screaming louder than necessary if the raids don't hurt him at all. At the least, intelligence reports indicate that the raids cause a considerable amount of activity in the Cuban armed forces--and this is undoubtedly not inexpensive. [*2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]
3. The raids may cause more psychological damage than we now think. I keep thinking of my own reaction (and I am a red-blooded American) if I were working in a sugar mill and the mill down the road were attacked. The fact that it was a Piper Cub which dropped two bombs, 100 yards wide of the mark, wouldn't be terribly reassuring to me. Inter alia, absenteeism in Cuba, which is already a serious problem, conceivably could be made

more serious.

4. If our opposition to the raids becomes known we run into a number of problems. First, exile reaction. Second, reaction of activists in Latin America; among other things, we may get another cooling-down period in which it will be very tough to get cooperation in our isolation policy. Third, reaction of the hard-noses in the U.S. (e.g. "the Administration won't even let others try to solve the Cuban problem"). Fourth, Cuban and Soviet reaction. If our opposition is known and we are successful in stopping the raids (and I think we could be successful if we really set our mind to it), substance will be lent to the Soviet/Cuban belief that we can control all the activities in the Caribbean. [1 line of source text not declassified] The Soviets and the Cubans will certainly raise the noise-level when some U.S. sponsored attacks really hurt them and when the history of such operations clearly indicates that we control them. Fifth, we can probably expect Castro to crow as he did last spring. "The U.S. has capitulated on one of my 5 points."

I personally think we should be very careful about the way we handle this problem. As it stands now, we should seriously consider the desirability of taking the public position (1) that we have already made our position clear with respect to attacks originating from the U.S., (2) that we intend to enforce this policy, (3) that while we sometimes doubt the effectiveness of attacks originating in third countries, we are obviously not in a position to control them; these are sovereign nations which determine their own foreign policy.

I am a complete non-expert in Russian policy but feel that we may want to take the following line with them, when and if pressed; (1) that we have made our policy clear with regard to raids from within the U.S. and (2) that we have no control over raids originating from areas outside of the U.S. In this regard we might note that the Russians seem to have no control over Communists in Laos, Vietnam, Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, etc. These people, like the anti-Castro forces, seem intent on overturning established governments.

GC

### **366. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, September 13, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Special US-USSR Files, 1963.  
Secret. Drafted by Thompson.

#### **SUBJECT**

Cuba

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

I made the oral statement which is attached hereto. The Ambassador said he wished to ask how he should translate the sentence reading "The United States could, of course, consult with any government in this Hemisphere from whose territory we have information that flights were originating against Cuba . . . ." He asked if this meant that we knew where these flights were coming from. I replied that we probably had some suspicions. I did not think the information was specific, and asked him to add the word "indicating" after the word "information."

The Ambassador said he hoped that Mr. Khrushchev's motives in raising this question were understood. He said

that the Chairman believed it was to our mutual interest to reduce tension in the Caribbean and to avoid a crisis over the Cuban problem.

I said I was sure that the President did understand, and thought that our position was clear from the statement which I had just made to him.

## **Attachment**

### ORAL STATEMENT

The President wished Mr. Khrushchev to know that he shares his view that the signing of the Test Ban Treaty and the recent exchange of views with the Soviet Government is encouraging, and he hopes it will be possible to proceed to the solution of other problems. The President is hopeful that the Test Ban Treaty will be approved by the United States Senate in the course of next week.

With respect to the Cuban situation, the President also agrees that the emergence of a new crisis would be in the interest neither of the Soviet Union nor of the United States, and can assure him that the United States will faithfully carry out its commitments.

With respect to any air attacks on Cuba, it can be stated categorically that not only was the United States not involved in any way in such attacks, but has been making every effort to prevent them. It is possible, but not likely, that a light private aircraft could take off from one of the large number of private fields in the southeastern portion of the United States. No such illegal flights have been detected by the means available to us. The President has directed, however, that the measures already taken be reviewed to see what further steps could be taken.

In keeping with the March 30, 1963 declaration by the Departments of State and Justice concerning hit and run attacks by Cuban exile groups against targets in Cuba, the law enforcement agencies are taking vigorous measures to assure that the pertinent laws of the United States are observed.

Apparently it is assumed that the United States exercises control over the policies and actions of the other sovereign, independent states of this Hemisphere. This assumption betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the relationship between the United States and the other American Republics. The history of inter-American relations makes abundantly clear that the American Governments will not tolerate interference with their foreign or domestic affairs. The states of this Hemisphere jealously defend the principle of juridical equality of states and reject any insinuation that difference of size and power in any way modifies this fundamental rule governing their relations.

The United States could, of course, consult with any government in this Hemisphere from whose territory we have information indicating that flights were originating against Cuba, but, in all candor, we must point out that such consultation would be greatly complicated by the increasing sense of outrage among the governments of this Hemisphere about Cuba's deliberate stimulation and support of subversive activities throughout the Hemisphere in direct violation of international norms. This is not simply a matter of speeches or words by Castro, as has sometimes been indicated. Clear evidence of Cuban involvement in this form of aggression is to be found in the fact that:

- a) The Cuban Government is recruiting Latin Americans, sending them to Cuba for training in guerrilla tactics and returning them to their countries to engage in terroristic activities. A case in point are the Cuban-trained Peruvians captured on May 14 and 15, 1963, at Puerto Maldonado as they attempted clandestinely to enter Peru from Bolivia.
- b) The Cuban Government is furnishing funds to revolutionary groups seeking the overthrow of governments by

force and violence. By way of illustration, in May 1963, two leading members of the Ecuadorean Communist Party, Jose Maria Roura and Alejandro Roman were seized as they were returning to Ecuador. They were carrying over \$30,000 which they confessed had been given them by Chinese and Cuban sources.

c) The Cuban leaders continue to exhort revolutionaries in Latin American countries to resort to sabotage, terrorism and guerrilla action. Premier Castro returned to this theme in his July twenty-sixth address when he called on activists in Venezuela and other countries to "open the breach" and begin fighting. Major Ernesto Guevara, in an article published in the September issue of Cuba Socialista, strongly advocates guerrilla warfare as the surest road to power in Latin America. Information available to us shows a direct connection between terroristic activities in Venezuela and the Castro regime. In addition to being guilty of such aggression against other American Republics by promoting these and other activities, the Cuban Government recently embarked on a most risky venture of direct violation of the territory and territorial waters of another country in this Hemisphere using units of its armed forces. On August 14, 1963, a Cuban helicopter and two patrol boats furnished by the Soviet Union forcibly removed from Cay Anguila, one of the islands of the Bahamas group, nineteen persons who had sought refuge on the island. This incident led to a vigorous protest by the British Government on August 21, 1963, requesting an apology and return of the persons taken prisoners.

In sum, it is not the United States, but the behavior of the Castro regime that is to blame for the difficulties in the Caribbean area.

### **367. Memorandum by William Attwood**

Washington, September 18, 1963.

//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. No classification marking. Attwood was Ambassador to Guinea March 29, 1961-May 27, 1963. In August 1963, he joined the U.S. Mission to the United Nations as an adviser. McGeorge Bundy wrote the following note on this memorandum: "G[ordon] C[hase]. Speak to me on this. McG B."

This memorandum proposes a course of action which, if successful, could remove the Cuban issue from the 1964 campaign.

It does not propose offering Castro a "deal"--which could be more dangerous politically than doing nothing. It does propose a discreet inquiry into the possibility of neutralizing Cuba on our terms.

It is based on the assumption that, short of a change of regime, our principal political objectives in Cuba are:

- a. The evacuation of all Soviet bloc military personnel.
- b. An end to subversive activities by Cuba in Latin America.
- c. Adoption by Cuba of a policy of non-alignment.

This memorandum is also based on the assumption that our present policy of isolating Cuba economically and politically will not overthrow the Castro regime in time to keep Cuba out of the 1964 campaign. So long as he receives Soviet aid and keeps his power base among the peasantry, his position seems secure.

It follows that the effect of our present policy is mainly negative:

- a. It aggravates Castro's anti-Americanism and his desire to cause us trouble and embarrassment.
- b. In the eyes of a world largely made up of small countries, it freezes us in the unattractive posture of a big

country trying to bully a small country.

Since we do not intend to overthrow the Castro regime by military force, is there anything else we can do which might advance U.S. interests without risking charges of appeasement?

According to neutral diplomats and others I have talked to at the U.N. and in Guinea, there is reason to believe that Castro is unhappy about his present dependence on the Soviet bloc; that he does not enjoy being in effect a satellite; that the trade embargo is hurting him--though not enough to endanger his position; and that he would like to establish some official contact with the U.S. and go to some length to obtain normalization of relations with us--even though this would not be welcomed by most of his hard-core Communist entourage, such as Che Guevara.

All of this may or may not be true. But it would seem that we have something to gain and nothing to lose by finding out whether in fact Castro does want to talk and what concessions he would be prepared to make.

The most propitious time and place to find out would be at the U.N. during the present General Assembly. Without appearing to take the initiative for a meeting, we could easily feel out the Cubans as follows:

- a. As a former journalist who spent considerable time with Castro in 1959, I could arrange a casual meeting with the Cuban Delegate, Dr. Lechuga. This could be done socially through mutual acquaintances.
- b. I would refer to my last talk with Castro, at which he stressed his desire to be friends with the U.S., and suggest that, as a journalist, I would be curious to know how he felt today. If Castro is ready to talk, this should provide sufficient reason for Lechuga to come back to me with an invitation.

It would be understood that I would be going as an individual but would of course report to the President before and after the visit.

My reasons for suggesting that I undertake this mission are threefold:

- a. Although Castro did not like my final article in 1959, we got along well and I believe he remembers me as someone he could talk to frankly.
- b. I have had considerable experience in the past seventeen years talking with Communist and neutralist leaders on both sides of the iron curtain.
- c. I have enough rank to satisfy Castro that this would be a serious conversation. At the same time, I am not so well-known that my departure, arrival or return would be noticed.

Two other points are worth emphasizing:

- a. Such a meeting would be purely exploratory. I would make no offers, promises or deals. I would simply sound him out as to whether he would be willing to take the three steps listed in paragraph three, and on what terms. I would report to the President and the decision to pursue negotiations or not could then be taken.
- b. The risk that the press would get wind of this project is minimal. For their part, the Cubans would not want it known they had solicited a meeting. On our side, it is of course important that the fewest possible people know of it. But in any case we are on firm ground so long as the invitation comes from the Cubans, since we are always ready to listen to an offer that could advance U.S. interests.

For the moment, all I would like is the authority to make contact with Lechuga. We'll see what happens then.

William Attwood/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

### **368. Summary Record of the 14th Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 1, 1963, 5 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 10/1/63. Secret.

Cuba

Mr. Desmond FitzGerald of CIA reviewed the situation in Cuba, emphasizing that a swing of the pendulum was taking place. Because things were becoming so bad for Castro momentarily, we should not overreact and conclude that the Cuban problem was on the way to being solved.

Several items were discussed:

1. The Defense Department agreed to review the feasibility of monitoring planes flying out of Cuba suspected of carrying arms to other Latin American countries.
2. Allied trade with Cuba--The Central Intelligence Agency will prepare a list of critical items [2 lines of source text not declassified]. The list will be sent to the Commerce Department, which will devise ways of preventing such items [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to Cuba, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
3. A proposed Presidential statement on Cuba, originally suggested by USIA but not yet been made, will be looked at again with a view to recommending to the President that he comment on the future Cuba in a forthcoming speech.
4. Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended sabotage actions--General Goodpaster asked whether the Agency had considered the two covert actions which the Joint Chiefs had suggested, i.e. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] dropping U.S. arms into Cuba. Mr. FitzGerald replied that CIA had never gotten the Joint Chiefs' suggestions. The Attorney General expressed some concern about whether suggested Cuban actions were being followed up. (It later developed that the Joint Chiefs' suggestions had been sent to the Defense representative on the Special Group who had chosen not to recommend these actions to the Special Group. Further consideration of the Joint Chiefs' recommendations will be undertaken by the Special Group.)
5. Sugar price program--It was agreed that this exercise had been completed and that there was nothing further to be done on this item.
6. Economic warfare group--Mr. FitzGerald urged the prompt establishment of a proposed economic warfare group which would coordinate all economic warfare measures taken against Cuba./1/

/1/McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting, October 1. Bundy noted that "the Department of Defense agreed to review the feasibility of monitoring planes flying out of Cuba suspected of carrying arms to other Latin American States;" that CIA and Commerce "will consider together how to block the movement of specific critical items [text not declassified] to Cuba;" and noted that the "proposed statement on the future of Cuba will be reviewed with a view to recommending that the President include it in a forthcoming speech." (Ibid.)

Brazil

A draft policy paper on Brazil was circulated to the group but not discussed. The Latin American Policy Committee is scheduled to deal with the paper on Thursday.

Bromley Smith/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

### **369. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, October 4, 1963, 10:30 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. This memorandum, drafted by Judd and approved in the White House on October 15, was part 5 of 6 separate memoranda of conversation. The meeting was held at the White House. The full conversation lasted until 11:25 a.m. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book)

#### **SUBJECT**

Cuban Shipping

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

United States

The President

William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary European Affairs

Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA

[Great Britain]

Lord Home, Foreign Secretary

Sir David Ormsby Gore, Ambassador to the U.S.

Oliver Wright, Foreign Office

The President showed Lord Home and the British Ambassador the latest figures on free world shipping in the Cuban trade./1/ British ships were in the lead followed by Greek ships. The number of Greek ships could be expected to decline drastically as a result of the Greek Decree recently issued. The President said the situation was embarrassing to us. He was constantly being asked why he didn't speak to our Allies, and why they did not cooperate with us. He asked Lord Home if the British Government could not do something about the situation.

/1/Apparently a list attached to Document 370.

Lord Home said that HMG would see what could be done. The trouble was that legislation would be needed. Also, a number of the ships were registered in Hong Kong and it was almost impossible to do anything with them. As a result of U.S. measures, the charter rates on ships on the Cuban trade had gone up, making the trade more attractive.

The President said that there must be some way that the British could get at this problem and Lord Home again said that he would see what could be done.

In passing, Lord Home mentioned that the UK was negotiating with Cuba for the sale of some buses.

**370. Memorandum From the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Carroll) to Secretary of Defense McNamara**

Washington, October 8, 1963.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, May through Dec. 1963. Secret.

**SUBJECT**

(U) Appraisal of Bloc and Free-World Shipping to Cuba, Soviet Forces Remaining in Cuba, and the State of Cuban Economy as Compared to a Year Ago

1. Forwarded for your information are copies of three appraisals prepared in response to an oral request from the Military Aide to the President./1/

/1/According to an attached covering sheet sent to Clifton, the oral request was made on October 4. The three attached appraisals were a review of shipping to Cuba over the past year, an estimate of Soviet personnel remaining in Cuba, and an estimate of economic conditions in Cuba as compared to last year. The appraisals are *ibid*.

2. The comparative assessment of Soviet Bloc and Free-World shipping points out that total shipping averaged 48.1 dry cargo and 19.2 tanker arrivals per month during the past year, as compared with an average of 90.6 dry cargo and 25.5 tanker arrivals during the first nine months of 1962. No significant decline in Soviet Bloc shipping is noted, attributable to the fact that in the preceding period Bloc ships were carrying large quantities of military materiel while during this year they have carried primarily foodstuff and industrial equipment in order to make up for the significant drop in Free-World shipping.

3. The assessment of the status of Soviet military personnel in Cuba, prepared in collaboration with CIA, concludes that Soviet military personnel withdrawals are continuing and that total Soviet military strength in Cuba is now estimated to be between 5,000 and 8,000--representing a reduction to date of at least two-thirds of the number originally estimated to be on the island during the crisis. Most of those remaining are advisors and technicians engaged in training Cuban personnel in the operation of Soviet weapons, in supervising the use and maintenance of Soviet equipment turned over to the Cubans, and in operating the Soviet-controlled air defense system. No organized Soviet ground combat units remain in Cuba.

4. The appraisal of the economic situation cites a continuing decline in Cuban production--on the order of 5 to 7 per cent, with 20 per cent decline in sugar harvest (the main stay of Cuba's economy) and with living conditions continuing to deteriorate. So far, however, the continued economic decline has not adversely affected the Cuban military establishment.

Joseph F. Carroll

Lieutenant General, USAF

**371. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, October 10, 1963, 4 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Gromyko talks with President. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by the White House on October 21 and by S on October 16. The meeting was held at the White House. This memorandum was one of eleven covering a conversation that lasted until 6:10 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) For conversations on U.S.-Soviet relations in general as well as an accounting of the other memoranda of this conversation, see volume V.

SUBJECT

Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

US

The President

The Secretary

Ambassador Thompson

Assistant Secretary Tyler

Mr. Akalovsky, ACDA/IR

USSR

Foreign Minister Gromyko

Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov

Ambassador Dobrynin

Mr. Sukhodrev, Foreign Ministry

Mr. Gromyko recalled the President's remark about Soviet personnel in Cuba and said that, as Mr. Khrushchev had told Mr. Harriman, there were now no Soviet troops in Cuba. The Soviet personnel now in Cuba were specialists training the Cubans in the use of arms supplied by the USSR. When this limited task was accomplished these would be withdrawn. As to what had been done in Cuba so far, there was no need to repeat that now because the President was informed on this matter. The Soviet Government was acting in Cuba on the basis of the understanding the President and Mr. Khrushchev had reached in their correspondence.

The President asked how many Soviet military specialists would remain in Cuba in, say, six months.

Mr. Gromyko said that he was unable to answer this question. He preferred not to speak in terms of dates but he wished to ask the President to understand that the USSR had in Cuba only military specialists with a limited mission.

The President commented that it would be helpful if, when the specialists were completely withdrawn, Mr. Khrushchev were to consider making a statement to that effect.

Mr. Gromyko said he would inform Mr. Khrushchev about this. However he suggested that the President take into account the difficulty of mentioning specific dates. So if Mr. Khrushchev did not mention any dates, this did not mean that specialists would stay forever.

The President said this might be so, but perhaps Mr. Khrushchev could make such a statement to one of the visiting newsmen in terms of an accomplished fact.

Mr. Gromyko said that he did not think there was any need to remind the President that Cuba was being subjected to constant pressure and provocation on the part of some forces which engaged even in such things as sending planes with bombs. The President probably knew better than he, Gromyko, who those forces were. The Soviet Government was convinced that if the US Government and the President personally wished to stop these activities, they would cease immediately.

The President said we believed we had stopped harassment by planes and had given warning, although perhaps if someone was close enough he could still fly in and drop a bomb. In any event, he did not see any benefit to the US from harassment. This would not unseat Castro and serve no useful purpose.

Mr. Gromyko commented that those air raids must be originating somewhere. If they originated outside the US, they could be stopped too, because the USSR had a high opinion of US influence in Latin America.

The President said we were not sure that the planes came from Latin America. Of two recent flights over Cuba, one has perhaps come from Central America, and some plane may have come even from Florida. We tried to stop the planes, but there were many fields in Florida, light planes were used and it was very difficult to keep them under control.

The Secretary recalled his remarks to Mr. Gromyko about activities in the other direction, noting this made it more difficult for us to deal with this situation. He also observed that the Chinese may be involved in this matter.

Mr. Gromyko asserted that the USSR had no information about such activities. If the US regarded speeches by Castro or other Cuban leaders as subversive, then Soviet speeches about capitalism and US speeches about communism were also subversive. In any event, the USSR had no information about any subversive activities from Cuba.

The Secretary asked whether Mr. Gromyko thought Cuba had said its last word regarding the signing of the Test Ban Treaty.

Mr. Gromyko said the US was familiar with the Cuban position on this matter. As he had told the Secretary earlier, the USSR believed that this question was under consideration by Cuba. Thus the USSR believed that the Cubans had not spoken their last word, although they did take the position that the policy of the US Government prevented them from signing. However, Mr. Gromyko noted that he could not speak for the Cubans.

The President commented that the Cubans might not like our policy; we did not like Cuban policy, but we wanted the Cubans to sign. He wondered whether the Cubans took this attitude because of China.

Mr. Gromyko said the USSR had no information which would confirm such a supposition. The USSR gave credence to the Cuban statement that it was the US policy which was the reason for their present stand.

**372. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, October 21, 1963.

//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65.  
Top Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

Accommodation with Castro

As you requested, I spoke to Ambassador Attwood in New York about the attached./1/ He gave the following information. (The conversation was necessarily vague and we didn't go into much detail.)

/1/Apparent reference to Document 367.

1. Adlai Stevenson had received approval for the approach.
2. Ambassador Attwood spoke to Lechuga. Lechuga expressed interest (he is a soft-liner) and suggested that someone from our side should go down to Cuba to talk with Castro. Attwood replied that the UN was a more appropriate talking place. Lechuga said he would convey the message to Havana.
3. Attwood concluded that the ball is in Cuban hands and the door is ajar. However, he is not hopeful. While Lechuga and Castro, himself, might be interested, he feels that Castro is too well boxed in by such hard-liners as Guevara to be able to maneuver much.

GC

**373. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, November 5, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, S.G. 104, November 14, 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on November 6. Copies were sent to U. Alexis Johnson, Gilpatric, and McCone.

SUBJECT

Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Special Group, 5 November 1963

PRESENT

Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone

The Attorney General, Mr. Helms, Mr. Cheever, Dr. Wheelon, and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1 and 2. The Attorney General and Mr. Helms were present for Item 3

[Here follows discussion of items 1, a report of an unsuccessful sabotage operation of October 21-22 in Southeast Pinar, and item 2, a proposal for low-level sabotage to be carried out on the north coast and tentative approval of a sabotage operation in northern Oriente province and infiltration of a radio operator into Cuba.]

3. Cuba--Peace Feelers

Mr. Bundy stated that it has come to the attention of the White House that Castro would like to have a talk designed to bring about some kind of "arrangement" with the U.S. To hear what Castro has to say and to know on what basis he might wish to negotiate would be of some use to the U.S. Mr. Bundy suggested that for this

initial talk Mr. William Attwood, currently on the staff of Mr. Stevenson at the United Nations, might be a likely candidate since Mr. Attwood has been in touch with Mr. Carlos Lechuga Hevia, the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. Also, Attwood has a fairly friendly relationship with Castro based on previous acquaintance.

In the Group discussion which followed it was thought inadvisable to allow Mr. Attwood, while on the UN staff, to get in touch with Castro. The suggestion was made that he might be removed from his official UN status and then go to Cuba for the ostensible purpose of writing an article for Look magazine. In this way it might be learned how badly Castro might want a detente with the United States.

It was suggested by Mr. Helms that it might be profitable to "war game" this problem and look at it from all possible angles before making any contacts.

A further suggestion was made by Mr. Bundy that Dr. Rene Vallejo Ortiz, Castro's aide and personal physician, might be flown to Mexico with Castro's proposals and discuss them with the U.S. Ambassador in Mexico City.

The Attorney General emphasized that as a prelude to all this the U.S. must require some fundamental steps such as the end of subversion in Latin America and removing the Soviet troops in Cuba before any serious discussion can take place about a detente.

Mr. McCone stated that it might be possible to use again Mr. James Donovan who is known to have excellent relationships with Dr. Vallejo. Vallejo might be flown to the UN for such talks or better still Donovan could go to Cuba.

It was decided by the Special Group members not to try to reach a firm decision at this time but to study the problem for several days and attack it again.

Paul Eckel/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Eckel signed the original.

#### **374. Memorandum From William Attwood to Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff**

New York, November 8, 1963.

//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Secret.

Following is a chronology of events leading up to Castro's invitation on October 31, to receive a U.S. official for talks in Cuba:

Soon after joining the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on August 26, I met Seydou Diallo, the Guinea Ambassador to Havana, whom I had known well in Conakry. He went out of his way to tell me that Castro was isolated from contact with neutralist diplomats by his "Communist entourage" because it was known he was unhappy with Cuba's satellite status and looking for a way out. He, Diallo, had finally been able to see Castro alone once and was convinced he was personally receptive to changing courses and getting Cuba on the road to non-alignment. Diallo added that the exile raids were an obstacle since they strengthened the hand of the hard-liners both with Castro and the public.

In the first week of September, I also read ABC correspondent, Lisa Howard's article, "Castro's Overture",/1/ based on her conversation with Castro last April. This article stressed Castro's expressed desire for reaching an accommodation with the United States and his willingness to make substantial concessions to this end. On September 12, I talked with Miss Howard, whom I have known for some years, and she echoed Ambassador

Diallo's opinion that there was a rift between Castro and the Guevara-Hart-Alveida group on the question of Cuba's future course.

/1/War/Peace Report, September, 1963, pp. 3-5.

On September 12, I discussed this with Under Secretary Harriman in Washington. He suggested I prepare a memo and we arranged to meet in New York the following week.

On September 18, I wrote a memorandum based on these talks and on corroborating information I had heard in Conakry.<sup>/2/</sup> In it I suggested that discreet contact might be established with the Cubans at the United Nations to find out whether Castro in fact wanted to talk, and on our terms. I showed this memo to Ambassador Stevenson, who felt the matter was worth exploring quietly and who indicated he might discuss it with the President.

/2/Document 367.

/3/See Document 372.

On September 19, I met Harriman in New York. After reading my memo, he suggested I also discuss it with the Attorney-General because of the political implications of the Cuban issue.

On September 20, I made an appointment with the Attorney-General in Washington. Meanwhile, Stevenson obtained the President's approval for me to make discreet contact with Dr. Lechuga, Cuba's chief delegate at the United Nations.

On September 23, I met Dr. Lechuga at Miss Howard's apartment. She has been on good terms with Lechuga since her visit with Castro and invited him for a drink to meet some friends who had also been to Cuba. I was just one of those friends. In the course of our conversation, which started with recollections of my own talks with Castro in 1959, I mentioned having read Miss Howard's article. Lechuga hinted that Castro was indeed in a mood to talk, especially with someone he had met before. He thought there was a good chance that I might be invited to Cuba if I wished to resume our 1959 talk. I told him that in my present position, I would need official authorization to make such a trip, and did not know if it would be forthcoming. However, I said an exchange of views might well be useful and that I would find out and let him know.

On September 24, I saw the Attorney-General in Washington, gave him my September 18 memo, and reported my meeting with Lechuga. He said he would pass the memo on to Mr. McGeorge Bundy; meanwhile, he thought that it would be difficult for me to visit Cuba without it being known and risking the accusation that we were trying to make a deal with Castro. He wondered if it might be possible to meet Castro--if that's what he wanted--in another country, such as Mexico, or at the United Nations. Meanwhile, he agreed it would be useful to maintain contact with Lechuga. I said I would so inform Lechuga and wait to hear from him or Bundy.

Back in New York, I informed Stevenson of my talk with Lechuga and the Attorney-General.

On September 27, I ran into Lechuga at the United Nations, where he was doing a television interview in the lobby with Miss Howard. I told him that I had discussed our talk in Washington, and that it was felt that my accepting an invitation to go to Cuba would be difficult under present circumstances, especially in view of my official status. I added, however, that if Castro or a personal emissary had something to tell us, we were prepared to meet him and listen wherever else would be convenient. Lechuga said he would so inform Havana. Meanwhile, he forewarned me that he would be making a "hard" anti-U.S. speech in the United Nations on October 7. I remarked that it wouldn't help reduce tensions; he replied he couldn't help making it because of the "blockade."

On October 7, in his reply to Lechuga's tough speech, Stevenson suggested that if Castro wanted peace with his

neighbors, he need only do three things--stop being a Soviet stooge, stop trying to subvert other nations, and start carrying out the promises of his revolution regarding constitutional rights.

On October 18, at dinner at the home of Mrs. Eugene Meyer, I talked with Mr. C.A. Doxiades, a noted Greek architect and town-planner, who had just returned from an architects' congress in Havana, where he had talked alone to both Castro and Guevara, among others. He sought me out, as a government official, to say he was convinced Castro would welcome a normalization of relations with the United States if he could do so without losing too much face. He also said that Guevara and the other communists were opposed to any deal, and regarded Castro as dangerously unreliable; and that they would get rid of Castro if they thought they could carry on without him and retain his popular support.

On October 20, Miss Howard asked me if she might call Major Rene Vallejo, a Cuban surgeon who is also Castro's current right-hand man and confidant. She said Vallejo helped her see Castro and made it plain to her he opposed the Guevara group. They became friends and have talked on the phone several times since the interview. Miss Howard's purpose in calling him now was that she thought any message from Lechuga would not get past the foreign office, and she wanted to make certain, through Vallejo, that Castro knew there was a U.S. official available if he wanted to talk. I told her to go ahead, so long as she referred to my talk with Lechuga and made it quite plain we were not soliciting a meeting but only expressing our willingness to listen to anything they had to say. She then called Vallejo at his home. He was out and she left word for him to call her back.

On October 21, Gordon Chase called me from the White House in connection with my September 18 memo. I brought him up to date and said the ball was in their court.

On October 23, Vallejo called Miss Howard at her New York apartment. She was out of town; he left word with the maid that he would call again.

On October 28, I ran into Lechuga in the U.N. Delegates Lounge. He told me that Havana did not think sending someone to the United Nations for talks would be "useful at this time." But he hoped he and I might have some informal chats from time to time. I said it was up to him and he could call me if he felt like it. He wrote down my extension.

On October 29, Vallejo again called Miss Howard at home. He assured her, in response to her question, that Castro still felt as he did in April about improving relations with us. As to his going to the United Nations or elsewhere for such a talk, Vallejo said it was impossible for Castro to leave the country at the present time. But he said he would relay her message to Castro (that there was now a U.S. official authorized to listen to him), and would call her back soon.

On October 31, Vallejo called Miss Howard, apologizing for the delay and saying he had been out of town with Castro and "could not get to a phone from which I could call you." He said Castro would very much like to talk to the U.S. official anytime and appreciated the importance of discretion to all concerned. Castro would therefore be willing to send a plane to Mexico to pick up the official and fly him to a private airport near Veradero where Castro would talk to him alone. The plane would fly him back immediately after the talk. In this way there would be no risk of identification at Havana airport. Miss Howard said she doubted if a U.S. official could come to Cuba but perhaps he, Vallejo, could come and see the official at the U.N. or in Mexico, as Castro's personal spokesman. Vallejo replied that Castro wanted to do the talking himself but did not completely rule out this situation if there was no other way of engaging a dialogue. It was agreed Miss Howard would relay the invitation to me and call Vallejo back as soon as possible with our reply. At this point she identified me as the U.S. official. Vallejo asked for the spelling, and recalled having met me in 1959 (I do not remember him). Miss Howard got the impression that Lechuga's previous message to Havana had not reached Vallejo or Castro.

On November 1, Miss Howard reported the Vallejo call to me and I repeated it to Chase on November 4.

On November 5, I met with Bundy and Chase at the White House and informed them of the foregoing. The next day, Chase called and asked me to put it in writing.

### **375. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, November 12, 1963, 10:30 a.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July-30 November 1963. Secret. Drafted by McCone. A draft copy was sent to Helms.

#### **SUBJECT**

Meeting on Policy Relating to Cuba--10:30 a.m.--12 Nov 63

#### **IN ATTENDANCE**

The President, Secty. McNamara, Secty. Rusk, Secty. Gilpatric, Attorney General, Secty. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Bundy, Secty. Johnson, Mr. McCone, Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Shackley

McCone opened the meeting with a brief resume of conditions in Cuba along these lines:

1. Cuba still belongs to Castro though his grip is weakening.
2. The military remain essentially loyal to Castro with some evidences of dissension and dissidents which are being exploited by CIA.
3. The internal security forces and apparatus are effective and show evidence of increasing efficiency.
4. The economy is bad and is deteriorating, causing increasing hardships to the civilian population. This is due to economic sanctions and Flora.
5. The Soviets are continuing a gradual withdrawal. No organized Soviet units appear in Cuba although they apparently provide principal manning for the SAMs. There are recent evidences of considerable rotation with between 1,000 and 2,000 new arrivals, but in balance there is a decrease.
6. Training of Cubans continues on all Soviet equipment including the SAMs. It is not clear whether the SAMs will be turned over to full Cuban control; however it is clear the Cubans will supply the majority of the operating personnel.
7. The only equipment which has been withdrawn has been the advanced C-band radar for the SAMs and certain communication equipment. No military equipment has been withdrawn. There have been some recent new arrivals of military equipment, particularly between 25 and 50 tanks.

McCone then stated that the program which had been followed for the last several months, having been approved about the first of June, was integrated and interdependent one part on the other and therefore should be considered as a comprehensive program and not a number of independent actions.

FitzGerald then made a presentation./1/

/1/FitzGerald's presentation was on the six-point integrated program against Cuba that included covert collection of intelligence, propaganda actions to stimulate low-level sabotage and passive resistance, economic denial actions, exploitation of disaffection with the Cuban military and power centers, general sabotage and harassment,

and support of autonomous anti-Castro groups. FitzGerald's presentation is described in detail in a memorandum for the record of this meeting by Bruce B. Cheever, November 14. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

With respect to sabotage, McCone stated that no one event will particularly affect the economy. However a continuous program will have its effects on the economy and it will encourage internal sabotage by dissident people within Cuba. There have been 109 events since April which were probably internally-inspired sabotage.

The President then raised the question of the sabotage program; whether it was worthwhile and whether it would accomplish our purpose.

Secretary Rusk then spoke at considerable length, the thrust of his remarks being opposed to sabotage. He stated we should concentrate on obtaining information as to what Castro is doing with respect to other countries, particularly sending arms to Latin American countries. Rusk said we must replace Castro; we must accomplish a reduction in Soviet troops, however sabotage might result in an increase in troops. Rusk had no problem with infiltration of black teams; furthermore internal sabotage gave him no problem and the more of this, the better. In addition he strongly supported our economic efforts. However he opposed the hit-and-run sabotage tactics as being unproductive, complicating our relationships with the Soviets and also with our friends and indicated a connection between our sabotage activities and the autobahn problem.

McCone observed that infiltration was difficult, internal sabotage was extremely difficult to stimulate but that external hit-and-run sabotage had the effect of automatically stimulating internal sabotage.

McNamara could see no connection between the Cuban operations and the Berlin autobahn incidents. He saw many advantages to going ahead which he advocated but ordered a careful watch.

The President asked questions concerning the immediate operations, and the next one on the schedule was approved.

FitzGerald explained the independent operations of the Artime group. McCone emphasized that to a very considerable extent these are uncontrollable and forecast that once Artime was in business, we might expect some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking.



**FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES**  
**1961-1963**  
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**Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington

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## **Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath**

### **376. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, November 12, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Special Group Meeting No. 105, December 6, 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. For McCone's account of this meeting, see Document 375.

#### **SUBJECT**

Cuban Operations

A meeting was held this morning with higher authority on the above subject. Present were: Mr. Rusk, Mr. McNamara, Mr. Robert Kennedy, Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Cheever, and Mr. Shackley.

Mr. McCone gave a brief summary of recent developments inside Cuba. He stated that the military is generally loyal to Castro. There have been some disorders but not very extensive. Castro's internal security forces appear to be well organized. He has developed a system of informers which is becoming increasingly effective. The economic situation is deteriorating largely because of the enforcement of economic sanctions, and Hurricane "Flora" although its damage was not as great as originally thought. The Soviets appear to be continuing the gradual withdrawal of personnel from Cuba although recently 1,000-2,000 troops have come in. There now seems to be a kind of "Soviet MAAG" program concerned mainly with training Cubans in all types of military activity including the handling of missiles. There has been some removal of the more sophisticated types of electronic equipment. Some new tanks have arrived in Cuba, estimates run from 25 to 50.

Mr. FitzGerald reported on Cuban operations under six main headings: (a) Covert Collection, (b) Propaganda, (c) Economic Denial, (d) Disaffections in the Military, (e) Sabotage and Harassment, and (f) Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups.

(a) Covert Collection. Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that inside Cuba CIA has three kinds of agent activities: (1) "singleton," (2) collection nets, and (3) agents involved in "black net" operations. While there is encouraging improvement in the geographical spread of these agents, there is still, understandably, a fairly heavy concentration of agents in the Havana area.

A question was raised as to how many agents in all of these activities have been lost. Mr. FitzGerald said that in the neighborhood of 25 had been either captured or killed in the past year. The reasons for these casualty figures are the increasing effectiveness of Castro's internal security forces and discovery brought about when agents try to obtain food. No matter how good the documentation, an outsider in a community is viewed with suspicion.

(b) Propaganda. The activities of CIA in this field are the mailing of leaflets and radio broadcasts. Some 30-40,000 leaflets per month have been mailed and during a day there are 32 hours of programs emanating from seven different stations. It is believed that there is a very excellent listening public. The programs appeal to people in a wide variety of jobs and professions. There is some jamming but it is spasmodic and generally confined to Havana.

(c) Economic Denial. Mr. FitzGerald reported that the U.S. economic denial program is contributing to Cuba's declining economy. Mention was made that the economic denial program would be more effective if the Canadians were willing to cooperate. Up to now they have not gone along with U.S. efforts, and they are supplying many items essential to Cuban economy. The UK and Spain are continuing to deal in certain types of goods required by the Cubans. Commodities going into Cuba in 1962 from the free world reached \$101 million. While this represents less than in 1961 the amount is still too high.

(d) Disaffections in the Military. While the military is loyal to Castro as has been noted there are indications that some leaders would like to break with the regime but lack courage and opportunity. Mr. FitzGerald commended a CIA-DIA task force which prepared a report covering some 150 Cuban military leaders. Out of this figure there are some 45 which look interesting from CIA's operational viewpoint. Mr. FitzGerald reported that CIA is in touch with three persons who are in the military or who have highly placed contacts in such circles. The aim is to use these three individuals to establish contact with military personnel inside Cuba. The principal aim is to get military leaders who have become disenchanted with the Castro regime to dare to talk and plot Castro's downfall with each other.

(e) Sabotage and Harassment. Mr. FitzGerald mentioned four successful sabotage operations against a power plant, oil storage facilities, a sawmill, and an underwater demolition operation against a floating crane in one of Cuba's harbors. It is believed that the publication of these successful sabotage activities in the Cuban press has tended to raise appreciably the morale of the people. Also, such sabotage continues to keep pressure on the Castro regime and adds to the growing economic problems facing the country.

(f) Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups. The question was asked from where would the autonomous groups operate. Mr. FitzGerald replied that they would operate from outside U.S. territory. He mentioned two bases of the Artime group, one in Costa Rica and the other in Nicaragua. Also it was hoped that the autonomous group under Manolo Ray would soon get itself established in a working base, possibly Costa Rica. Mr. FitzGerald said that much could be accomplished by these autonomous groups once they become operational.

A question was asked as to what decisions remain to be made. Mr. FitzGerald replied that we were looking for a reaffirmation of the program as presented, including sabotage and harassment. When asked what was planned in sabotage for the immediate future, he said that destruction operations should be carried out against a large oil refinery and storage facilities, a large electric plant, sugar refineries, railroad bridges, harbor facilities, and underwater demolition of docks and ships. The question was also raised as to whether an air strike would be effective on some of these principal targets. The consensus was that CIA should proceed with its planning for this type of activity looking toward January.

The State Department raised questions with respect to sabotage activities in Cuba. The thought was advanced that there may be a relationship between such hit and run attacks on Cuba and the delay of American convoys en route to Berlin. A further question was posed as to the over-all importance to the United States of sabotage operations, especially since it is so difficult to keep them from being directly attributable to the U.S. It was thought that the hit and run type effort might in fact invoke loss of support inside Cuba and may even result in bringing more Soviet troops back into Cuba. Somehow the U.S. must pin responsibility for these activities on Castro. The U.S. in fact must be ready to retaliate when it can be fairly well established that Castro is attempting with arms, money and men to foment Communist uprisings in any Latin American country.

The consensus was that since CIA's sabotage operation is in the main low cost and since it does worry the Castro regime, denies him some essential commodities, stimulates some sabotage inside Cuba and tends to improve the morale of the Cubans who would like to see Castro removed, CIA should proceed with those operations planned for the coming week end (November 15 though 17).

The view was expressed that CIA, in connection with the Department of Defense, should concentrate on attempting to catch Castro red-handed delivering arms to Communist groups in Latin American countries. It was determined that during the next 90 days from this date an attempt would be made by means of air patrols and surface ships to identify ships carrying arms for Castro to Latin American countries. It was hoped that a ship with Cuban arms could be picked up. Conversations are to be initiated by the Secretary of the Navy with CIA to map out a three-month operation against Cuban shipping. It was also determined that the Colombian and Venezuelan governments should be asked to join with the U.S. in developing a joint patrol designed to identify ships carrying weapons from Cuba destined for revolutionary groups in Latin American countries.

Paul Eckel

### **377. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, November 12, 1963.

//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Secret; Sensitive.

I talked this afternoon with William Attwood and told him that at the President's instruction I was conveying this message orally and not by cable. I told him that the President hoped he would get in touch with Vallejo to report that it did not seem practicable to us at this stage to send an American official to Cuba and that we would prefer to begin with a visit by Vallejo to the U.S. where Attwood would be glad to see him and to listen to any messages he might bring from Castro. In particular, we would be interested in knowing whether there was any prospect of important modification in those parts of Castro's policy which are flatly unacceptable to us: namely, the three points in Ambassador Stevenson's recent speech<sup>/1/</sup> of which the central elements are (1) submission to external Communist influence, and (2) a determined campaign of subversion directed at the rest of the Hemisphere. Reversals of these policies may or may not be sufficient to produce a change in the policy of the United States, but they are certainly necessary, and without an indication of readiness to move in these directions, it is hard for us to see what could be accomplished by a visit to Cuba.

/1/Not further identified.

I left it to Attwood how much of this he would convey in the initial message to Vallejo, and I also gave him discretion as to how this message was to be transmitted, with the proviso that it must be clear at all times that we were not supplicants in this matter and that the initiative for exploratory conversations was coming from the Cubans. Attwood indicated to me that he expected Lisa Howard to telephone Vallejo and then probably to get on the line himself to handle the conversation along the lines stated above. Attwood will report the results of this communication and in the event that an arrangement is made for Vallejo to come to New York Attwood will come to Washington to concert a position for his use in this conversation.

McG. B./2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

### **378. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, November 25, 1963.

//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 6/63-4/65.  
Top Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

Cuba--Item of Presidential Interest

1. I assume you will want to brief the President/1/ on Bill Attwood's Cuban exercise which is presumably still in train (see attached)./2/

/1/President Johnson. President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, on November 22.

/2/Reference is to a November 19 memorandum from Chase to Bundy, reporting that Attwood had talked with Castro's confidant, Dr. Vallejo, who invited him to Cuba and promised that the visit "would be very secure." Attwood replied that he could not come at this time and preliminary talks in New York were essential. Vallejo could not come to New York, but Cuban U.N. delegate Carlos Lechuga would discuss an agenda for the talks with Attwood in New York. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 6/63-4/65)

2. My own thinking on this one, vis-a-vis the events of November 22, is still very fluid; but here it is. Basically, the events of November 22 would appear to make accommodation with Castro an even more doubtful issue than it was. While I think that President Kennedy could have accommodated with Castro and gotten away with it with a minimum of domestic heat, I'm not sure about President Johnson. For one thing, a new President who has no background of being successfully nasty to Castro and the Communists (e.g. President Kennedy in October, 1962) would probably run a greater risk of being accused, by the American people, of "going soft". In addition, the fact that Lee Oswald has been heralded as a pro-Castro type may make rapprochement with Cuba more difficult--although it is hard to say how much more difficult.

3. If one concludes that the prospects for accommodation with Castro are much dimmer than they were before November 22, then Bill Attwood's present effort loses much of its meaning. We would appear to have three alternative courses of action in handling the present status of the Attwood-Lechuga tie-line.

(a) We can tell Attwood that if Lechuga calls, Attwood should tell Lechuga that in view of recent events, he is not now prepared to talk about an agenda with Lechuga.

(b) We can tell Attwood that if Lechuga does not call over the next couple weeks (the Cubans may feel that November 22 has stopped all bets), he should take the initiative and get a message across to the Cubans, that despite recent events, we are still prepared to hear what is on Castro's mind.

(c) We can tell Attwood that if Lechuga calls about setting up an appointment between Attwood and Lechuga, that Attwood should schedule such a meeting for a few days later and call us immediately. However, if Lechuga does not call him, Attwood should take no initiative until and if he hears from us.

4. I choose 3(c) above. While November 22 events probably make accommodation an even tougher issue for President Johnson than it was for President Kennedy, a preliminary Attwood-Lechuga talk still seems worthwhile from our point of view--if the Cubans initiate it. We have little or nothing to lose and there will be some benefits; at a minimum, we should get a valuable reading as to what Castro regards as negotiable (e.g. the Soviet tie-line?) and a hint as to how he views the effect of November 22 on Cuban/U.S. relations. At the same time, if the Cubans, who have the ball, feel that all bets are off, we should take no initiative until we have thought the problem through carefully.

If we decide that course 3(c) is the right one, the sooner we call Attwood, the better. In view of his and Stevenson's activist tendencies in this matter, it seems conceivable to me that, not hearing from Lechuga in the near future, they will approach him and assure him that we feel the same way and that we are still prepared to hear what Castro has on his mind.

GC

**379. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, November 25, 1963.

//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65.  
Top Secret; Eyes Only.

**SUBJECT**

Cuba--Bill Attwood

1. Attached is an unsolicited chronology from Bill Attwood which describes the activities of the Cuba-Attwood tie-line from November 11 to the present. Apparently, the memo was dispatched on November 22, but because of the recent events, did not reach us until today.

2. I do not think that Bill's chronology changes the sense of the memo which I sent to you earlier today./1/ It does bring up a couple other points however.

/1/Document 378.

(a) Assuming we decide to let the Lechuga-Attwood tie-line continue its present limited course, shouldn't we tell Bill to gently ease Lisa Howard out of the picture? (November 22 offers him a good excuse--"We are naturally re-studying the situation in light of recent events.") Her inclusion at every step so far (see attached), frankly, makes me nervous.

(b) In view of the fact that you once mentioned to me that you wanted the written tracks of this operation kept to a minimum, do you want me to tell Bill that he needn't send us any more chronologies? Or did you mean that you wanted no written tracks between Bill and the Cubans? (I personally feel that the chronologies are valuable; they give us a more accurate picture of what is going on in New York than oral briefings and permit us to exercise a closer control.)

GC

**Attachment/2/**

/2/Secret.

**Memorandum From William Attwood to Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff**

New York, November 22, 1963.

Following is an addition to my memorandum to you dated November 8, 1963:/3/

On November 11, Vallejo called Miss Howard again to reiterate their appreciation of the need for security and to say that Castro would go along with any arrangements we might want to make. He specifically suggested that a Cuban plane could come to Key West and pick up the emissary; alternatively they would agree to have him come in a U.S. plane which could land at one of several "secret airfields" near Havana. He emphasized that only Castro and himself would be present at the talks and that no one else--he specifically mentioned Guevara--would be involved. Vallejo also reiterated Castro's desire for this talk and hoped to hear our answer soon.

On November 12, Bundy called me and I reported Vallejo's message. He said this did not affect the White House decision that a preliminary talk with Vallejo at the United Nations should be held in order to find out what Castro wanted to talk about--particularly if he was seriously interested in discussing the points cited in Stevenson's October 7 speech. Bundy suggested I transmit our decision to Vallejo, stressing the fact that, since we are responding to their invitation and are not soliciting a meeting, we would like to know more about what is on Castro's mind before committing ourselves to further talks in Cuba.

On November 13, I went to Miss Howard's apartment and called Vallejo at home. There was no answer. She then sent a telegram asking that he call her at his convenience.

On November 14, Vallejo called her. She gave him my message--that we would want to talk to him here at the United Nations before accepting an invitation to go to Cuba. She said that, if he wished to confirm or discuss this further with the U.S. official, he could call him (Vallejo) at home on the evening of November 18. Vallejo said he would be there to receive the call. Meanwhile, he did not exclude the possibility of his coming to the United Nations and said he would discuss it with Castro.

On November 18, Miss Howard reached Vallejo at home and passed the phone to me. I told him Miss Howard had kept me informed of her talks with him and that I assumed he knew of our interest in hearing what Castro had in mind. Vallejo said he did, and reiterated the invitation to Cuba, stressing the fact that security could be guaranteed. I replied that we felt a preliminary meeting was essential to make sure there was something useful to talk about, and asked if he was able to come to New York. Vallejo said he could not come "at this time". However, if that's how we felt, he said that "we" would send instructions to Lechuga to propose and discuss with me "an agenda" for a later meeting with Castro. I said I would await Lechuga's call. Vallejo's manner was extremely cordial and he called me "Sir" throughout the conversation.

On November 19, I called Chase, and reported the conversation.

### **380. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, November 26, 1963, 11:35 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Akalovsky. Approved by the White House on December 2 and by Thompson on November 27.

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

US

The President

Under Secretary Harriman

Ambassador Thompson

Mr. Tyler-EUR

Mr. Bundy--The White House

Mr. Akalovsky--ACDA/IR

USSR

Mr. Mikoyan

Ambassador Dobrynin

Mr. Smirnovski, Chief of the American Section, Foreign Ministry

Mr. Sukhodrev

SUBJECT

Call by Mr. Mikoyan on the President

[Here follows discussion of other subjects; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, volume V.]

The President then noted that the United States was not planning to invade Cuba, but that the Cuban problem was a very serious one with our people. He hoped that as days came and went we would be able to find a solution there which would make it possible to lead our peoples further towards peace and understanding. Actions already taken had gone part of the way and some lessening of tension had taken place. We had a number of problems at home which were quite troublesome, and if there was any indication at any time that we could in some way bring about better understanding and better relations we would go our part of the way. We were dedicated to our system and intended to preserve it, but this did not mean that we wanted it to dominate or enslave any other people.

Mr. Mikoyan said he was happy to hear these words uttered by the new President of the United States. The President's desire to live in peace and friendship with the USSR and with other nations was in full accord with the views of the Soviet Union.

The President stated that there would be no change in the Kennedy policy. We were very happy that Congress had shown evidences of approving negotiations and exchanges of views between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev. This had offered us real encouragement not only in their attitude but also in our people's attitude. Our constant purpose, each day, would be to seek to travel the road of peace and to find solutions to many problems that engaged the two sides and to many differences existing between them.

The President continued that as an immediate comment he wished to say that the problem which was the biggest with our people was the result of the Castro-promoted subversion. This inevitably and invariably gave us strained relations. He hoped, however, that in future both sides would find that they had moved further to peace and had made gains greater than even those made by his predecessor and Mr. Khrushchev.

Mr. Mikoyan said he was very much gratified to hear this. However, there was only one point he wished to comment on, namely, the President's remark concerning Cuban subversive activities. He said he could not understand how a small nation like Cuba could subvert anyone, let alone a big power. On the contrary, the whole world could see how small Cuba was being subverted by a number of various, well-financed organizations. The Soviet Union believed that all subversive activities should be ended everywhere. He asserted that he knew Cuba

did not want to subvert anyone. In his conversation with Castro, the latter had told him that he wanted good relations with the United States. In his statement on the occasion of the tragedy falling upon the United States, Castro had shown himself as a great humanitarian as he had voiced deep regret about President Kennedy's death. Therefore, Mr. Mikoyan continued, he wished to ask the President not to accept the allegations which were sometimes mentioned in the press. He wanted the President to believe him that good relations with Cuba were in the interest of the United States.

The President responded that his intention had been simply to give an evaluation of the feelings of our people and of what gave them problems. He said he had spoken sincerely and earnestly about US intentions with respect to Cuba. We had no plans for invasion, and we believed that there was no justification for Cuba to invade others by subversion or otherwise. The President reiterated that what he was seeking now was merely to give Mr. Mikoyan an evaluation and expressed the hope that better understanding could flow from this.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

### **381. Editorial Note**

On November 28, 1963, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone met with President Lyndon Johnson at Johnson's residence for approximately 30 minutes. According to McCone's memorandum for the record, November 29, the discussion on Cuba was as follows:

"The President then turned to Cuba. He asked how effective our policy was and what was the future of Cuba. He asked how effective the economic denial program was and how we planned to dispose of Castro. He said he did not wish any repetition of any fiasco of 1961, but he felt that the Cuban situation was one that we could not live with and we had to evolve more aggressive policies. He looks to us for firm recommendations. In this connection we should prepare a briefing and also we should study carefully various courses of action." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 23 November-31 December 1963)

On November 30 McCone again met with President Johnson with McGeorge Bundy also present. The meeting lasted for approximately 1-1/2 hours and according to McCone's memorandum for the record, December 2, the discussion on Cuba was as follows:

"The President again raised the question of what we were going to do in Cuba. Bundy advised that a policy meeting was scheduled for Monday, time not set, to discuss Cuban policy. I pointed out to the President the statements of President Kennedy on September 5th, September 13th, and November 20th, 1962 and then I showed the evidence that proved absolutely that arms had been imported into Venezuela from Cuba. I stated that most positive efforts should be made immediately to secure complete OAS agreement on a course of action which would involve a series of steps ranging from economic denial through blockade and even to possible invasion, but that it must be OAS action, otherwise it would involve confrontation with Khrushchev. I stated that if the action was a Hemispheric action I didn't see that the USSR could do much about it. The President agreed but decided to await the policy meeting on Monday."

Later on in the memorandum, McCone noted that he reviewed the Cuban overflight program and advised the President of the USIB criteria and the extent to which the flights were being carried on. (Ibid.)

The reference by McGeorge Bundy to the meeting of Monday, was to a meeting with the President on December 2; see Document 383. The statements by President Kennedy of September 4 (not 5), September 13, and November 20, 1963, all dealt in part with the danger of Cuban subversion to the Western hemisphere and the United States intention to prevent it. For texts, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pages 369-370, 373-375, and 461-463.

**382. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, December 2, 1963.

//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65.  
Top Secret; Eyes Only; Sensitive.

**SUBJECT**

Bill Attwood Activities

1. Last week, (after President Kennedy's death) Lechuga told Lisa Howard that he had received a letter from Castro authorizing him to have a discussion with Attwood. Lechuga wondered whether things were still the same. Miss Howard said she didn't know anything. She later passed the information to Attwood.
2. Bill ran into Lechuga today at lunch, by accident. After Lechuga expressed condolences, Bill mentioned that Miss Howard had told him that Lechuga had received the above mentioned letter. Lechuga confirmed that he had been authorized to have a preliminary discussion with Bill (he did not mention from whom the letter had come although he had previously told Miss Howard that the talks were authorized by Castro). Lechuga wondered how things now stood. Bill told Lechuga he would let him know. They also agreed, that from this point on, there was no further need to use Lisa Howard as an intermediary.
3. Bill doesn't know whether Castro wrote the letter before or after the death of President Kennedy. In any event, Lechuga has apparently received no stop-order since the assassination. One might assume, therefore, that the assassination has not changed Castro's mind about talking to the U.S.
4. The ball is in our court; Bill owes Lechuga a call. What to do? Bill thinks that we have nothing to lose in listening to what Castro has to say; there is no commitment on our side. Also, it would be very interesting to know what is in the letter.

I am also dying to know what's in the letter and two weeks ago I would not have hesitated. But things are different now, particularly with this Oswald business. At a minimum, such a talk would really have to be a non-event. I, for one, would want to think this one over carefully.

GC

**383. Editorial Note**

At 6 p.m. on December 2, 1963, Secretary of State Rusk met with President Johnson to discuss Cuba. Also attending were Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Director of Central Intelligence McCone, Director of the United States Information Agency Donald Wilson, and Special Assistant to the President McGeorge Bundy. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Martin, who apparently also attended the meeting, prepared a paper setting forth talking points for Secretary Rusk, December 2. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 501, Cuba) See the Supplement.

According to a memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, Bundy asked Chase to produce a "Cuban monograph" for the meeting. Chase produced a paper that he described as "an effort which attempts to give a broad sense of the main threads and problems of our policy towards Cuba, with an indication as to where we appear to be heading." Chase admitted to Bundy, "I do not yet have a real feel as to how much the President knows about Cuba," and he was not sure his paper would meet Bundy's needs, but he suggested Bundy was free to do with it what he thought best. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Meetings,

12/63-3/65) Chase's paper has not been found. Chase was slated to be the notetaker at the meeting, but in light of President Johnson's inclination to "abhor a crowd," Chase volunteered to drop out. (Memorandum from Chase to Bundy, December 2; *ibid.*) If Chase did not attend, there may have been no notetaker and thus no record of the meeting.

**384. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, December 3, 1963.

//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65.  
Top Secret; Eyes Only; Sensitive.

**SUBJECT**

Bill Attwood's Activities

I refer to our conversation this morning about the next step in the Bill Attwood story. In the event we are going to move soon on this one (after your assurances re Oswald, I, for one, am in favor), for a starter, here are some rough guidelines which you may want to consider.

1. Bill Attwood should call Lechuga and make an appointment to see him. At the meeting he should say the following:

(a) The new Administration has not yet had an opportunity to examine the Cuban question in detail.

(b) However, in deference to the late President's judgment that it is worthwhile to hear what is on Castro's mind, and in view of the fact that what Castro says may have a bearing on the new Administration's eventual assessment of the Cuban situation, I am authorized to hear you out.

(c) (After hearing Lechuga's story.) You can rest assured that the information will be passed on to the proper people. If we are interested in further talks, I will let you know.

2. We should emphasize to Bill that the meeting must be held with complete discretion; should news of the meeting leak out, Bill should be in a position to issue a foolproof denial. In this regard, we are glad that Lisa Howard is now out of the picture. She should be given no intimation that further U.S./Cuban contact is taking place.

3. One main problem is that, in his meeting with Lechuga, Bill may tend to convey a spirit of accommodation, which, when reported, could relieve Castro of an increased anxiety which the assassination of President Kennedy seems to have produced and which is in our interest to maintain. Therefore, we should stress to Bill that he must convey the sense of an interested but non-committal listener, completely confident of his position. Expressed in words, the mood should be roughly as follows:

"Fidel, we are content to let events continue on their present course. We intend to maintain, and whenever possible, to increase our pressure against you until you fall; we are pretty certain that we will be successful. Moreover, you can forget about getting 'another Cuba' in the Hemisphere. We have learned our lesson and 'another Cuba' is simply not going to happen. However, we are reasonable men. We are not intent on having your head per se; neither do we relish the suffering of the Cuban people. You know our central concerns--the Soviet connection and the subversion. If you feel you are in a position to allay these concerns, we can probably work out a way to live amicably together and to build a prosperous Cuba. If you don't feel you can meet our concerns, then just forget the whole thing; we are quite content to continue on our present basis."

4. I agree that it is questionable whether Bill Attwood is the man to convey the message. On the other hand, an Ed Martin type who, in his bones, probably does not believe in the possibility of accommodation would not lend the right flavor to the meeting either. There must be a delicate balance. Given the choice between the two types, I would pick the believer, Bill, and arm him with a good, stiff brainwashing and education in Cuban affairs before he meets with Lechuga. Frankly, if really given my choice, I would pick you for the job. Is there any way you could do it and not be conspicuous (e.g. outside New York or Washington)?

GC

**385. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)**

Washington, December 4, 1963.

//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63-3/65. Top Secret.

**SUBJECT**

Cuba Meeting (Without President) Next Tuesday, December 10, 1963

1. I spoke to John Crimmins at some length about preparations for the meeting next week regarding new courses of action we can take, short of invasion, to make life difficult for Castro. He plans to produce the following type of document for the meeting.

(a) The paper will include State's recommendation on how we plan to proceed in the OAS as a result of the Cuban arms cache issue./1/ For example, should we push for a break in diplomatic relations among the "soft 5", a break in economic relations between Latin America and Cuba, a break in communications between the OAS countries and Cuba?

/1/There were actually two papers, one, entitled "OAS Action Against Cuba" and undated, is ibid. Regarding the second paper, see footnote 2 below.

(b) The paper will then describe a number of possible bilateral and unilateral actions which we can take (e.g. unleashing of the exiles, low level flights, military feints (at a level which will make the Cubans, but not the Soviets, jumpy), intensification of covert program). There will be a brief discussion giving the advantages and disadvantages of each of these courses of action, along with State's recommendation in favor or against./2/

/2/The second paper, entitled "Possible Further Unilateral and Bilateral Actions to Increase Pressure on Cuba (Short of Use of Force)," undated, was submitted to the Standing Group on December 12. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63-3/65) See the Supplement.

(c) John will get the paper distributed by Saturday/3/ afternoon so that the agencies will have time to consider State's recommendations before the Tuesday meeting./4/

/3/Saturday, December 7. According to a December 9 memorandum from Chase to Bundy the second paper on unilateral and bilateral action was withdrawn from consideration by the Standing Group by Secretary Rusk for further consideration in State. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63-3/65)

/4/The Standing Group met on Tuesday, December 10, to discuss "OAS Action Against Cuba," see footnote 1 above. The Group placed emphasis on measures designed to harass Cuba and restrict arms shipments to Latin

America. (Memorandum from Califano to Gilpatric, December 18; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 131, Misc. 63-65) See *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, vol. XII, p. 355.

2. John plans to meet with Alexis Johnson and the Secretary this evening. Among other things he hopes to clear the above menu.

3. Bromley feels that we should try to maintain this meeting as a Standing Group meeting (among other things, this will allow us to invite the AG). Attendance at the meeting would be roughly as follows: Ed Martin, somebody from the 7th floor of State, John McCone, Dez FitzGerald or Dick Helms, Roswell Gilpatric, another person from Defense, Don Wilson, and the AG. Do you have any problems with such a list? How about Douglas Dillon, Maxwell Taylor, Ted Sorensen?

GC

### **386. Editorial Note**

On December 13, 1963, the Standing Group of the National Security Council met to discuss Cuba. Two papers were on the agenda. The first was a Department of State draft entitled, "Possible Further Unilateral and Bilateral Actions to Increase Pressure on Cuba," see footnote 2, Document 385. The second was a December 12 Central Intelligence Agency memorandum entitled "Cuba--A Status Report." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63-3/65) See the Supplement. These two papers were only briefly discussed as the participants were more concerned with the unsatisfactory results of a November 14-18 surveillance and intercept operation against suspected arms smuggling into Colombia. The Standing Group did approve certain actions recommended in the two papers. The Group gave authorization to CIA to develop the capacity to conduct air attacks against selective Cuban targets by autonomous exile groups. Assets were to be in place within 90 days, but this did not constitute authority to conduct the raids. A general consensus favored endorsement of intensification of the current program of exile raids on Cuba. Intensified Department of State action against Free World shipping to Cuba was also approved. Since the Standing Group was not able to consider all the actions recommended in the two papers, further decisions were delayed until a December 19 meeting with President Johnson. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 131, Misc. 63-65) Regarding the meeting with the President, see Document 388.

### **387. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, undated.

//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Top Secret. Prepared by Smith. A copy was sent to Chase.

The President reacted to the attached memorandum of December 9 from Mr. Attwood by asking Mr. Moyers what instructions had been given to Attwood. Where he got the memo I do not know.

I reviewed for Mr. Moyers the actions taken since December 9 and reported that consideration of using Attwood in negotiations with representatives of Castro had been under review almost weekly. Timing of a contact had not been considered right.

I recommended that, in the light of the recently announced USSR-Cuba trade agreement and the renewed Russian pledge to aid Cuba by all means if an invasion should be launched,<sup>1/</sup> any contact between Attwood and Castro representatives should be avoided lest we convey to the Cubans we were reacting defensively to the latest Russian actions. I said that a no-contact-now policy reflected the current situation and did not forestall use of Attwood at a later date if a decision was made to do so.<sup>2/</sup>

/1/Announced in Khrushchev's December 13 speech before the the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in which he declared that "revolutionary Cuba will not remain defenseless if the aggressive militaristic circles of the U.S.A. attack it." For text, see *The Current Digest of Soviet Press*, vol. XV, No. 49, January 1, 1964, pp. 3-13. The trade agreement for long-term purchases by the Soviet Union of Cuban sugar was signed by Castro and Khrushchev on January 21, 1964, but apparently was announced earlier.

/2/On December 11 Chase sent Bundy a memorandum on Attwood's activities. Attwood told Chase there was no pressure to reply as "Lechuga, and the Cubans in general, probably feel that the situation has changed since President Kennedy's assassination. Deep down, they probably don't expect anything hopeful from us." Attwood told Chase that Lechuga "seemed somewhat reluctant to bring up the subject of a letter he had received from Cuba." If the contact was to continue, Attwood wanted to call Lechuga within a couple of weeks, otherwise the matter "would lose momentum and wither on the vine." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65)

BKS

**Attachment/3/**

/3/Secret.

**Memorandum From William Attwood to the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson)**

New York, December 9, 1963.

SUBJECT

Latest Cuban Developments for your talk with the President

As you know, President Kennedy in September authorized me to establish a discreet contact with the Cuban UN representative to verify reports that Castro--if not his Communist advisers--was prepared to go quite far in meeting our terms for normalizing relations.

McGeorge Bundy has the chronological account of what this initial contact led to during October and November. At all times I was in contact with the White House. We never indicated to the Cubans that we wanted to make a deal but only that we were prepared to listen.

Finally, on October 31, Castro invited me to meet him in Cuba and guaranteed both discretion and security. We replied that we would prefer preliminary discussions here at the United Nations to make sure there was something worth talking about.

On November 18, Castro's right-hand man, Rene Vallejo, informed me by telephone that instructions were being sent to the Cuban Representative, Dr. Lechuga, to discuss an agenda with me.

On December 2, Lechuga told me he had received a letter from Castro authorizing him to talk with me about certain problems "in a general way". Lechuga said that in view of the President's death he did not know whether we still wished to have such a talk. I told him I would let him know. I then reported this to Gordon Chase in Bundy's office and am now waiting for further instructions.

Personally, I feel that we have nothing to lose by finding out what is on Castro's mind and what he wants to talk about.

### 388. Memorandum of Meeting With President Johnson

Washington, December 19, 1963, 10:55 a.m.

//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63-3/65. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Chase on December 27.

#### SUBJECT

Cuba

#### OTHERS PRESENT

Acting Secretary Ball; Ambassador Thompson; Deputy Under Secretary Johnson; Assistant Secretary Martin; John Crimmins; Acting Secretary Gilpatric; Secretary Vance; General Wheeler; Secretary Dillon; Acting Director General Carter; Richard Helms; Desmond FitzGerald; Deputy Director Wilson; McGeorge Bundy; William Moyers; George Reedy; Gordon Chase

The primary purpose of the meeting was to brief the President in depth about some of the basic Cuban issues. Essentially, the discussion described where we have been since January, 1963, where we are now, and where we can go. (An outline which was prepared for the discussion is attached.)/1/

/1/Chase is apparently referring to a long draft memorandum for the President, prepared by McGeorge Bundy on December 15. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

1. A large part of the meeting was devoted to a briefing by Mr. FitzGerald and a general discussion on CIA's present covert program and on the U.S. Government's economic denial program. Essentially, this part of the discussion covered 6 areas.

(a) Mr. FitzGerald described covert intelligence activities directed against Castro's regime, including the numbers, characteristics, and geographic spread of CIA assets within Cuba.

(b) Mr. FitzGerald described CIA-controlled radio programs and other propaganda media directed at Cuba which have been used to encourage low risk, simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance, and to stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. He noted the recent increase of spontaneous anti-regime propaganda inside Cuba.

(c) Mr. FitzGerald said that CIA has worked with State and other agencies to deny to Cuba commodities from the Free World which are critical to the economy. The results have been mixed. For example, while we have been able to penetrate certain European firms which deal with Cuba, we also know that equipment vitally needed in Cuba, some of U.S. origin, reaches the island via Canada and Great Britain.

The group agreed that this is not an easy problem; Mr. Ball said that our allies have always been reluctant to interfere with private traders and have always had a different view of Free World/Bloc trade than we have had. Nevertheless, it was also agreed that we should intensify our efforts and that there are still things we can do. First, Mr. Crimmins noted that we could consider ways in which the new amendment to the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act (prevents assistance to any country whose planes or ships carry commodities to Cuba) can be used to reinforce our economic denial program./2/ Second, Mr. Ball said that the question of Canadian trade in sensitive items would be taken up with the Canadian Minister of Economics and Trade on December 20; later, Mr. Ball will talk to other appropriate Free World governments also. Third, the President directed that the agencies prepare a detailed memorandum (including the names of companies and commodities involved in Free

World trade with Cuba) which, inter alia, will be useful for his forthcoming talks with Prime Ministers Home and Pearson.

/2/Public Law 88-205, passed December 16; 77 Stat. 379.

(d) Mr. FitzGerald spoke about CIA's program to identify, seek out, and establish contact with potentially dissident non-Communist elements in the power centers of the regime with a view to stimulating an internal coup which would dislodge Castro. Our effort is based on the premise that a popular uprising in Cuba is unlikely, primarily because Castro is capable of controlling such an uprising. Instead, we are trying to penetrate the Cuban regime's power structure. In this regard, we have had only limited success. On the one hand, we have been able to make an important penetration in the Cuban army. On the other hand, the dissident elements, while willing to act, are not yet willing to act together. They simply don't trust each other, mainly because Castro has been successful, in the past, in penetrating dissident groups.

The President asked whether there is any significant insurgency within Cuba. Mr. FitzGerald said there is some but that there is no national movement on which we can build. Mr. Bundy noted that the insurgents generally seem to suffer heavy losses at Castro's hands.

(e) Mr. FitzGerald said that CIA has directed four small scale, externally mounted sabotage operations for the purpose of stimulating resistance and hurting Cuba economically. The discussion then focussed on a proposed attack on a major target--the Matanzas power plant. Mr. FitzGerald noted that this would have a significant favorable impact, psychologically as well as economically; the dissidents would view the attack as evidence that the Johnson Administration is not giving up the fight for Cuba.

But there are a number of disadvantages to the power plant attack. First, the chances of total success (e.g. target destroyed, no one caught) are less than 50-50 while the chances of partial success (target destroyed, people caught) are only somewhat better than 50-50. Second, if the raiders get caught, they will undoubtedly admit their CIA connection. (General Carter believed this point was weak--we get blamed for everything that happens in Cuba anyway.) Third, such an attack will be highly visible and will have a high noise-level. In this regard, Mr. Bundy said that we might want to lie low for now so that Castro, presently under a strain because of the arms cache discovery, will not be able to shift the accusing finger in our direction. Fourth, Mr. Ball said that it might slow up the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba. Fifth, Ambassador Thompson said that the timing seemed bad--the Soviets now appeared to be in a situation where they may be thinking of cutting back aid to Cuba. They will draw a lot of conclusions from the first acts of President Johnson. An attack on a big Cuban target could give Castro important leverage in his negotiations for more Soviet aid.

General Wheeler thought that, to improve the chance of success, we might want to try to hit the Matanzas power plant from the air; it should be noted that there have already been some free-lance raids over Cuba. Alexis Johnson pointed out that an air strike might cause retaliation against one of our U-2 flights.

In response to a question, Secretary Vance indicated that he was in favor of an attack on Matanzas.

It was decided that there will be no air or ground attack on the Matanzas power plant at this time, primarily because of its high probability of failure and because of the Soviet dimension. However, it was agreed, in principle, that low-risk sabotage efforts could go forward along with the planning necessary to develop an air strike capability./3/

/3/Both Acting Director of Central Intelligence Marshall Carter and Chief of the Special Affairs Staff Desmond FitzGerald produced memoranda for the record of this meeting. They both indicated that it was President Johnson who made this decision. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 23 November-31 December 1963) See the Supplement.

(f) Mr. FitzGerald described CIA's program in aiding two autonomous Cuban exile groups, which will be operating from outside the U.S. One group, which is headed by Manuel Artime, will start operating out of Costa Rica and Nicaragua in February; the other group is headed by Manolo Ray who is somewhat to the left of Artime, but probably has the best following within Cuba. Both of these groups will conduct externally mounted raids on Cuba, and will send teams inside Cuba to conduct internal sabotage and to establish contact with dissidents. Mr. FitzGerald added that there are some disadvantages in these operations--the groups aren't trained by CIA and they operate outside of CIA control. But there are advantages too--they operate from outside United States territory and we will have relatively little trouble denying U.S. association with these groups.

Mr. Bundy noted, and Mr. FitzGerald agreed, that these groups operate a long distance away from the target; we cannot expect too much effect from their raids.

2. Mr. Bundy gave a very quick briefing on some other aspects of the current Cuban situation. (The group paused to read the attached CIA situation brief.)/4/

/4/Apparent reference to December 18 briefing notes for Acting Director Carter, entitled "The Situation in Cuba." The notes summarized Soviet withdrawals, analyzed remaining Soviet forces in Cuba, assessed the Cuban military as fully capable of deterring internal dissidence and exile raids, and concluded that despite economic problems Castro was very much in control. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuba Meeting--12/19/63) See the Supplement. Also in the Supplement is a related CIA Special Report, OCI No. 0310/63B, December 13, "Fidel Castro's Growing Military Power." (Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba, White Label)

(a) With respect to Soviet/Cuban military strength on the island, Mr. Bundy noted that one of our primary objectives is to ensure that there is no reintroduction of offensive missiles. The camera is our best inspector and, so far as we know, there are no offensive missiles now in Cuba. Mr. Bundy added that we are concerned about the transfer of SAM control to the Cubans in about mid-1964, and we will have to watch this development carefully. As for the Soviet troops, the general consensus of the group was that the big withdrawals are over and that, from here on, the withdrawals will proceed more slowly.

(b) Mr. Bundy noted, in passing, our anti-subversion efforts. The key to the problem is to build up the will and capabilities of the Latin American countries to counter the threat. Our efforts in the field of controlling travel between Latin America and Cuba are also important.

(c) Mr. Bundy described briefly the very tenuous, sensitive, and marginal contacts we have established with Castro himself. The initiative is on Castro's part and we are essentially faced with a decision as to whether or not we are prepared to listen to what Castro has to say./5/ Mr. Ball noted that such U.S./Cuban contacts could have an unsettling effect on Soviet/Cuban relations.

/5/In a December 20 memorandum from Chase to Bundy, Chase reported a conversation with Attwood who stated that Adlai Stevenson had mentioned the U.S.-Cuba contact recently to President Johnson. Chase did not know what the nature of the President's reaction was, but he noted "from the tenor of the President's Thursday meeting [December 19], I would surmise that it was somewhere between lukewarm and cool." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Memos re. Cuba Miscellaneous, 11/63-6/65)

3. Mr. Bundy described several unilateral and bilateral courses of action we can take in the future to make life difficult for Castro.

(a) Air attacks, unleashing of exiles (allowing them to use U.S. territory as a base for attacks on Cuba), and low level flights are aggressive-type acts which have distinct advantages but which are similar in that they all tend to raise the noise-level. Low level flights, for example, would provide us with more intelligence and would irritate and harass Castro. At the same time, they could precipitate the shooting down of a U-2.

(b) Mr. Bundy said that we can take further unilateral shipping measures--e.g. close ports and deny U.S.-financed commodities to lines engaged in Free World shipping to Cuba. He noted, however, that we have found through past experience that bilateral measures are more effective in reducing Free World shipping to Cuba. At the same time, we should not deceive ourselves. We should recognize that the Soviets are capable of handling all Cuba's shipping needs even if we are able to eliminate Free World shipping to Cuba.

(c) Mr. Bundy said that the President could make a public statement in the near future, taking a more vigorous line than we have in the past. He noted that in his November 18 speech,<sup>/6/</sup> President Kennedy made two points about Cuba--the first was designed to encourage anti-Castro elements within Cuba to revolt, and the second was to indicate that we would not permit another Cuba in the Hemisphere.

<sup>/6/</sup>Reference is to an address before the Inter-American Press Association, in Miami on November 18. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 872-877.

(d) Bilaterally there are possibilities of increasing our pressures against Free World trade to Cuba. Spain should be a high priority target.

*Note:* At this point the President left the room and there was a brief discussion about the exiles in Florida. Mr. Crimmins said that resettlement remains our basic policy. It is true that the exiles feel that the pressure for their resettlement is intense. In fact, it is no more intense now than it has been for some time.

5. On the President's return to the room, Mr. Bundy introduced the subject of the discovery in Venezuela of the Cuban arms cache.<sup>/7/</sup>

<sup>/7/</sup>Reference is to the discovery on November 3 by Venezuela of an arms cache on the beach of Paraguana Peninsula, Venezuela. On November 28 Venezuela announced that the arms were of Cuban origin. For documentation on the reaction of the United States and the Organization of American States, see vol. XII, pp. 352-354.

(a) Mr. Helms gave a graphic presentation of the link between the arms cache and a plot to upset the elections in Caracas.

(b) Mr. Martin explained the status of the OAS investigation of the arms cache. The evidence is convincing in showing that the arms were from Cuba. The OAS investigating team is still working on its report. Hopefully, it will be able to tie the arms cache into a general plot to subvert Venezuela. The report should be ready by about January 10.

(c) Mr. Bundy described the types of action we can hope to get in the OAS as a result of the discovery of the arms cache. The most interesting is the surveillance action where we have essentially two basic choices--we may want to push for a system which involves search and seizure of Cuban vessels on the high seas; this implies the possible use of force. Or we can push for a system involving the search and seizure of Cuban vessels in territorial waters; this evades the issue of force. Mr. Bundy added that it is still too early to know how far the Latin Americans will go in support of force against Castro. We have put out feelers.

6. Mr. Bundy brought up the problem of lifting travel restrictions on Americans who wish to go to Cuba. Mr. Ball noted that a great number of students want to go down to Cuba during the Christmas holidays and that Justice Department recommends that we lift our travel restrictions. If we don't, we will probably be obliged to put many of the students in jail when they return; this will be embarrassing. Mr. Ball added that the State Department is tentatively opposed to lifting the travel restrictions because of the effect it will have on Latin American countries. We have been trying to get the Latin Americans to impose restrictions on travel to Cuba; if we lift our own restrictions, our position will be considerably weakened. Mr. Ball said that he would be meeting

with the Attorney General later in the day to talk about the subject.

Tentatively, the President indicated that he favored maintaining the travel restrictions and a policy of selective prosecution./8/

/8/On December 21 the Department of State announced that the prohibition of unauthorized travel to Cuba was "an essential part of this country's foreign policy." Department of State Press Release No. 640; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1964, pp. 10-11.

Gordon Chase/9/

/9/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**389. National Security Action Memorandum No. 274**

Washington, December 20, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 274. Secret. Copies were sent to the Departments of Defense and the Treasury.

TO

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Commerce

The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Cuba--Economic Denial Program

1. At his meeting on Cuba on December 19, 1963,/1/ the President stated his deep concern with the extent of Free World trade with Cuba, and his desire for a detailed memorandum on the subject.

/1/See Document 388.

2. Accordingly, it is requested that State coordinate with Commerce and CIA and prepare a memorandum which includes, but is not necessarily restricted to, the following information.

(a) The extent of the trade between the Free World and Cuba--e.g. the value of the trade and the countries involved.

(b) The commodities involved in Free World trade with Cuba, paying special attention to items which are critical to the Cuban economy.

(c) The names and addresses of the principal firms which are directly or indirectly involved with the shipment of commodities to Cuba.

(d) Steps we have taken with foreign governments and private companies to stop trade with Cuba, including the responses of such governments and companies to our pressures.

(e) Recommendations for further action.

McGeorge Bundy

### **390. Editorial Note**

On December 27, 1963, Director of Central Intelligence McCone met with President Johnson at his ranch in Texas. According to McCone's December 29 memorandum for the record Johnson told McCone that he wanted to "'change the image of the DCI' from a cloak and dagger role to the role of adviser to the President." McCone responded that was very much in line with his thinking and he was prepared to do anything the President desired. McCone and Johnson then discussed specific items, one of which was Cuba. Their discussion on Cuba went as follows:

"I reviewed briefly the most recent summary (the CIA-DIA assessment of 20 December) of the situation in Cuba, advising the President that there had been no additions to the Soviet forces but no appreciable withdrawal. There had been a substantial turnover in recent months and the probability was that a few hundred--and not more than a few hundred--Soviets had departed. This was about the extent of the net reduction. I said that it appeared that the Soviet activities were entirely of a training nature, that the Cuban SAM trainees had been deployed at SAM sites and that there was a possibility that autonomous Cuban control of the SAM sites would present us with a very difficult situation in the immediate future. The President then asked what could be done if the Cubans decided to use the SAMs against our U-2's. I stated that we could not go without continuing aerial surveillance. We had two choices: either use our 'new development,' which I opposed because of its importance for other purposes, or tentatively to actually 'take out' the SAM sites. The President remarked that this would then mean war and I responded that certainly the destruction of the SAM sites would mean war, that the degree of escalation could not be determined in advance. I stated that this was the most ominous situation that confronted us in Cuba in the immediate future. The President made no comment." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 23 November-31 December 1963)

The CIA-DIA summary, December 20, entitled "Status of Soviet Military Personnel in Cuba," is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, May through Dec. 1963. See the Supplement.

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